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Abstract 
 
This thesis comprises of four empirical studies. The first three empirical studies identify and 
investigate the role of different factors explaining the cross sectional and temporal variation 
of foreign equity portfolio holdings for thirty-six developed and developing host countries. 
The fourth empirical study demonstrates the impact of foreign equity flows on global 
financial linkages of four Asian emerging markets. 
 
Our first three empirical studies use foreign equity portfolio holding data on 36 host countries 
and employ different panel data models. Our survey of the literature shows that only few 
studies (two to the best of our knowledge) have modelled the bilateral cross-country foreign 
equity portfolio holdings on a global basis. Further, unlike previous studies, which use cross-
section models, we test all our hypotheses using relatively more efficient random effect and 
more robust fixed effect panel data models. 
 
The first empirical study examines three hypotheses demonstrating the association between 
three different components of transaction costs (commission, fees and market impact) and 
foreign equity portfolio allocation (FEPA). To the best of our knowledge, we are first to 
comprehensively test the role of each of the components individually and collectively in 
modelling FEPA. Addressing several robustness issues, we show significant and robust effect 
of transaction costs with clear evidence that foreign investors tend to underweight countries 
with higher transaction costs.  
 
In our second empirical study we test five hypotheses investigating the role of country 
specific equity market characteristics (CSEMC) in explaining FEPA. We use five different 
variables as proxy of CSEMC, such as stock market development/size, market liquidity, 
emerging market dummy, equity return volatility and exchange rate volatility. We are first to 
use the later two volatility measures in modelling FEPA. Consistent with theory, the results 
show that all the CSEMC factors tend to have strong and statistically significant effect on 
foreign equity portfolio allocation decisions.  
 
Our third empirical study investigates the relationship between investor protection and FEPA. 
The existing findings on the role of investor protection are highly controversial with divided 
views and contrasting conclusions. By including three different measures, we demonstrate 
that investor protection right, particularly the one specific to foreign investments, is also an 
important feature influencing allocation decisions.  
 
Finally, in our fourth empirical study we use daily foreign equity flow data for four Asian 
emerging markets. Application of co-integration and vector error correction (VEC) models 
provide strong indication that the increase in foreign equity flows is driving the global 
financial linkages of the Asian emerging markets. Using different variants of VEC model, our 
investigation also demonstrates that foreign investors in the selected Asian emerging markets 
engage in momentum trading strategy and flows have significant effect on the local equity 
market (price pressure hypothesis).  
 
Overall, our study concludes that stock market development features are the most important 
inputs in the worldwide foreign equity portfolio allocation decision. Furthermore, there is an 
indication that the growing foreign equity portfolio flows are, in part, responsible for the 
increasing global financial linkages of the Asian emerging markets. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction: background and summary of findings 
 
1.1 Foreign equity portfolio investment: A background 
International or foreign equity is defined as investment in equities of corporations located outside 
the domicile of home country
1
. Almost thirty-five years ago, Bruno Solnik published an article 
with the title “Why not diversify internationally rather than domestically” in the Financial 
Analyst Journal (July/August 1974a). Solnik and McLeavey (2009) note that at that time, the 
U.S pension funds had never invested outside the United States. The situation was not much 
different in other countries (except for U.K.) in which there were legal restrictions on foreign 
investments and investments in foreign securities were regarded as exotic. Although European 
banks and private investors, to some extent, have long been foreign investors by cultural heritage 
and necessity (given the small size of the countries), institutional investors‟ guidelines limited or 
proscribed foreign investment. Because institutional investors are regarded as large and 
sophisticated investors, their absence from the foreign investment arena was considered 
significant.  
 
Solnik and Mcleavey (2009) remark that during early 1970s a number of factors, such as poor 
information, lower expertise with regard to global asset allocation and stock selection, restrictive 
regulations, and high transaction costs restricted foreign investments.  However, with gradual 
removal of these restrictions, the benefits of international diversification for improving the risk-
return profile of domestic portfolio have increasingly been recognized (for details see chapter 2). 
Figure 1-1 provides a general trend of the total foreign equity portfolio holdings (assets) on a 
global basis as reported by IMF for the recent period of 2001-2006. The table shows a significant 
growing interest in holdings of foreign equities by global investors. Solnik and Mcleavey (2009) 
note that the increasing interest is driven by the well-known phenomenon called globalization of 
financial markets. They further posit that the global integration of financial markets and its 
associated benefits, such as reduced transaction costs, easier access to information, round-the-
                                                 
1
 The terminology on foreign investment varies across countries. Americans use the word international to refer to 
non-American investments and global to American plus non-American investments. Other English speaking 
nationals prefer to use the word foreign to denote nondomestic investments and international refer to domestic plus 
foreign investments. For the purpose of this thesis foreign, international or/and global are used interchangeably 
throughout the text and refer to nondomestic investment. 
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clock computerized quotation/trading, and development of expertise by major financial 
institutions may have contributed to the growth in foreign equity portfolio investment.  
 
……….Insert Figure 1-1 about here, see page 18………….. 
 
Many studies also document gradual removal of controls on foreign portfolio investments by 
developed countries beginning early 1980s (French and Poterba, 1991) and developing countries 
beginning early 1990s (Bekaert, 1995 and Bekaert and Harvey, 2003). Removal of cross border 
restrictions within European Union countries allowed European-based investment management 
firms to freely market their financial products to other European-member states. Similarly, 
Solnik and McLeavey (2009) further attribute the convergence of international accounting 
standards, bank regulations and standard and ethical principles of investment profiles as the other 
possible drivers for the rapid pace in the growth of foreign portfolio investments.  
 
Furthermore, domestic investors also need not go abroad or use services of foreign 
brokers/market makers to diversify internationally. Solnik and McLeavey (2009) identify several 
ways to accommodate foreign equities in domestic portfolios. Investors may use Global Shares 
or American/Global Depository Receipts. Some large companies enlist their equities on several 
major stock markets around the globe. Multinational companies such as Royal Dutch/Shell and 
BP, are now traded on more than a dozen markets. In United States and also in few other 
countries, trading may also take place in the form of negotiable certificates representing 
ownership of shares of the foreign company, referred as American Depository Receipt (ADR) in 
U.S or Global Depository Receipt in Europe. For example, in case of U.S., under such depository 
receipt arrangement, foreign shares are deposited with a U.S bank, which then issues ADRs in 
the name of foreign company. ADR is an easy and direct means of having exposure to a foreign 
market. Although buying ADR is an alternative for retail investors, it is more costly than direct 
purchase abroad for the large institutional investors. Another disadvantage of ADR is that only a 
limited number of large companies have issued ADRs representing a small proportion of foreign 
market capitalization and therefore they do not tend to offer full international diversification. 
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Similarly, domestic investor can have indirect foreign equity exposures in their portfolios by 
buying country funds (closed and open-end). A closed-end country fund is an investment 
company that buys shares in foreign market and in turn, issues its own share in the domestic 
market. The price is determined by demand and supply of the fund. The numbers of shares traded 
are usually fixed and cannot be redeemed. However, they could be traded on the stock market. 
Although closed end fund allows better diversification to a particular region or country than 
ADRs, it is still an inferior substitute to direct investment in foreign markets, even for most 
emerging markets. In case of an open-end country fund, usually called mutual fund, shares can 
be purchased and redeemed at net asset value (NAV) owned by the fund. Most of these funds 
now take the form of index funds tracking an international index of developed and/or emerging 
markets. Finally, Exchange Traded Fund (ETFs) is also a novel form of index fund that could be 
traded on a stock market like shares of any individual company (see Gastineau, 2001). These 
funds could be traded anytime during market hours and also could be sold short or traded on 
margin. Since they track an index rather than individual company, ETFs have been a major 
success in early 2000s as they provide greater diversification opportunities and have lower cost 
than the traditional mutual funds. Further details on the various means of foreign equity exposure 
are provided by Solnik and Mcleavey (2009). 
 
The above discussion suggests that a number of factors have contributed towards the growth of 
foreign equity investments. Before we discuss the general research question and the associated 
theories and empirical literature, it is worth exploring the intriguing question from the 
perspective of the countries receiving these investments: What are the effects of increased 
foreign equity portfolio investment on domestic capital markets and ultimately on economic 
growth? This ensures that in addition to academic contribution, our study has genuine policy 
implications. 
 
1.2 Benefits and concerns of foreign equity portfolio investments for host countries 
Development of capital markets, particularly equity market, became one of the top priorities in 
last three decades. Errunza (2001) states that the emphasis to develop local equity market, 
particularly in developing countries, was triggered by the failure of the obsolete non-market 
based strategies and realization of the potential role that private initiative and private capital can 
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play in the economic development. The resulting development of local equity markets created 
conducive investment climate for attracting foreign equity portfolio investments (FEPI). 
Consequently, many countries have relaxed capital control restrictions on foreign investments to 
further develop their domestic capital market, attain more efficient risk sharing and resource 
allocation, as well as to mobilize and improve the structure of their external finance. These 
strategies were followed by developed countries during 1960s-1980s and during 1990s by 
developing countries seeking to drive the growth of their economies. Since the debt crisis of 
early 1980s FEPI has become the second biggest source of international investments in 
developing countries (Errunza, 2001). 
 
Errunza notes that although the growth in FEPI has number of beneficial effect, they are also at 
times been blamed for destabilizing markets and triggering occasional crises (1994 Mexican and 
1997 South East Asian crises). The concern has been that FEPI drives regional and global co-
movements and the fickle short run nature of foreign equity flows has significant influence on 
local equity market. This makes the local capital market highly sensitive to flows and a sudden 
reversal in portfolio flows may potentially destabilize capital markets as well as economies.  
 
In light of the debate among policy makers, we briefly assess the literature on the costs and 
benefits of FEPI.  
 
1.3 Role of FPEI in capital market development 
Errunza (2001) suggests that the growth of foreign equity investments promotes globalization of 
domestic capital markets and financial globalization in turn contributes to the development of 
local capital market. This would ultimately have positive impact on the growth of the local 
economy. In the following sections, we discuss a number of interrelated and reinforcing 
influences of FEPI. 
 
1.3.1 Information, institutions and regulation  
Although efficient functioning of capital market is a prerequisite for attracting FEPI, the growing 
presence of foreign portfolio investors demands timely and reliable information, minority 
shareholder protection and adequate market/trading regulations. The pressing demand of foreign 
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investors should necessitate development of new institutions and services encouraging transfer of 
technology and training of local personnel.  
 
1.3.2  Investor confidence and market development 
With active participation of foreign investors, local investors also develop confidence in their 
local market as they perceive that the risk is shared by foreign investors and therefore more 
domestic financial resources could be mobilized. Similarly, with the growth of foreign equity 
investments local capital market becomes more active and efficient and is able to support new 
issues including privatizations. Ngugi et al., (2003) use event study on Kenyan equity market and 
investigate the micro-structural effect before and after the institutional changes, which include 
allowing foreign investors to invest in local market. They demonstrate that free entry of foreign 
investors has positive influence on market micro-structure including temporary rise in liquidity, 
fall in volatility and efficiency gain. Although some studies claim no changes in liquidity and 
efficiency in price discovery process (Chang et al., 1999), majority supports the positive 
influence of allowing foreign investments. Stulz (1999) also finds that foreign investors provide 
the much needed market liquidity and increase in the valuation of local market.  
 
1.3.3 Corporate control  
In many countries, the status for corporate control, particularly in emerging markets, is in its 
infancy stage given the evolving state of markets and group approach to business organisations 
and management (Errunza, 2001). Foreign equity portfolio investors can act as monitor and play 
disciplinary role in the markets by demanding managerial performance, by monitoring managers‟ 
activity, and ultimately by their investment decisions. In summary, foreign investors can infuse 
the concepts and practice of shareholder value and free market culture in the local mindset. 
 
1.3.4 Resource mobilization  
Development of capital market, increased liquidity and supply of equity securities, and provision 
for better information should improve access to international capital markets in terms of floating 
depositary receipts, country funds, global shares and exchange traded funds and should reverse 
capital flight. Errunza (2001) argues that the contribution of FEPIs to market development, their 
impact on capital flight, and potential tapping of foreign savings through foreign listings should 
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all contribute towards increased resource mobilization. The increased participation and 
confidence shown by foreign investors also complements in upgrading the country‟s sovereign 
borrowing capabilities in international market. 
 
1.3.5 FEPI and globalization 
Increase in FEPI leads to financial globalization and the effect of globalization is mainly 
reflected by decline in the cost of capital and projection evaluation. 
 
1.3.5.1 Cost of capital  
Bekaert and Harvey (2003) note that theoretically financial liberalization measures should 
integrate local markets with global capital market and influence the pricing of securities. With 
growing foreign investments, foreign investors‟ purchase should bid up prices of domestic stocks 
and lower expected returns.  As local capital markets integrate globally, they are exposed to 
common global sources of risk and move more in tandem with globally integrated markets. 
There are number of studies (Errunza and Losq, 1985; Henry, 2000 and Bekeart and Harvey, 
2003) which demonstrate that by opening local capital markets to foreign investors, on average, 
the local cost of capital decreases in response to global pricing of domestic securities. 
 
Bekaert and Harvey (2000) measure how liberalization affects the equity generating process in 
20 emerging markets with primary focus on the cost of equity capital. With a number of 
robustness checks across specifications, they demonstrate that dividend yields decline after 
liberalization, but that the effect is always less than 1% on average. Edison and Warnock (2003) 
show that the decrease in dividend yields (cost of capital) is much sharper for those countries that 
experience more complete liberalization and attract greater inward foreign investment. Similarly, 
Henry (2000) also observes similar results using a number of emerging markets. 
 
1.3.5.2 Project evaluation 
Errunza (2001) claims that increased efficiency of an open and globally integrated local capital 
market should assist in better allocation of resources. A more open and developed capital market 
provides better market signals, which in the presence capital control, may be noisy in a thinly 
traded closed market. The positive impact of foreign investments on development of local capital 
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market not only improves allocation efficiency but as Sweeney (1993) notes the evaluation of 
productive projects also becomes more tractable. In a closed market, the cost of capital (discount 
rate) is higher and the number of priced factors (commanding risk premium) are likely to be 
more when compared with an open and globally integrated capital market. As such, in a thinly 
traded closed capital market, it is difficult and costly to identify a project‟s exposure to multiple 
risk factors. This suggests that if there are no comparable protects already in the economy, it will 
be difficult to evaluate the risk and return characteristics of new projects. However, as Errunza 
(2001) documents, in an open economy and integrated capital market, the evaluation process 
becomes relatively easier because domestic investors can substantially benefit from the action of 
foreign investors and their knowledge in terms of identification and estimation of priced factors. 
In summary, liberalization of financial market and subsequent foreign investment should better 
facilitate the assessment of real domestic investments. 
 
1.4 Primary concerns 
Although our preceding discussion suggests the beneficial impact of FEPI, it would be not 
prudent to ignore the worries of FEPI debated in the literature. The primary concerns are related 
to the impact of short term flows on local capital market, particularly for emerging markets 
where it is generally argued that lack of adequate, timely and reliable information along with 
weak institutional frameworks fail to support and manage the flows (Gelos and Wei, 2005). 
 
Many studies examine the role of foreign equity flows using a-theoretical models with some 
reporting evidence of destabilizing effects caused by panic trading of foreign investor (for 
example see Cumby and Glen, 1990; Bekaert and Urias, 1996; Borensztein and Gelos, 1999, and 
Richards, 2005). Krugman (1998) documents that “ in 1996 capital was flowing into emerging 
Asia at the rate of about $100 billion a year; by the second half of 1997 it was flowing out at 
about the same rate.” He also suggests that imposition of capital controls on foreign investments 
could be used to stabilize the markets. Bekaert and Harvey (2003) posit that Malaysia re-
imposed such control on foreign investments in October 1998 with an aim to thwart the 
perceived destabilizing actions of foreign speculators. Johnson and Mitton (2003) document that 
a faster growing economy like China still maintains restrictions on flows of foreign funds and 
Russia and Korea are debating benefits associated with free flow of foreign funds. Hence, on the 
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one hand, net portfolio flows should lower the cost of capital for local economies and help 
finance their growth; on the other hand, the experience from 1997 Asian financial crisis shows 
that volatility caused by portfolio flows could have detrimental impact.  The three primary 
concerns are related to increased volatility, including spillover of volatility, dynamic relationship 
of flows and local equity returns, and contagion effect. 
 
1.4.1 FPEI and volatility of local returns 
Errunza (2001) argues that there is no theoretical reason to believe that foreign investments 
should increase volatility of local equity markets. Finance theories do not explicitly predict that 
volatility of local market should increase once the market liberalizes and foreign investments 
begin to flow in (see Bekaert and Harvey, 1997, 2003 for details). Errunza (2001) demonstrates 
that the evidence on the impact of local volatility is weak. Bekaert and Harvey (1997) show that 
there is no significant impact on the unconditional volatility. Further, Bekaert and Havery (2003) 
argue that it is not obvious from finance theory that volatility should increase or decrease when 
markets are opened to foreign investors. However, volatility, particularly in emerging markets, 
has also been linked to irrational herding behaviour of foreign investors. Herding behaviour is 
observed when investors follow each other‟s activity and generally trade as a group even when 
the prevalent fundamentals do not warrant such behaviour.  
 
Using data from South Korea, Kim and Wei (2002) report that non-resident foreign portfolio 
investors are more likely to engage in herding than investors who have branches/subsidiaries in 
South Korea and the former may seems to have caused greater volatility in emerging equity 
markets, which is a matter of concern to the policy makers.
2
 Aitken (1998) and Kim and Wei 
(2002) argue that because foreign investors pay little attention to the long term fundamentals and 
are largely involved in herding, fickle portfolio flows may significantly increase volatility of 
equity returns and may destabilize the markets. Aitken (1998) also claims that the changing 
                                                 
2
 There are several examples of interventions by policy makers concerned with the negative impact of foreign equity 
flows. For instance, Malaysia imposed capital controls in 1998 following the Asian financial crisis with an aim to 
control the excessive volatility that seems to be the result of rapid outflow of foreign capital. In December 2006, the 
Thai government tried to impose tough controls by requiring investors with more than $20,000 of investment to 
remain invested for a minimum period of one year or face severe penalties if this investment is removed within a 
year. However, the government had to reverse this decision following a steep fall in the stock market after shares 
suffered their worst daily fall in 16 years with the fall of 14.8%.  
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sentiment of institutional investors in emerging markets, owing to feedback and momentum 
trading, at times may create short-term bubble-like booms and bursts. Such studies are in sharp 
contrast to the arguments of Errunza (2001) and Bekaert and Harvey (2003). Similarly, Stulz 
(1999) finds no destabilizing effect of portfolio investments on the local equity markets in 
emerging countries. Hamao and Mei (2001) document no impact of foreign investments on the 
volatility of Japanese market. Choe et al., (1999) also find no evidence that foreign equity flows 
have any destabilizing effect on Korea‟s market during the Asian crisis of 1997.  
 
Similarly, regarding volatility spillover from equity returns of develop markets, Errunza (2001) 
again argues that there is no strong theoretical reason to suggest that cross-country correlation 
should rise. However, with effective financial liberalization the inflow of FPEI should integrate 
the local equity market with its global counterparts. In a fully integrated market where risk 
premium is determined on global basis, it is intuitive to expect that foreign events may have 
some impact on local equity markets. If this is the case, then the volatility in developed markets 
may influence volatility of local emerging markets. 
 
1.4.2 Joint dynamics of foreign equity portfolio flows and local equity returns 
The destabilizing effects of foreign investment are also attributed to the number of studies 
investigating bi-directional causality and short run dynamic relationship between flows and local 
equity returns. If flows are highly influenced by recent domestic returns, it signifies trend 
chasing, positive feedback or momentum investments. Momentum investments imply selling of 
recent losers and buying recent winners. Bekaert et al., (2002) find strong feedback or 
momentum trading behaviour and suggest that equity investors extract excessive information 
from recent returns. Momentum investment or trend chasing is also corroborated by Bohn and 
Tesar (1996), Richards (2005), Froot et al (2001) and Griffin et al., (2004). Using data from U.S. 
Treasury, Bohn and Tesar (1996) claim that U.S. investors, rather than rebalancing their portfolio 
consistent with theory, tend to invest in equities exhibiting recent higher returns. Similarly, Kim 
and Wei (2002), using different categories of foreign portfolio investors in emerging markets, 
corroborates the positive feedback trading. They attribute differences in available information to 
the differences in trading behaviours. Using six Asian emerging markets, Richards (2005) 
documents strong contemporaneous relationship between equity returns and net inflows and 
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finds momentum trading behaviour with respect to recent return.  Brennan and Cao (1997) argue 
that portfolio flows show linear relationship with local equity returns incorporating significant 
information to predict future returns. Froot et al., (2001) and Richards (2005) claim that cross-
border flows of fund incorporate information about markets‟ fundamental prospects and aid in 
predicting long term future returns.   
 
A number of studies have also looked at the impact of flows on equity price. Froot et al., (2001), 
Bekaert et al., (2002), and Richards (2005) have documented the price pressure hypothesis. 
These studies show that portfolio investments significantly increase the price of local markets. 
However, Bekaert and Harvey (2003) observe that studies disagree on whether the effect is 
temporary or permanent. If the increase in prices is temporary, it may just be reflection of “price 
pressure”, which has also been documented in developed markets for mutual fund flows on stock 
indices (Shleifer, 1986 and Warther, 1995). However, if the price increase is permanent, it may 
reflect a long-lasting decrease in the cost of equity capital associated with the risk-sharing 
benefits of capital market openings. Bekaert et al., (2002) make such claim and show that 
increased valuation may be permanent indicating long term reduction in cost of capital. 
 
1.4.3 Comovement and contagion 
One of the other concerns of market integration is that it creates closeness of home markets, 
regionally and internationally. A major move in one market may affect other markets regardless 
of Errunza‟s (2001) argument that there are no strong theoretical reasons to believe that FPEI 
should lead to greater market comovements. However, in a globally integrated market, it is 
intuitive to believe that an event in one market could have impact on another market as both are 
exposed to same global risk factors. Errunza (2001) posits that such impact should be small and 
perfectly rational without any destabilising effect. Bekaert and Harvey (2003) argue that if 
increased integration may reduce expected returns, it may also increase stock market correlation 
reducing the potential diversification benefits. 
 
Similarly, there is a debate on the contagion phenomenon, particularly, during bear markets. 
However, Stulz (1997) concludes: “if there is plenty of arbitrage capital, contagion should not be 
a problem.” (p. 26).  
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1.5 Summary of hypotheses and findings 
As noted above, the growth in foreign equity portfolio investment plays an important role in the 
development of local capital market. National policy makers would be interested in identifying 
the different factors foreign investors take into account in their country allocation decision. The 
knowledge and evidence of these different factors should guide national governments in creating 
friendly investment climate for foreign investors. Given the importance of foreign equity 
portfolio investment, policy makers would be interested in finding answer to the following 
question:  
 
1. What determines the cross-country and temporal variation in worldwide foreign equity 
portfolio holdings?  
 
Our first three empirical studies examine various hypotheses related to the above question. We 
propose a number of predetermined and novel variables and explain the variations in foreign 
equity portfolio holdings.  
 
In our earlier discussion, we also noted that there is an extensive empirical debate on the 
destabilizing effect of foreign equity portfolio flows, particularly for emerging markets. The 
growth in foreign equity investments in emerging markets and the debate on the likely 
implications for their integration with the global equity markets has prompted intense research 
interest in this subject matter. The current credit crises caused by the high defaults in the U.S. 
sub-prime market and its spill-over effects to other economies in developed and developing part 
of the world have further highlighted the need to investigate the role of foreign institutional 
investors in emerging stock markets. Although there are a number of studies which provide 
evidence of increasing integration of emerging markets with the global markets (Syriopoulos, 
2007; Chelley-Steeley, 2005 and Dungey et al., 2004), none have so far examined the role played 
by foreign investors on the long and short run linkages of emerging markets. In view of the 
global spread of current financial crisis and its likely implications for a number of emerging 
markets, it is both topical and desirable to understand the role and influence of foreign investors 
on the process of integration of emerging equity markets with the global markets.  Our fourth 
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empirical study attempts to answer the following question: 
 
2. What is the impact of foreign equity portfolio flows on global linkages of the Asian 
emerging markets? 
 
In the following sections, we summarize the motivation of our study, and briefly report the 
findings of the hypotheses tested related to both the above questions. 
 
1.5.1 Determinants of worldwide foreign equity portfolio holdings 
Using Markowitz‟s (1952) portfolio optimization framework an extensive  number of articles 
show that cross-country investment significantly improves the risk-return profile of domestic 
equity portfolios (see Grubel, 1968; Levy and Sarnat, 1970; Solnik, 1974; Grauer and 
Hakansson, 1987; Errunza, 1988 and DeSantis and Gerard, 1997).  Although few studies (Jorion, 
1985; Farragher and Hui, 1985 and Goetxmann et al., 2001) claim that the benefits of cross-
country diversification may not be as strong as demonstrated by existing studies, majority of the 
studies generally corroborate diversification benefits. If investments in foreign equities span 
efficient frontier favourably then what is the optimal level of foreign portfolio equities that 
investors should hold in their domestic portfolio? The International Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(ICAPM) prescribes that every investor should hold the world market portfolio. However, a 
significant number of theoretical studies demonstrate that ICAPM may not hold in practice 
(Alder and Dumas, 1983; Solnik, 1974b; Cooper and Kaplanis, 1986, 1994 and Stulz, 2005). 
There are number of market frictions or barriers, such as real exchange rate risk, market 
efficiency, illiquidity, institutional risk, information asymmetry etc, which invalidates ICAPM 
and investors may therefore deviate from holding the world market portfolio. Most of the capital 
market equilibrium frameworks model the violation of unrealistic assumptions of ICAPM, i.e. 
markets are perfectly integrated, purchasing power parity holds, no transaction costs, and no 
barriers to international investments, in explaining the deviation of the holdings of foreign 
equities from the optimal as predicted by theory.  
 
Our study uses the theoretical framework of Cooper and Kalpanis (1986) and tests several 
hypotheses. Cooper and Kalpanis (1986) show how the presence of deadweight costs arising 
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from frictions/barriers to international investments influence worldwide foreign equity portfolio 
allocation decision.  
 
The empirical literature has extensively focused on investigating the phenomenon of home bias 
(tendency to overweight home markets contrary to ICAPM guidance), particularly from U.S. 
perspective. A long list of predetermined factors has been suggested explaining home bias, 
including information asymmetry, behavioural factors and institutional factors.  However, only 
few studies (two to the best of our knowledge) have modelled the bilateral cross-country foreign 
equity portfolio holdings (FEPH) on a worldwide basis. Studies modelling FEPH are limited due 
to the lack of high quality and comprehensive bilateral cross-country equity holding data (Chan 
et. al., 2005). Our study makes use of the bilateral cross-country equity holding data recently 
made available by the Co-ordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) of International 
Monetary Fund. We employ panel data set of 36 host countries with bilateral investments from 
16 source countries for a period of 6 years (2001-2006). Extensive coverage of 36 countries with 
over 500 cross sectional units (over 3000 observations) enables us to undertake comprehensive 
and robust investigation. 
 
Given the relatively fewer number of studies modelling FEPH, we make important contributions 
to the existing literature on international equity portfolio investment (see chapter 2, section 2.8 
for details).  Following theoretical and empirical literature, we construct an estimate of country 
level foreign equity portfolio allocation (FEPA – for details see section 2.1) and examine the role 
of different factors explaining cross sectional and temporal variation of FEPA. We test all our 
hypotheses using relatively more efficient random effect and more robust fixed effect panel data 
models. 
 
The first sets of hypotheses we test examine the role of transaction cost on FEPA decisions (see 
chapter 6). We handpick data on three different components of transaction costs (commission, 
fees and market impact) from Standard and Poor (S&P) stock market fact books and test the 
following hypotheses: 
 
H1  Countries with lower level of average commission attract higher level of FEPA. 
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H2 Countries with lower level of average fees attract higher level of FEPA. 
 
H3 Countries with lower level of average market impact cost attract higher level of FEPA. 
 
This is the first study to test the individual and collective effects of each of the components of 
transaction costs on FEPA. Our study addresses a number of robustness issues, such as omitted 
variable bias, unit specific effect, reverse causality, free float home bias, major financial centres 
effect and between effect estimations. The results show significant influence of transaction cost 
with evidence of foreign investors underweighting countries with higher transaction costs. 
 
The second set of hypotheses investigates the role of country specific equity market 
characteristics (CSEMC) explaining FEPA (see Chapter 7). We use five different variables to 
proxy for the effect of CSEMC, such as stock market development/size, market liquidity, 
emerging market dummy, equity return volatility and exchange rate volatility. We are first to use 
the two volatility measures (stock market volatility and exchange rate volatility) in modelling 
FEPA with strong theoretical arguments (see chapter 3, section 3.2.4 and 3.2.5). The following 
hypotheses are tested in the second empirical study: 
 
H4 Stock market development/size has positive influence on FEPA. 
 
H5 Foreign investors prefer to overweight markets with higher liquidity. 
 
H6 Foreign investors prefer to underweight emerging markets. 
 
H7 Foreign investors prefer to underweight markets with higher equity market volatility. 
 
H8 Foreign investors prefer to underweight markets with higher real exchange rate volatility. 
 
In line with theoretical arguments, the results indicate that all the CSEMC factors have strong 
and statistically significant effect on the foreign equity portfolio allocation decisions. 
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Finally, our third set of hypotheses explores the relationship between investor protection and 
FEPA. Existing conclusions on the role of investor protection are controversial with contrasting 
views. Within the framework of panel data set and following Bekeart et al., (2007), we use 
ICRG‟s investment profile index to capture the features of investor protection risk specifically 
related to foreign investment. We also include ICRG‟s quality of institution index reflecting 
broad based measure of investor protection representing country specific regulatory 
environment. La Porta et al., (1997, 1999 and 2000) demonstrate that countries following 
English common law are better at instituting and enforcing investor protection rights. We use a 
dummy that takes value of one if a country follows English common law and zero otherwise. We 
test the following hypotheses in our third empirical study: 
 
H9 Higher levels of investor protection measures specifically related to foreign investment 
are associated with higher levels of FEPA. 
 
H10 Higher levels of general investor protection measures are associated with higher levels of 
FEPA. 
 
H11 Countries adopting English common law attracts higher levels of FEPA. 
 
Our results show that investment profile and Common English law dummy are highly statistically 
significant across all regressions. However, quality of institution is not able to stand different 
robustness tests indicating foreign investors may not be interested in the broad based general 
investor protection right development index  rather they are more concerned about the regulatory 
framework which directly affects their investments (see section 3.5 of chapter 3 for argument). 
 
Drawing on the results of the first three empirical chapters, we conclude that CSEMC, including 
transaction cost and volatility measures, exert largest influence on foreign equity portfolio 
country allocation decision. All the CSEMC variables are statistically significant and bear the 
correct signs. Intuitively, foreign investors like to allocate higher fraction of their wealth in 
countries with larger equity market capitalization, with higher turnover ratio, with lower 
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transaction costs, lower equity and exchange rate volatility, and in non-emerging markets. 
Although relatively not as important as the CSEMC factors, an investment climate offering 
sound and cost efficient investor protection rights, particularly specific to foreign investments, 
also affects country allocation decision.  
 
1.5.2 Impact of foreign equity portfolio flows on global financial linkages of Asian 
emerging market 
Our fourth and final empirical study demonstrates the impact of foreign equity flows on global 
linkages of four Asian emerging markets. This study draws inspiration from two main strands of 
the literature. The first one deals with integration of emerging equity markets with the global 
equity markets by investigating the correlation structure and comovements in equity returns. The 
second deals with the dynamics of foreign investment flows and equity returns in emerging 
markets. We are the first to combine both the strands and provide comprehensive evidence on the 
long run equilibrium relationship and short run dynamics between flows, local equity market and 
global capital markets.  
 
We use daily net foreign equity investment flows and stock index return available for four Asian 
emerging markets of India, Korea, Taiwan and Thailand for 2001-2007. Our study uses a number 
of variants of VEC model and tests the following hypotheses: 
 
H12 Foreign equity portfolio flows drive the global integration of the Asian emerging markets 
with the global equity markets. 
 
H13 Foreign investors are “return chasers”, i.e., flows are caused by changes in expected 
returns (i.e. feedback hypothesis). 
 
H14 Increase in foreign equity portfolio flows raises domestic stock market price (i.e. price 
pressure hypothesis). 
 
The findings suggest that greater integration of the Asian emerging markets with global equity 
markets appears to be affected by the increasing investments by foreign investors. The short-run 
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impact confirms that the global markets have a significant causal effect on equity returns of all 
four emerging markets. Most notable is the finding that foreign equity investment flows play a 
significant role in correcting the short-term deviations in the convergence process of Asian 
emerging equity markets with the global equity markets. The results are consistent with previous 
research. However, we find stronger evidence for positive feedback hypothesis for all four 
markets. Findings also support the widely held view that foreign investors are return chasers and 
their trading behaviour in emerging markets is highly influenced by recent returns. The results 
also confirm the price-pressure hypothesis suggesting foreign equity investors have significant 
role affecting stock market valuations in the Asian emerging markets. Conclusively our results 
indicates that the Asian emerging markets may become increasingly vulnerable to the shocks in 
the volume and pace of foreign equity investment flows and turn more volatile in future.  
 
1.6 Structure of the thesis 
The structured of the thesis as follows. The following chapter extensively discusses the 
theoretical and empirical literature on the determinants of foreign equity portfolio holdings. It 
motivates the rationale of our study in light of the identified gap and claims contribution to the 
literature. Third chapter develops the hypotheses tested in our four empirical studies. Chapters 4 
and 5 discuss the data and methodology respectively. Chapters 6 - 9 present the empirical 
findings and chapter 10 concludes the study highlighting the limitations and issues for further 
research. 
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Figure 1-1: Growth in total foreign equity portfolio holdings (2001-2006) 
 
Source: Co-ordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (International Monetary Fund)  
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Chapter 2 Theoretical and empirical literature 
 
2.1 Introduction 
From the discussion in previous chapter, it is evident that foreign equity portfolio plays 
important role in the development of domestic capital market whereas evidence on destabilizing 
effects is highly debatable. The interesting question to be asked is if foreign portfolio equity 
investments are important then every country should strive to attract foreign investors. We begin 
this section by analysing the foreign equity portfolio allocation computed using the data from 
IMF‟s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey, which reports cross-country bilateral equity 
portfolio stock holding data. Following Chan et al., (2005), the portfolio allocation (weights) 
from country i (called investor or source country) into country j (referred as host or destination 
country) for a particular year t is defined as 
 
     
       
∑        
  
   
 
 
 
where wijt is the foreign equity portfolio allocation (FEPA).  FEPHijt is foreign equity portfolio 
holdings from country i into country j for the year t. The bilateral data on the 36 host countries (j) 
is from International Monetary Fund (IMF). We compute the average FEPA received by the 36 
host countries from 16 investor countries (K) using the following equation and the statistics are 
reported in Table 2-1.  
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For example, suppose investors from countries A and B (i.e. K=2, the investor countries i), invest 
USD 25 million each into equity issued by corporation domiciled in country C, D, E and F ( i.e. 
host countries j), for a particular year. Hence, the total fund invested by A and B is 100 million 
each and the weight allocated over 4 host countries is 25% (25/100) each. Therefore, average 
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allocation received by host countries from A and B is 25% {(25%+25%)/2}. Also, suppose the 
allocation is same over six year period. This suggests that average FEPA received by each of the 
host country is 25% {(25%×6)/6}.  
 
…..…….Insert Table 2-1 about here, see page 50………….. 
 
In our sample, the number of investor countries is 16 (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, 
UK and U.S).   
 
The number of host countries is 36 as shown in Table 2-1 above. It is clear that the top ten 
countries receiving highest foreign portfolio equity allocation from foreign investors are all 
developed countries. The countries that find themselves at bottom 10 are mostly emerging 
countries with the exception of New Zealand.  This simple descriptive statistics leads us to the 
following general research question:  
 
What factors explain the cross sectional and temporal variation of FEPA? 
 
There is evidence that legal barriers to foreign investments are gradually being removed in 
emerging countries (Stulz, 2005). Furthermore, studies (Kohers et al., 2006) also demonstrate 
that emerging markets provide higher return and better diversification opportunities relative to 
developed markets. However, despite higher return and favourable diversification opportunities, 
why do investors still prefer developed markets in their country allocation? With the objective of 
seeking answers and identifying potential opportunities for further research, we explore the 
extant literature on international equity portfolio investment. The literature review will focus on 
the following three questions: 
 
1. What are the theoretical motivations for investing in foreign equities? 
2. What theories guide foreign investors for optimum foreign equity country allocation? 
3. What are the existing empirical evidences on international portfolio allocation? 
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2.2 International portfolio diversification  
2.2.1 Introduction 
Harry Markowitz‟s (1952) pioneered the portfolio-optimizing model. He shows that by including 
assets that are less than perfectly positively correlated, the risk-return profile of a portfolio is 
improved.  Further studies (Evans and Archer, 1968 and Wagner and Lau, 1971) also corroborate 
the diversification benefits of the portfolio-optimization model. Grubel (1968) argues that 
although the mean-variance optimization model is criticized by some studies (explained in the 
later section), their basic content has become economic orthodoxy in investment management 
industry. Grubel extents the model in context of claims denominated in foreign currency and 
analyses influence of diversification using equity market indexes of eleven countries. His 
findings demonstrate that a portfolio well diversified internationally dominated the U.S. index 
when measured in terms of ex-post returns and risk. Following Grubel‟s work an extensive 
number of studies (see Sarnat, 1970; Solnik, 1974a.b, Errunza, 1977, 1983 among others) 
confirm the advantage of holding foreign securities. Levy and Sarnat (1970) study equity market 
indexes of 28 countries for a period spanning 1951-1967. They report that investment in the U.S. 
and Japanese stocks make a substantial proportion of optimal portfolio, primarily because of 
negative correlations during the study period observed between equity markets of U.S and Japan. 
They further note that American investors can substantially improve their risk-return 
combination by including securities of foreign countries, such as Japan, South Africa and other 
developing markets of South America and Asia. We explore the technical details advocating case 
for international portfolio diversification in the following section. 
 
2.2.2 The case for international portfolio investment 
Among others, contribution of Bruno Solnik (1974a, 1977, 1982, 1995, 2004 and 2009) is 
considered substantial in the field of international investments. Solnik and McLeavey (2009) 
report that the practice of international portfolio investment long been custom in many European 
countries, but is a recent phenomenon in North America. They document that international 
portfolio diversification is growing among all countries and is now popular among U.S. 
institutional investors. Solnik and Mcleavey (2009) show that during early 1970s U.S. pension 
fund virtually held no foreign securities in their portfolio but by the year 2006, the percentage of 
foreign assets approached approximately 20% of the total assets. Similarly, during the same 
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period, British institutional investors held more than 25% of total assets in foreign securities and 
few Dutch firms held more than 50% of their assets invested abroad. Figure 2-1 shows the 
growth in world market capitalization for past twenty years. If we ignore peak of the global 
financial crisis year (2008), world market capitalization grew by a factor of almost 7. The share 
of U.S. was almost 28% at the beginning of 1989 peaking nearly 50% in 2001 and again 
dropping to 33% by end of 2008. Similarly, for U.K., the trend of their share in world market 
capitalization has also not been stable beginning with almost 8% in 1988 reaching highest point 
of nearly 9% in 2000 and dropping to 5% by end of 2008. Solnik and Mcleavey (2009) report 
that the mere size of foreign markets justifies international diversification, even for U.S. 
investors. They note that in a fully efficient and integrated global capital market, a passive 
investor should, in theory, (basic International Capital Asset Pricing Model, discussed in 
subsequent sections), hold the world market portfolio. For U.S. investors, as of end of the year 
2008, almost 67% of their equity portfolio should be invested abroad and for U.K. this figure 
should be a staggering 95%. Even though it may be unrealistic to believe in a perfectly integrated 
and efficient world capital market, the case for international diversification is still strong as 
explained in the following paragraph. 
 
……………..Insert Figure 2-1 about here, see page 51……………….. 
 
Further developing the work of Grubel (1968) and Levy and Sarnat (1970), Solnik (1974a) 
conjectures that the basic argument in favour of international diversification stems from the 
notion that foreign securities allow domestic investors to reduce the total risk of their portfolio 
and offer profit potential. The rationale for improvement in the risk-return profile is that 
domestic securities tend to co-move together because they are commonly affected by domestic 
conditions, such as monetary announcements, changes in interest rates, budget deficits, national 
growth and political events. This surely creates a positive correlation (even after removing the 
idiosyncratic risk after domestic diversifications) among almost all equities traded in the same 
national market. However, as highlighted earlier, low correlation among countries provide 
opportunity for a global investor to reduce risk via diversification, particularly for passive 
investor who wishes to mimic the world market portfolio. Solnik and McLeavey (2009) show 
that low correlation also provides profit opportunities for an active investor. As the low 
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correlation does not perfectly synchronize the movement of national markets, an expert investor 
can hope to adjust the international asset allocation of global portfolio toward markets with 
superior performance. This should generate better risk-adjusted expected return as discussed and 
shown in the model below. 
 
2.2.3 Model of international risk diversification 
The prime objective of risk diversification is to reduce the total risk of a portfolio. The reduction 
in risk should also be accompanied by highest possible expected return. Solnik and McLeavey 
(2009) claim that total risk of major international equity markets is greater than that of U.S 
market, when the dollar is used as the base currency. The increase in risk, in part, is caused by 
currency risk, which adds to the risk of foreign investment, even though volatility of different 
national markets, based in their home currency, may be comparable. However, they show that 
the risk of an internationally diversified portfolio could be reduced through lower correlations 
among equity markets. For example, let‟s consider a U.K. investor who partly invests in 
domestic assets (e.g. a UK stock index) and partly in foreign assets (e.g. a Brazilian stock index). 
The proportions invested in each asset class are denoted as    for domestic assets and    for 
foreign assets.    and    denotes return on domestic asset and foreign assets respectively with 
all returns denominated in base currency (i.e. the UK pound). The return on foreign assets is 
subject to change with movement in exchange rate also signifying exposure to foreign exchange 
risk. The standard deviations of returns on the domestic and foreign assets are    and    
respectively with total risk being denoted by   . The correlation between the two asset classes is 
    .  
 
The covariance between two asset classes is given by  
 
The expected return on the portfolio 
The well known portfolio risk formula given by Markowitz (1952) is 
                  2-1 
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The total risk or the standard deviation of the portfolio is thus equal to 
 
 
The total risk of the portfolio will always be less than the average of both standard deviations, 
i.e.            except for the case when correlation between two asset classes is exactly one. 
However, it is widely known that correlation is rarely perfectly synchronized and therefore there 
is always the possibility of reducing the risk through diversification. 
 
Solnik (1974a) provides the empirical evidence, as shown in the Figure 2-2, that by adding 
securities in the portfolio of U.S. holdings, there is significant gain through reduction of risk. As 
shown in the figure, total risk for a portfolio consisting of U.S securities only accounts almost 
21% which significantly reduces to almost 12% when securities from other countries are added 
to the portfolio. With portfolio of U.S. stock only, the risk reduces as the number of securities 
increase but it peaks almost 21% with almost 30 securities and does not improves the risk with 
further addition. However, when international securities are added, the total risk drops to 12%.  
 
……………..Insert Figure 2-2 about here, see page 51……………….. 
 
2.2.4 Foreign exchange risk consideration 
When domestic portfolio consists of foreign asset, the return on the portfolio depends on the 
currency used. For example, the total return for the U.K. investor will be different if the portfolio 
is denominated in GBP or in Brazilian real. The pound value of the asset is equal to its Brazilian 
Real value scaled by exchange rate (i.e. number of GBP per Brazilian Real) as shown below. 
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where   and    are, respectively, the values in Brazlian currency (i.e. local currency) and in 
GBP pounds and    is the exchange rate (number of GBP per Brazilian Real). The return which 
the UK investor earns for a single time period i.e. from time 0 to time 1 is equal to 
 
 
   
  
    
 
  
  
         
    
 
     
  
 
     
  
 
     
  
 
     
  
 
 
 
where    is the return in GBP,   is the return in local currency (i.e. Brazilian Real) , and   is the 
percentage exchange rate movement
3
. In order to simplify notations, it is usually assumed that 
the cross product     is small relative to r and s and therefore Solnik and Mcleavey (2009) 
suggests that it can be ignored. This implies that the variance of GBP return is simply sum of the 
variance of local currency return (Brazilian Real) and return on exchange rate. 
 
or 
 
where   
  is the variance of the foreign asset measured in GBP,    is the variance in local 
currency (Brazilian Real) and   
  is the variance of exchange rate (number of GBP per Brazilian 
Real).   is correlation between asset return in local currency and movement in exchange rate. As 
we know that correlation coefficient never exceeds 1, asset and exchange rate risk are never 
additive. As a result, we have  
        
                                                 
3
 If a dividend or coupon is paid in period 1, it will be included in V1. 
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The difference between    and   is the contribution of the currency risk. As demonstrated in the 
figure below, Solnik (1974a) shows the effect of exchange risk in a portfolio. The portfolio in the 
figure below is constructed assuming returns in dollar at each point in time. Three portfolios are 
shown. First, a portfolio of U.S stock only, second is the portfolio of U.S and other international 
stocks but assuming no protection against exchange rate risk and third for an exchange risk 
covered (hedged) portfolio. As expected, the risk of the portfolio unprotected against movement 
in exchange risk is larger than for a covered portfolio. However, even if the risk is not covered, 
the total risk of the internationally diversified portfolio is much lower than the domestic 
portfolio. 
 
……………..Insert Figure 2-3 about here, see page 52……………….. 
 
The theoretical discussion clearly advocates the case for international portfolio diversification. 
As noted earlier, there has been extensive research advocating the case for international 
diversifications.  Grauer and Hakansson (1986) applies mean-variance model to a global 
environment by incorporating four principal U.S. asset categories and up to fourteen non-U.S. 
equity and bond categories in their portfolio. They find significant gains by including non-U.S. 
asset classes. Errunza (1977 and 1983) examines the effects of adding emerging markets as asset 
class and demonstrates that internationally diversified portfolio produce better risk-return profile 
than purely investing in the U.S. stock index. However, there are studies, as discussed below, 
that question the empirical validity of the findings supporting international diversifications. 
 
2.3 The Case against international portfolio diversification 
Although there are considerable evidence on benefits of international diversification,  a number 
of studies claim that evidence in the literature overstate potential benefits of international 
diversification. Jorion (1985) claims that the models favouring international portfolio 
diversification do not consider estimation risk, particularly the difference between ex-post and 
ex-ante mean returns. Similarly, there is evidence on the increasing or unstable correlation 
among the world equity markets (Watson, 1980; Shaked, 1985 and Goetzman et al., 2005) and 
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finally there are barriers/costs associated with international investment reducing the benefits of 
diversification (de Roon et al., 2001 and Solnik and Mcleavey, 2009). 
 
2.3.1 Estimation risk 
In almost all studies advocating benefits of international portfolio diversification, ex-post 
exercises are used to yield result of portfolio optimality. However, Solnik and McLeavey (2009) 
note that portfolio management need to be forward looking. A prudent asset allocation strategy 
should be based on credible market forecast, not on ex-post returns. Jorion (1985) criticizes most 
of the works favouring international portfolio diversification as a means of enhancing average 
returns with reducing portfolio risk. He argues that the claim of improving risk-return profile 
relies on the assumption that required inputs to the classical mean-variance analysis are known 
with certainty. In classical optimization problem, expected returns, variances and co-variance of 
returns are simply substituted by their ex-post sample values and optimal portfolio is then 
derived without taking account of the uncertainty in estimation of input parameters. Jorion 
(1985) asserts that investors should take uncertainty of the estimations in their model when 
forming expectations and should consider estimators that are less subject to estimation error than 
the classical sample mean. He uses studies of Grubel (1968) and Levy and Sarnat (1970) to 
demonstrate that most serious defect of classical approach is poor and unstable result of the out-
of-sample performance of optimal portfolios. The performance measures (i.e. the risk and return 
measures) deteriorate substantially outside the sample period. Another major problem detected is 
the instability of optimal portfolio. Each portion added to the portfolio are extremely sensitive to 
fluctuations in expected return, and just by augmenting few extra observation the distribution of 
optimal portfolio is completed altered. Jorion concludes that estimation risk due to uncertain 
mean returns has significant effect on optimal portfolio selection and therefore alternative 
measures (see Jorion, 1985 for the measures) should be considered. However, the variance and 
co-variances in most of the studies are measured with good precision. He concludes that there are 
pitfalls of analyzing portfolio diversification in a mean-variance framework based on ex-post 
data and most of the studies overstate the extent of potential gains in average returns. He 
suggests that benefits of diversifications are more like to occur by reduction in risk rather than 
enhancement in expected returns. 
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Although Jorion (1985) challenges the result of international portfolio diversification on the 
grounds of estimation risk, Eun and Resnick (1988) show that even after incorporating the 
estimation and exchange rate risk, international diversification strategies significantly outperform 
the risk-return profile of domestic portfolio, even in out of sample periods. 
 
2.3.2 Increase in correlation 
The increase in correlation between equity markets is also considered as a case against 
international portfolio diversification. The prime benefit of diversification is risk reduction 
because of differing correlation between equity markets. However, Solnik and McLeavey (2009) 
claim that international correlation has in fact trended upward over the past decade. They 
demonstrate that the correlation of U.S and other major developed stock markets have been 
trending upward since 1975. Similarly, studies also show that international correlations increase 
during periods of high volatility. For example, Goetzmann, Li and Rouwenhorst (2002) 
investigate the correlation structure of major world equity markets (France, Germany, United 
Kingdom and United States) from late nineteenth century (1870) until end of 2000 and report 
that correlations significantly vary through time. They show significant increase in correlation 
during late nineteenth century, during the Great Depression, and the late twentieth century.  
 
A number of studies show that emerging equity markets are also showing signs of greater 
financial integration with the developed markets (see, Jong and Roon, 2005). Phylaktis (1999) 
examines the extent of capital market integration for a group of Pacific Basin countries and finds 
they are highly integrated with the world financial markets. In a latest study, Tai (2007) 
examines Asian emerging market data and concludes that over time, since the markets were 
liberalized, they exhibit greater integration with world capital markets. 
 
Although most of the above studies suggest that correlations have increased over time, especially 
during period of high volatility, many authors ague that the correlation coefficient estimates used 
in many studies suffers from biased sampling error (see Gibson and Boyer, 1998; Loretan and 
English, 2000; and Forbes and Rigobon, 2002).   Loretan and English (2000) propose the use of a 
correct statistical procedure to study correlation of equities, bonds and foreign exchange 
incorporating various periods of market turbulence. Similarly, Forbes and Rigobon (2002) also 
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examine numerous crises periods, including the October 1987 crash and conclude that  the tests 
based on correlation measures are inadequate and problematic being victim of bias introduced by 
persistent volatility in market returns (i.e. hetoroskedascity). After proposing an adjustment to 
hetoroskedascity, they show that correlation does not increase significantly in periods of crisis.  
Similarly, Longin and Solnik (2001) note that correlations measures are stable in the presence of 
large positive shocks (i.e. bull market) but do tend to show upward trend in presence of large 
negative shocks. They claim that although there is some evidence that correlation increases 
during distress period but the rise is not as strong as suggested by some practitioners, at least not 
significant enough to reduce the risk reduction benefits of international diversification. Similarly, 
Ang and Bekaert (2002) incorporate different correlations regimes (normal and volatile) in their 
asset allocation model and show that the presence of increased correlation during the bear 
markets makes a much smaller negative influence on the optimal global asset allocation.  
 
2.3.3 Barriers to international investment  
Although many studies build strong case for international diversification, Solnik and McLeavey 
(2009) claim that investors do not allocate their wealth following the suggestion of ICAPM. 
They suggest that the conservative investment behaviour of under allocating foreign markets 
may be explained by the prevalence of potential barriers to foreign investment such as familiarity 
with foreign markets, market efficiency, regulation, transaction costs, taxes and currency risk. In 
fact, these barriers are the suspected sources of frictions explaining why ICAPM may not hold in 
practice as discussed below. 
 
2.4 Domestic CAPM in international setting 
As discussed above, there is significant evidence that by including foreign assets, investors can 
significantly improve their risk-return profile. Based on the extension of Markowitz (1952) 
portfolio theory, Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966) developed the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM). The domestic version of CAPM is extended to include foreign portfolio 
investment and is termed as International Asset Pricing Model (ICAPM). The initial version of 
the ICAPM is based on number of assumptions, such as: 
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1. Investors throughout the world have identical consumption baskets. 
2. Different currencies have no significant implications for portfolio choice and asset 
pricing, i.e. real prices are identical in all countries. This implies that the purchasing 
power parity relationship holds at every point in time and the exchange rates simply 
mirror differences in their inflation rate. 
3. Capital markets are perfect across the world, i.e. world capital market efficiency holds 
and markets are fully integrated. 
4. There are no withholding taxes, no information asymmetries, no restrictions on short 
selling, no transaction costs and no other barriers to international capital flows. 
5. Investors are identical with respect to risk aversion and information. 
6. Investment and opportunity sets are same across countries. 
 
Similar to the domestic CAPM, the ICAPM assumes that all investors determine their demand 
for each risky asset by using the Markowitz (1952) mean-variance optimization (expected-utility 
maximization) in domestic currency. The demand from each of the investors across the world is 
aggregated and equated with the aggregate supply of the assets (their market capitalization). The 
net supply of the risk free assets (i.e. borrowing and lending) in each currency is assumed to be 
zero.  
If the above assumptions hold, the ICAPM has a very simple implication for all investors across 
the globe: all investors must hold the world market portfolio regardless of their country of 
residence i. Consequently, it follows that portfolio share of country i invested into country j, for 
time t,    
  should be 
where         is the market capitalization of country j for the period t and             world 
market capitalization for period t. The market portfolio share is the benchmark share for all 
investors for country j. If the ICAPM prevails, all investors should hold the world market 
portfolio.  Does this theory hold?  In light of extant theoretical and empirical studies, many show 
that the above relationship is far from reality and foreign investors‟ deviate from the optimal 
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allocation. A number of theoretical studies, as discussed in the following section, show the 
implications of portfolio allocation when the restrictive assumptions of basic ICAPM are 
relaxed. 
 
2.5 Inadequacy of domestic CAPM in international framework 
Cooper and Kaplanis (1986) state that the domestic CAPM cannot be imposed in the 
international context by simply extending the opportunity set to incorporate the world market 
portfolio. International capital markets differ significantly from the domestic capital markets in 
many important aspects, such as different currency areas, different social-economic systems and 
extensive barriers to capital flows.  As discussed in the following section, many studies 
incorporate such complexities of international capital markets in the theoretical development of 
international equilibrium models. Most of these models consider exchange rate risk as one of the 
key factors causing foreign equity country allocation to differ from the theoretical prescription of 
ICAPM. Similarly, these models also relax most of the other restrictive assumptions of ICAPM. 
 
2.5.1 Purchasing power relationships and exchange rate risk 
Zimmermann et al., (2003) note that the extension of international asset pricing models (single-
beta ICAPM, APT and multi-beta ICAPM) are based on restrictive assumptions, as mentioned 
preceding section. However, country-specific consumption and investment opportunities imply 
that foreign investors from different countries perceive the returns on assets differently. This 
heterogeneity in expected returns and risk on the same asset arises primarily due to deviation 
from purchasing power parity (PPP) theory between countries. Grauer, Litzenberger and Stehle 
(1976) assume that the prevalence of exchange rate risk in the international portfolio is due to 
different stochastic national inflations, whereas on the other hand Solnik (1974b), Sercu (1980) 
and Adler and Dumas (1983) assumes that exchange rate risk originate from differences in 
consumption baskets between investors of different origin. In the following sections, we briefly 
explore the concept of PPP. 
 
The basic concept of purchasing power parity is attributed to the contribution of Cassel (1916). 
Adler and Dumas (1983) claim that PPP simply measures similarity of consumption 
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opportunities in different countries. Stulz (1981a) defines the consumption opportunity set of an 
investor as “… the set of goods available for his consumption, the current prices, and the 
distribution of the future prices of those good …” (p.384). This implies that the primary causes 
of PPP deviations are differences in composition of national consumption baskets, relative prices 
of goods prevailing in different countries, and time-evolution of those prices. Stulz (1984a) 
corroborates that consumption baskets and investment opportunity sets of investors matter when 
one applies capital asset pricing models in an international context. The core fact that countries 
differ is shown to affect the portfolio held by investors, the equilibrium expected returns of risky 
assets and financial policies of firms. 
 
 Two different versions of PPP are reported in the literature: absolute PPP (APP) and relative 
PPP. Absolute PPP suggests that the exchange rate between two countries should equate to the 
ratio of average price levels in the two countries. This implies that at any point of time the 
following relationship should hold: 
 
 
Where   
  denotes the price of the gth good in domestic country, and   
  stands for the weight of 
that good in domestic consumption basket.   
 
 and   
 
 are the gth good‟s price and its weight in 
the foreign country, respectively.    is the number of domestic goods, and    is the number of 
foreign goods in the foreign country. Finally,   
  is the spot price of the foreign currency in direct 
form, i.e., number of domestic currency for unit foreign currency. Equation 2-9 shows the 
relationship between average price levels. This relationship of absolute PPP must be 
distinguished from Commodity Price Parity (CPP), also known as the “law of one price.” CPP 
states that the real price of any good should be the same irrespective of the country. This implies 
that any good g available in domestic and foreign country should have the following pricing 
relationship: 
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CPP is thus a concept in which an instantaneous arbitrage condition should hold in the absence 
of trade barriers between the two countries. This relationship generally holds for homogenous 
goods traded on organized auction markets, such as commodities exchanges. Good examples are 
gold and other precious metals. Equation 2-9 shows an average version of the CPP. PPP can be 
violated between two countries even though CPP holds for each individual good. In such 
circumstances, the weighting schemes in the national consumption baskets differ. Such 
differences occur because of the heterogeneity of national consumption tastes. Alder and Dumas 
(1983) remark that violation of CPP is rule rather than exception implying there may be two 
sources of PPP – differences in the national consumption basket and deviations from CPP. 
 
If APP and CPP focus on national consumption basket and law of one price respectively, relative 
PPP emphasizes on the relationship between differential inflation rates and changes in exchange 
rate between the pair countries over a certain period. The rate of inflation in a country is 
generally computed on the basis of changes observed over consumer price index (CPI). The CPI 
is a price of representative goods in the consumption basket of a country. Theoretically, the CPI 
should measure consumption opportunities and preferences of all citizens in a country. The rate 
of inflation is then computed by measuring the changes in the CPI over the relevant time period. 
Relative purchasing power parity (PPP) implies that the inflation differential between the two 
pair countries should be exactly compensated by respective movements in the changes of spot 
exchange rate between the two countries‟ currencies. If we use the CPIs of the pair countries as a 
valid representation of price levels and take the ratio of the absolute PPP at the beginning and 
end of the period, we should end up with the following representation of relative PPP: 
 
 
  
  
    
 
      
   
    
 
    
  
Where     
  is the spot exchange rate at time t (at the end of period t), and       
  is the spot 
exchange rate at time t-1 (at the beginning of period t).   
   represents domestic inflation rate for 
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period t and   
 
 denote the foreign inflation rate for the same time period respectively. The above 
relationship suggests that if PPP holds, changes in exchange rate merely mirror the inflation 
differential, which means that it should not affect the valuation of financial assets in real terms. 
 
Solnik and McLeavey (2004) note that deviation from purchasing power parity could be a major 
source of exchange rate risk and consumption preferences can differ among countries. In such a 
case, the risk that the real prices of consumption good may not be identical in all the countries is 
referred as real foreign currency risk, real exchange risk, or purchasing power risk. 
Theoretically, if the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) relationship holds then there should not be 
any risk to foreign investors arising from exchange rate changes as they will merely reflect 
inflation differentials (Solnik, 1974b).  Solnik and Mcleavey (2009) show the following PPP 
relationship 
 
    (       ) 
 
where x and s are the percentage movement in the real and nominal exchange rates and     and 
    the inflation rates in domestic and foreign countries.  For example, let‟s assume that the 
yearly inflation rate is 1% in USA (domestic country) and 0% in Germany (foreign country). In 
order to ensure that there is no uncertainty arising from foreign exchange risk, the Euro must 
appreciate by 1% (x = 0%, s = 1%). Hence, we see that even if there is a change of 1% in 
exchange rate, there is no real effect on the return of investor due to exchange rate movement 
because this movement is adjusted by inflation rate differential. It‟s only when the Euro changes 
by more or less than 1%, the investor faces uncertainty over exchange rate and therefore 
uncertainty on their portfolio return due to exchange rate risk. This demonstrates that if PPP 
holds, the real exchange rate risk is constant (x = 0). However, we know that PPP does not 
always hold, at least not in the short run and therefore investor faces exchange rate risks which 
are not explained by inflation rate differentials between two countries (see Solnik, 1974b; Sercu, 
1980 and Adler and Dumas, 1983, Stulz, 1984 and Carrieri et al., 2006). 
 
Solnik and Mcleavey further stress that in practice; exchange rate movements are volatile and 
therefore cannot simply be explained by an adjustment to inflation. As inflation rates are 
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relatively stable compared to movements in nominal exchange rate, at least in the short run, 
investors do face exchange rate risk. However, if investors are able to hedge the potential 
exchange rate risk, then the domestic CAPM still holds in the international context.  However, 
investors need to pay premium for hedging exchange rate risk. This suggests that exchange rate 
risk could be an important component in determining expected return and should be a priced 
factor. We further discuss the issue of exchange rate volatility in chapter 3 section 3.3.5. 
 
The above discussion suggests that investors, irrespective of their origins, should hold the world 
market portfolio, provided they completely hedge their exchange rate risk.  
 
2.5.2 International capital market efficiency and market segmentation 
The concept of efficient market is central to finance theory. In an informationally efficient 
market, any new information should be immediately and fully impounded in the price of a 
security. As mentioned above, the general consensus of ICAPM theory is that individual markets 
across the globe are efficient, most probably due to intense competition among professional 
security analysts and managers in each of the individual national markets. However, the degree 
of efficiency differs from country to country, depending on the maturity, liquidity, size and level 
of regulation. The efficient market hypothesis, if it holds, implies that, on average, it is not 
possible to “beat” the market portfolio in any market and therefore the ICAPM should be a 
useful guide in investment policy. Although the national markets may be quite efficient, the 
efficiency of international markets remains debatable. This raises the question: can investors 
exploit international market inefficiency by active country allocation? Solnik and McLeavey 
(2009) claim that there is less analyst competition across countries than within a single domestic 
market.  The issue of world market efficiency is based on the level of market integration and 
segmentation. In an integrated world market, investors should be able to take advantage of 
international inefficiency by moving capital across the world on the basis of new information. 
However, the debate whether market is integrated or segmented involves two concepts related to 
impediments to capital mobility and international asset pricing.  
 
Many authors (Errunza and Losq, 1985, 1989; Eun and Janakiramanan, 1986; Hietala, 1989; and 
Errunza et. al., 1992) claim that international capital markets are not fully integrated because of 
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various investment barriers. Barriers, which impede the flow of capital, may be psychological 
caused by informational asymmetry, legal restrictions, higher transaction costs, discriminatory 
taxation, higher political and foreign exchange risks (see Cooper and Kalpanis, 1986, Harvey, 
1995, Gelos and Wei, 2005 and Chan et al, 2005).  Such barriers tend to restrict or limit the 
mobility of cross-country investment and segment national markets. Similarly, Bekeart and 
Hodrick (2009) also argue that investment barriers segment national markets from the global 
capital markets. Bekaert (1995) and Nishiotis (2004) classify investment barriers into “direct” 
and “indirect” barriers. The direct barriers comprise regulatory restrictions arising from foreign 
exchange control, foreign ownership restrictions, discriminatory taxes and higher trading costs 
(stamp duty). For example, during 1990s, the Korean authorities imposed restriction on foreign 
ownership up to 10% of the total market capitalization. Similar restrictions still exist in countries 
like India and China. The indirect barriers may arise from market specific risks such as poor 
information disclosure and weak investor protection. 
  
Solnik and Mcleavey (2009) report that direct and indirect barriers are more severe in emerging 
markets. Some authors (see Cooper and Kaplanis, 1986 and Zimmermann et al., 2003) model the 
ICAPM taking account of barriers to cross border investments referring to them as potential tax 
on foreign investment. Black (1974) also notes that such tax arises from various kinds of direct 
and indirect barriers to international investment, such as the possible expropriation of foreign 
holdings (investor protection or political risk), direct control on the import and export of capital, 
information asymmetries and restriction on the fraction of a business that can be foreign owned. 
Furthermore, Cooper and Lessard (1981) also develop an international capital market 
equilibrium model incorporating different types of barriers to international investment.  
 
Similarly, impediments to capital flows also affect asset pricing. If financial markets are fully 
integrated, then securities with identical risk characteristics, but listed in two different markets, 
should have identical expected returns and priced identically. A company located in a country, 
which is not fully integrated with the world capital markets, faces a higher cost of capital 
because the firm‟s equity risk is borne by the domestic investors only. If the firm makes it less 
costly for foreign investors to hold its shares, the investors‟ risk is dispersed and therefore the 
cost of capital falls. If markets are segmented, the same security with identical risk features may 
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have different expected returns and priced differently. The presence of restrictions imposes 
additional costs and risks to foreign investments causing market segmentation and thus affecting 
asset pricing. International asset pricing under different forms of market segmentation has been 
studied and more complex asset pricing models have been developed (see Black, 1974; Stapleton 
and subrahmanyam, 1977; Solnik, 1977; Stulz, 1981b; Errunza and Losq, 1985, 1989; Eun and 
Janakiramanan, 1986 and Hietala, 1989; Errunza et. al., 1992). 
 
The above discussion suggests that in a complex world capital markets where direct and indirect 
barriers to capital flows are still in place, particularly for emerging markets, it is intuitive to 
believe that ICAPM may not hold in practice. Cooper and Kaplanis (1986) notes that casual 
empiricism conflicts strongly with the implications of existing ICAPM models and even with 
hedging of exchange rate risk, these models are unable to explain why, relative to world market 
portfolio, global investors‟ portfolio have a large bias towards domestic risky assets. Similarly, 
the models also fail to explain why investors discriminate between countries preferring to 
overweight some countries and underweight others. Cooper and Kalpanis (1986) provide an 
excellent framework modelling the portfolio equity allocation with different deadweight costs 
arising from direct and indirect barriers to foreign equity portfolio investments. As shown in the 
following section, they show why the foreign equity portfolio allocation may not be consistent 
with the suggestion of ICAPM. 
 
2.5.3 Investment barriers/market frictions and Cooper and Kaplanis framework 
Our study uses the theoretical framework of Cooper and Kaplanis (1986), which suggests that in 
the presence of deadweight costs foreign investors do not hold the world market portfolio as 
implied by the international equilibrium setting, i.e. the ICAPM.  Their framework links foreign 
equity portfolio allocation (weights) to the deadweight costs arising from different 
barriers/market frictions to foreign equity portfolio investments. These barriers include 
transaction costs, taxation, capital control and so on. We briefly discuss their model here. For 
elaboration and further technical details please refer Cooper and Kaplanis (1986). 
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Within the framework of Cooper and Kaplanis (1986), each investor is assumed to be mean-
variance risk-averter investor. The objective of such investor is to maximize return for a given 
level of variance. Let‟s consider an investor i with the following optimization function: 
 
subject to  
 
  
       
 
  
    1 
where xi is a column vector of weights containing foreign portfolio weightings, the nth element 
(xin) corresponds to weight of individual i’s total wealth invested in risky assets of country n. R 
denotes the column vector of pre-tax expected returns and ci is the column vector of deadweight 
cost of investor i. The nth element of ci is cin which is the deadweight cost for holding the asset 
in country n. V is the variance/covariance matrix of the gross (pre-cost, pre-tax) returns on the 
risky assets.    is the given constant variance and I is a unity column vector. Now the objective 
of the investor is to optimize equation 2-11 given the two constrains. Equation 2-11 can be 
maximized using the Lagrange method. The corresponding Lagrangean is  
 
 
where h and    are the Lagrange multipliers. In order to maximize the objective function 
(equation 2-11), we need to set its derivative to zero and solve it to produce 
or 
 
where  
    (  
     
   )  2-11 
   (  
     
   )   (   )(  
      )    (  
    ) 2-12 
                  2-13 
    ( 
     )(        )  2-14 
                
39 
   , 
               -  
       
 
Investors should hold the two funds in the absence of any barriers, the world market portfolio 
and the minimum variance zero beta portfolio. Additionally, they hold a fund specific to 
individual investor preference, which is the portfolio with the minimum variance for a specified 
level of deadweight cost. 
 
Now that the individual weights are determined, the latter can be aggregated to end up with 
world capital market equilibrium. Therefore the market clearing condition is 
 
 
where Wi is the proportion of world wealth owned by country i, M  is a column with the 
corresponding ith element of which is Mi and is the proportion of the world market capitalization 
in country i‟s market. Substituting equation 2-14  in equation 2-15 the resultant is 
 
 
 
and subtracting equation 2-16 from equation 2-13 we eliminate R.  
 
But  
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and is defined as the global minimum variance portfolio. Substituting equation 2-18 in equation 
2-17 we obtain 
If there are no barriers to investors for investing in foreign or in home country, then the 
deadweight costs (cin) are zero. In such a case, the right hand side of 2-20 is zero implying that 
all investors should hold the world market portfolio. Consider a case where the covariance 
matrix, V, is diagonal with all variances equal to s
2
 and the deadweight cost of any 
country/investor pair is denoted by c, except for domestic country that is equal to zero. In such 
case, the portfolio holdings of investor i in country n is: 
 
   
Equation 2-21 shows that larger the marginal deadweight cost, c, greater should be the deviation 
of portfolio holdings from the world market portfolio. The above relationship also implies that if 
the cost c of country A is higher than country B, country A will be more underweighted relative 
to world market portfolio than country B. 
 
2.6 Empirical evidence 
Most of aforementioned frameworks show why actual foreign equity portfolio holdings may 
deviate from the world market portfolio as predicted by ICAPM. We discussed the theoretical 
models that incorporate market frictions (deadweight costs) arising from different direct and 
indirect barriers to foreign investments. These frictions are generally violation of the 
assumptions made in ICAPM, i.e. the presence of exchange rate risk, the inefficiency of world 
financial markets and complete integration and the presence of barriers to international 
investments. Stulz (2005) argues that with dramatic increase in cross-border securities trading 
and the removal of formal barriers to international investment, the country-specific 
characteristics effects should matter less. However, this is far from reality because country 
specific barriers to foreign investments and the associated potential risks still remain very 
important. The empirical evidence suggests the country specific features matter for portfolio 
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choice. Chan et al., (2005) claim that the unavailability of high quality bilateral cross-border 
equity portfolio investment data has limited the number of empirical studies in international 
equity portfolio investment. Most of the studies have focused on the U.S. cross border 
investments as data on other countries are not available. On the empirical front, there have been 
several issues studied with majority focusing on home bias as discussed below. 
 
2.6.1 Home bias and investment barriers 
Our study does not model home bias measure rather it investigates allocation of bilateral 
portfolio holdings. However, the survey of home bias literature and possible factors explaining it 
is important in identifying sources that could possibly explain FEPA. ICAPM predicts that each 
investor country should hold the world market portfolio of risk assets. However, it is well known 
that investors, on aggregate, underweight foreign equities and overweight their home equities, a 
phenomenon inconsistent with the suggestions of ICAPM (see French and Poterba, 1999; Cooper 
and Kaplanis, 1994; Tesar and Werner, 1995, Lewis, 1999, Ahearne et al, 2004, Chan et al., 
2005 and Fidora et al. 2007). This phenomenon is commonly known as home bias, which 
suggests that investors are irrational because they shun the potential gains of an internationally 
diversified portfolio. Most of the studies focus on U.S. market and examine the sources of US 
investor‟s home bias (for a good survey, please see Lewis, 1999). Home bias is defined as  
 
Home bias = 1 – 
                                            
                                         
 
 
Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) and French and Porterba (1991) document that on average the 
portfolio of US investors show a high level of home bias towards their domestic security, relative 
to the world market portfolio.  Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) report that in 1991, U.S. investors 
held 98% of their portfolios in domestic securities while their market capitalization had a share 
of 36% in the world market portfolio. Ahearne et al. (2004) show that home bias of US investor 
is decreasing over time (see Figure 2-4 below) but it is still far from the level of allocation 
suggested by ICAPM.  
 
…………Insert Figure 2-4, see page 52  ...………….. 
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The earlier studies on home bias offers three key but conflicting factors to explain home bias. 
First being the need to hedge domestic inflation. Several earlier works (Solnik, 1974b; Sercu, 
1980; Stulz, 1981b, 1983; and Alder and Dumas, 1983) have developed models to investigate 
whether relatively larger demand for domestic assets stems from the need to hedge against 
domestic inflation. All these models predict that as fraction of domestic goods in total 
consumption increases, or as the risk aversion increases, the demand for local securities, in 
contrast to international securities, also increases. In other words, domestic assets seems to 
provide a good hedge against the deviation of PPP,  However, Uppal (1993) develops a home 
bias model  which suggests that it is unlikely that bias towards home is explained by 
consumption toward domestic goods and therefore home bias may not be the consequence of 
demand for hedging domestic inflation. Similarly, Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) using U.S. data 
provide empirical evidence in rejecting the hedging motive as an explanation of equity home 
bias. In a recent study, Giofre (2009) also rejects the domestic inflation-hedging hypothesis. 
 
Another explanation documented by earlier studies is based on institutional barriers to foreign 
investments, such as the limit on level of ownerships. Kohers et al., (2006) suggest that the 
equity returns in developing markets demonstrate relatively lower correlation with the returns of 
developed market and thus provide better diversification opportunities. However, Errunza (1983) 
notes that the developing markets, which are more attractive to  invest from diversification point 
of view, are also the most difficult markets to invest because of severe restrictions on foreign 
investments. As such, restriction on inward foreign investment could be the potential cause for 
the prevalence of home bias. Similarly, in a recent study, Chan et al., (2009) show that because 
there are restrictions on foreign inward portfolio investments in emerging markets, no significant 
diversification could be achieved unless, on average, 20% of the minimum market float is freely 
allowed to foreign investors. However, contradicting the above studies, the third set of factors 
presented in the literature is based on the theoretical models of international capital market 
equilibrium models discussed above. Studies (Black, 1974; Stulz, 1981b, Cooper and Kaplanis, 
1986, 1994 and French and Porterba, 1991) suggest that despite the removal of formal 
restrictions, the existence of taxes in the form of various costs of investing abroad are the 
potential factors leading to home bias. 
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Further, a number of studies (see Zou, 1998; Kang and Stulz, 1997; Baxter and Jermann, 1997) 
have documented the role of information asymmetry in explaining home bias. Brennan and Cao 
(1997) develop a model of international investment based on endowment of information 
differences between foreign and domestic investors. They conjecture that when domestic 
investors hold cumulative information advantage over foreign investors about their own 
domestic assets, foreign investors tend to buy foreign securities during period of higher returns 
on foreign assets and sell when the return is low. Coval and Moskowitz (1999) suggest that 
geographic proximity effect works even within U.S domestic stock portfolios and information 
asymmetries are driving these effects. Ahearne, et al. (2004) and Suh (2005) demonstrate that 
because U.S. domestic investors have relatively more precise information of home securities, 
they are more willing to invest in domestic securities. Similarly, the effect of information 
asymmetry has also been recently corroborated in more comprehensive studies that include a 
number of additional countries other than U.S. (please see Chan at al. 2005 and Fidora et al, 
2007). Bae et al., (2008) measure information asymmetry and relate it to home bias. They 
demonstrate that home analysts in 32 countries make more precise earnings forecasts for home 
stocks than foreign analysts do. On average, the increase in precision is about 8%. Furthermore, 
the magnitude of the home analyst advantage is linked to home bias. When the domestic 
analysts‟ forecasts are more precise compared to foreigners‟ forecast (more information 
asymmetry), foreign investors hold less of that country‟s assets. 
 
However, Jeske (2001) shows that home bias is not accounted by asymmetric information issues 
in some countries and therefore still remains a puzzle.  Similarly, in a recent study, 
Nieuwerburgh et al., (2009) claim that despite domestic investors gaining more information 
about foreign markets, they choose not to profit more from knowing information which others do 
not know. In sharp contrast to all studies claiming home bias arises because domestic investors 
suffer from information asymmetry problem, they show that learning amplifies information 
asymmetry (for details please see Nieuwerburgh et al., 2009). 
 
Dahlquist et al., (2003) offer different explanation. By using data on US portfolio holdings they 
show that countries having weaker investor protection rights receive lower foreign investments. 
They demonstrate that the prevalence of closely held firms in most countries explain home bias 
                
44 
and also show that U.S. investors underweight countries with lower investor protection rights 
measures in place, particularly those rating high on potential risk of expropriation. They suggest 
that investor protection measures, particularly those related to foreign investment may be an 
important factor. Similarly, using comprehensive survey data of U.S. residents‟ holdings of 
foreign securities, Ahearne et al. (2004) demonstrate that indirect barriers (investor protection 
and accounting standard) and information asymmetric factors are important in explaining home 
bias phenomenon. Kho et. al., (2009) merge portfolio and corporate finance theories and 
conclude: “foreign portfolio investors exhibit a large home bias against countries with poor 
governance because their investment is limited by high optimal ownership by insiders (the 
“direct effect” of poor governance) and domestic monitoring shareholders (the “indirect effect”) 
in response to the governance” (p. 1).   
 
Chan at al., (2005) report that bilateral information asymmetry and country specific stock market 
development features are the most important factors explaining home bias. They show that 
transaction costs are correlated with home bias whereas Tesar and Warner (1995) and Warnock 
(2002) suggest that transaction costs do not explain the observed home bias. Haselmann et al., 
(2010) show that after the introduction of the Euro, which mitigateded exchange rate risk and 
transaction costs, home bias has significantly reduced in the Euro region.  
 
Strong and Xu (2003) investigate the determinants of home bias using survey data of fund 
managers‟ view (US, UK, Europe and Japan). Contrary to all previous findings, they show that 
behavioural explanations are more important than institutional explanation. Similarly, a number 
of earlier studies have also reported behavioural factors as determinant of home bias. French and 
Poterba (1991) conjecture that investors may be simply optimistic about their domestic market 
and over-invest in their market. Similarly Shiller et al. (1996) also document the role of 
investors‟ optimism on home market performance. Kilka and Weber (2000) conduct an 
experiment on graduate investment students in U.S. and Germany and find that both groups are 
more biased towards their own domestic stocks. Glassman and Riddick (2001) conclude that the 
required adjustment needed to reflect the perceived riskiness of foreign assets is quite large (2-5 
times the standard deviation of historical estimates for France, Germany, Japan and the United 
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Kingdom). Pastor (2001) and Li (2004) both confirm that investors have very strong subjective 
prior beliefs about the higher risk or lower returns of foreign stocks. 
 
In summary, although the phenomenon of home bias is widely researched, particularly those 
observed by U.S. investors, the results on the possible explanations are inconclusive. A number 
of competing factors including information asymmetry, direct formal regulatory restriction, 
investor protection, stock market development features and behavioural factors have been 
documented in the literature but the home bias still remains a highly debatable puzzle in 
international finance. 
 
2.6.2 Bilateral cross-country trade (gravity models) and investment barriers 
A small number of studies have also investigated the role of bilateral information asymmetry on 
the determinants of international trade in assets, particularly securities. According to Portes and 
Rey (2005) a „gravity model’ has been extensively used in modelling cross-country trade of 
goods and services since the 1960s. It aims to explain the bilateral determinants of trade flow 
between two countries using factors such as distance, language, culture and other bilateral 
variables. For instance, Frankel and Rose (1998) demonstrate that trade between two pair 
countries depends on the correlation of business cycles and distance. Based on these models 
some studies have also made use of the bilateral factors to control or explain home bias. In more 
recent studies (Chan et al., 2005 and Fidora et al., 2007) pair country factors such as distance 
between capital cities, common language, bilateral trade and equity market correlation are used 
to model home bias. Except for correlation, all bilateral factors are shown to be statistically 
significant. 
 
2.6.3 Portfolio holdings and investment barriers 
Portes and Rey (2005), Chan et al. (2005) and Fidora et al. (2007) all note that empirical 
evidence in the area of international portfolio holdings have been constrained by the 
unavailability of quality and bilateral equity holdings data. Most the studies are based on 
investments by U.S investors and investigate the issue of home bias. The only exceptions are 
Dahlquist et al., (2003) and Gelos and Wei, (2005). Dahlquist et al, (2003) use the data of U.S. 
investors cross-country holdings for the year 1997 obtained from US Treasury Department and 
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notes that in the absence of home bias and closely held shares variable, the coefficient on the 
world market portfolio should be one (i.e. the ICAPM holds). However, the coefficient is 0.1496 
with t-statistics of 5.59. When they use the world float portfolio, taking account of the freely 
traded equities, the coefficient is 0.1610 with t-statistics of 14.68. However, when both the 
variables are used, only the world float portfolio is significant. They also find the variable of 
closely held share to be highly significant but they note that just because the closely held share 
variable is significant, it does not imply the absence of home bias effect. In fact, the presence of 
closely held firms creates home bias. Similarly, they do not find general investor protection 
measures, except for the risk of expropriation, stock market openness and development to be 
significant. This is in sharp contrast to the results reported by Chan et al. (2005) and Gelos and 
Wei (2005), both of which finds stock market development measures to be significant in country 
allocation decisions. The latter use more comprehensive data than Dahlquist et al. (2003). 
Similarly, Dahlquist et al. (2003) results also contradicts with finding of Agarwal et al., (2005) 
who show that US investors tend to hold higher level of portfolio in countries with better 
investor protection measures. Gelos and Wei (2005) use a propriety micro data on emerging 
markets mutual funds and show how level of transparency affects portfolio holdings for the 
emerging markets only. 
 
Apart from conflicting results, existing studies, mentioned above, also do not address the issue of 
robustness, particularly the country specific effect in all their empirical methods. 
 
2.7 Gap and contribution of the study 
We first discuss the contribution of the first three empirical studies in this chapter. The 
contribution of the final chapter is further discussed in the hypothesis development chapter 
(chapter 3, section 3.4). 
 
The persistence of home bias indicates that, on aggregate, foreign investors allocate relatively 
large fraction of their wealth to domestic assets. This suggests that if we are able to control the 
effect of home bias, we should be able to explain the determinants of foreign equity portfolio 
country allocation. Most the earlier studies in international equity portfolio investment provide 
theoretical explanations of why investors may not hold the world market portfolio i.e. why the 
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ICAPM may not hold in practice. Moreover, as noted earlier, the results of scanty studies 
modelling foreign equity portfolio holdings are inconclusive. A major factor limiting research on 
foreign equity portfolio investment is the lack of cross border holdings data. We make use of the 
recently available high quality bilateral foreign equity portfolio holdings survey data of 
International Monetary Fund known as Co-ordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS). 
Furthermore, Chan et al., (2005) remark that most of the existing studies are from the perspective 
of U.S. investors and they leave the question open whether the explanations of wide cross-
sections of source countries are similar or not? Similarly, few of the existing studies that do 
include multiple source countries only investigate the investment from developed to other 
developed countries (Chan et al., 2005). Compared to developing countries, generally the U.S. 
and other richer countries have more developed equity markets, higher standard of information 
disclosure and better investor protection climate. It is therefore important to examine whether the 
inclusion of developing equity markets as host countries yields similar results or not?   
 
This study makes number of contributions to the existing literature. First, it extends the evolving 
literature on foreign equity portfolio investment by investigating the role of different factors 
(transaction costs, country specific equity market characteristics and investor protection) in 
modelling FEPA.  Our study is the first to use three different components of transaction costs in 
explaining the cross-country equity portfolio allocation. Transaction costs are barely considered 
in any other studies on foreign equity portfolio holdings despite its importance shown by various 
theoretical models (see chapter 3, section 3.1). In our second empirical investigation, we show 
that in addition of stock market development factors reported in the literature, equity market 
volatility and exchange rate volatility are also important explanatory factors. To the best of our 
knowledge, no other study has investigated the role of equity market volatility despite good 
theoretical basis (see chapter 3, section 3.2). In the third empirical study, we attempt to resolve 
the controversial issue of investor protection and foreign equity portfolio holdings. We segregate 
the effect of general investor protection measure (quality of institution) and investor protection 
measure specific to foreign investments (investment profile, see chapter 3, section 3.3), in 
investigating their impact on foreign equity portfolio investment. 
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Second, most of the existing studies are based on U.S. investment data and use cross sectional 
approach in their methodological treatment. However, in our study we pool bilateral data from 
36 countries (developed and developing) for the period of 2001-2006 with 562 bilateral cross 
sectional units and over 3000 observations. Such comprehensive dataset provides rich variation 
(between and within) with countries ranging from most developed like USA, UK, Japan etc. to 
developing countries like India, China, Indonesia and so on. In contrast to the cross-sectional 
approach followed by existing literature, we test our hypotheses using the more efficient random 
effect and the robust fixed effect models within a panel-data framework (see Chapter 5 for the 
advantages of panel data models). 
 
Finally, as portfolio flows have been shown to be of great importance in case of emerging 
markets (Errunza, 2001),  we focus on the dynamics of equity portfolio flows on domestic return 
and possible global financial linkages for four Asian emerging markets using high frequency 
daily equity portfolio data. We combine two strands of literatures, one focussing on long term 
equilibrium relationship and the other on short term dynamics to provide comprehensive 
evidence on the role of foreign equity portfolio flows on global financial linkages of Asian 
emerging markets (for details please see chapter 3, section 3.4).   
 
The following chapter discusses the development of hypotheses and further discusses the 
contribution for each empirical chapter. 
 
2.8 Chapter summary 
The literature on international or foreign equity portfolio investment during the period of 1970-
1990 was dominated by the development of capital market equilibrium models. These theoretical 
models attempted to model different barriers to international investments in testing the ICAPM. 
The objective was to show why foreign investors may not hold the world market portfolio as 
suggested by the ICAPM. 
 
The empirical evidence on testing most of the equilibrium models so far has been constrained by 
the unavailability of high quality cross-country bilateral holdings data. Most existing studies 
include US micro level (mutual fund) data to explain the phenomenon of home bias. The results 
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so far have been inconclusive. A small number of studies have also used the gravity models from 
international trade literature investigating trade of foreign securities. Similarly, even smaller 
numbers of studies have investigated the determinants of foreign portfolio holdings, again 
constrained by unavailability of cross-country bilateral data.  
 
The findings of all the empirical and theoretical studies so far are inconclusive with conflicting 
results with some describing formal direct barriers and others indirect barriers such as investor 
protection, information asymmetry, stock market development, etc. as the possible explanatory 
factors of foreign equity portfolio investments. 
 
The lack of studies modelling foreign equity portfolio holdings and the recent availability of 
cross-country foreign equity portfolio holdings data from IMF motivated us to investigate the 
role of different factors influencing foreign investors‟ decision of cross-country allocation. 
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Table 2-1: Foreign equity portfolio investment (holdings) 
Country Portfolio Allocation 
USA 0.3776 
UK 0.1573 
France 0.1081 
Germany 0.0882 
Japan 0.0794 
Switzerland 0.0533 
Italy 0.0343 
Finland 0.021 
Sweden 0.0209 
Canada 0.0171 
Australia 0.0146 
Belgium 0.0108 
Korea 0.0107 
Indonesia 0.0101 
Russia 0.0058 
Taiwan 0.0058 
Norway 0.0057 
Denmark 0.0056 
Brazil 0.0054 
Austria 0.0045 
Mexico 0.0042 
China 0.0041 
India 0.0031 
Greece 0.0028 
Portugal 0.0027 
Hungary 0.002 
Turkey 0.0019 
Thailand 0.0018 
Poland 0.0017 
Malaysia 0.0015 
NZL 0.0015 
Czech Republic 0.0009 
Argentina 0.0005 
Chile 0.0004 
Philippines 0.0004 
Peru 0.0002 
 
                
51 
Figure 2-1: Trend in world market capitalization 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
Figure 2-2: International Portfolio Diversification 
 
Source: Solnik (1974) 
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Figure 2-3: International Portfolio Diversification with Hedged Portfolio 
 
Source: Solnik (1974) 
 
 
Figure 2-4: Home bias for US investors 
 
Source: Ahearne et al. 2004 
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Chapter 3 Research questions and hypotheses development 
 
3.1 What is the role of transaction costs in explaining FEPA? 
Do investors hold higher proportion of international equity in countries with lower transaction 
costs?  We need to base our argument on good theoretical basis before developing each of the 
factor specific hypotheses. Stulz (1981a) develops an international asset-pricing model 
explaining the effect of transaction costs as one of the barriers to international capital investment. 
However, as transaction costs and turnover should have inverse relationships, Tesar and Werner 
(1995) and Warnock (2002) note that transaction costs do not help explain the observed home 
bias for U.S. investors. They find higher portfolio turnover rate on foreign rather than domestic 
market. Similarly, using data on U.S. equity portfolio and direct measure of transaction costs 
compiled by Elkins/McSherry (for details see section 4.2, page 87), Domowitz et al., (2001) also 
do not find any relationship between transaction costs and home bias detected in U.S. equity 
portfolios. However, in a recent study, Haselmann et al., (2010) demonstrate that after the 
introduction of the Euro in European countries, home bias has diminished because of the 
reduction in transaction costs. Similarly, Chan et al., (2005) using mutual funds data from 26 
developed and emerging markets find that transaction costs are inversely related to foreign bias 
(tendency to over or underweight a foreign market relative to ICAPM). They define foreign bias 
as the ratio of the share of country j in the mutual funds holding of country i to the share of 
country j in the world market portfolio. Based on their result, they note “Intuitively, foreign 
investors would have greater desires to invest more in countries with large stock market 
capitalization, with high stock market turnover, with lower transaction costs, and in non-
emerging markets” (p. 1527). Furthermore, Gelos and Wei (2005) employ turnover ratio as a 
crude measure of liquidity/transaction costs and report similar results.  
 
This above discussion indicates that transaction costs could be a significant factor in explaining 
bilateral foreign equity allocation. Investors may overweight a country with lower transaction 
costs and vice versa. This suggests that after controlling for home bias we should be able to 
demonstrate whether transaction costs have any impact on bilateral cross-country equity 
investment as implied by recent studies (Chan et al, 2005, Gelos and Wei, 2005 and Haselmann 
et al., 2010). 
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Solnik and McLeavey (2004) remark that the impact of transaction costs is often disregarded in 
international portfolio management. They suggest that transaction costs should be accounted in, 
particularly for active global portfolio management, as they significantly vary among countries. 
They further state that higher transaction costs could reduce the expected return and benefits of 
global diversification. To the extent diversification benefits may reduce risk, the incorporation of 
transaction costs could reduce the expected return, thus minimizing the benefits of international 
diversification. This may explain the difference in equity returns between paper portfolio and 
portfolio managed in practice. The importance of transaction costs may be more pronounced 
when investing in thinly traded equity markets, particularly the emerging markets. Solnik and 
McLeavey (2009) suggest that a portfolio manager should strive for the best execution costs for a 
trade. Best execution refers to the most favourable costs the client needs to incur given the 
market condition and circumstances at the time of trade. As explained in the following section, 
execution costs could take different forms with some being explicit and measurable while other 
implicit and more difficult to measure and estimate.  
 
Commissions are major components of transaction costs paid to the brokers and are generally 
negotiated. The level of commission depends on the characteristics of trade, such as liquidity of 
the stock and size of the order. Solnik and McLeavey (2009) note that brokerage commissions on 
stocks tend to be low in the United States and is generally 0.1% of large transactions. Such 
commissions are larger in other countries, typically ranging from 0.1% to 1%, particularly in 
emerging markets. The commission paid by the clients to the brokers, in many cases, not only 
represents the services of execution but it also allows the clients to use the brokers‟ research and 
other services. 
 
Fees are some additional fees need to be paid for compensating for various services, such as 
post-trade settlement costs and stamp duty fees in UK. Commission and fees are explicit costs 
and are measurable with relative ease, but getting the most cost effective execution may not 
necessarily imply the minimization of these costs.  
 
Market impact is an implicit cost that needs to be borne by investors. Execution of transaction 
generally has impact on the price of the security. Market impact refers to the difference between 
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the actual execution price and the market price that would have prevailed had the investor not 
traded on the security. For instance, an order to buy a security, which is relatively larger than a 
normal transaction volume, will generally have significant upward impact on the security, at 
least for a temporary period. As such, one needs to estimate the market impact of the trade. 
Measuring the overall price impact is a difficult task to undertake because the price that could 
have prevailed had the transaction not taken place, i.e. the benchmark price, is not observable. 
One way this is computed is to use the volume-weighted average price on the day of the 
transaction. The key idea is that the unbiased estimate of the benchmark price is the average of 
the low and high price observed. Market impact is then measured as the percentage difference 
between the execution price and this benchmark price. Solnik and McLeavey (2009) note that the 
market price is excessively dependent on the order size, market liquidity for the security traded, 
and the speed of execution sought by the managers. The effect of market impact could be 
extensively significant for institutional investors who usually trade securities in order sizes, 
which are a significant percentage, and even multiple, of the typical daily trading volume for the 
security.  
 
All the above-mentioned costs are incurred on an executed trade. However, in case where 
investors are not able to execute, there is an opportunity cost for non-execution. Such 
opportunity cost refers to the loss (gain) due to delay in the transaction against the stipulated time 
or failure to complete the transaction in full. This could be particularly important in thin market 
which suffers from illiquidity. If it takes hours or days to execute a trade, then the investor could 
suffer significant loss due to adverse movement. For example, a manager might act on privileged 
and costly information to buy but if the price moves up before he is able to execute the 
transaction, it could have significant adverse impact. Similarly greater the delay less the 
opportunity to exploit any privileged information as the delay opens opportunity of information 
leakage.  
 
The above discussion highlights some of the practical issues when dealing with different forms 
of transaction costs. We now explore the literature concerning the impact of transaction costs on 
expected return, diversification benefits and other aspects of security trading. 
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The role and importance of transaction costs in investments is not trivial. A number of studies 
(Constantinides, 1986; Davis and Norman, 1990 and Uppal, 1993) have developed models of 
international portfolio choice incorporating the effect of proportional (variable) transaction costs 
on the reallocation effects of portfolio holdings. A common finding of the studies is that as the 
magnitude of transaction costs increases the reallocation of foreign portfolio decreases in the 
respective equities. Keim and Madhavan (1995) suggest that transaction costs are important in 
determining investment performance and may significantly diminish or possibly outweigh the 
expected value generated by an otherwise good investment strategy.  The consumption and 
portfolio choice model developed by Rowland (1999) shows that as the level of transaction costs 
increases, the rate of portfolio diversification decreases. This implies that despite the well-known 
benefits of international diversification, investors may underweight countries with higher 
transaction costs.  
 
Other studies have also shown that assets with high transaction costs usually trade at a lower 
price relative to their expected cash flows (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Brennan and 
Subrahmanyam, 1996 and Datar et al., 1998).  Furthermore, higher transaction costs shift the 
bias in investment decision towards assets with shorter pay-off, thus reducing the average-
holding period (see Blukey and Harris, 1997 and Green et al., 2000 for details). Similarly, 
Bekaert and Hodrick (2009) confirm that trading cost is generally “priced”. That is, equities with 
otherwise similar characteristics and similar expected cash flows trade at different prices when 
their trading costs are different. This suggests that high transaction costs may reduce the 
incentive to trade and produce thinner markets constraining the potential for mobilizing the 
resources for investment because the cost of equity goes up. 
 
Similarly, Green et al., (2000) using long dataset on UK stock market, suggest that the increase 
in transaction costs also generally increases market volatility, which is probably through thin 
trading effect. They suggest that emerging markets must get the level of transaction costs right in 
order to influence their market volatility. They also note that emerging markets should not only 
focus on those aspects of transaction costs which they use as regulatory measures, such as stamp 
duty but must also concentrate on other components of transaction costs as discussed earlier. De 
Roon et al., (2001) find that for US investors investing in emerging markets, the diversification 
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benefits disappear when short selling and transaction costs are incorporated. They note tests for 
portfolio spanning and intersections have been applied to numerous problems in finance and a 
very important assumption in all such studies is the absence of market friction (transaction 
costs). However, in practice this is not the case and transaction costs are important elements of 
investment strategies. They further note that the presence of high transaction costs is one of the 
key impediments to foreign investments in emerging markets. Using the Emerging Market Data 
Base (EMDB) of the International Finance Corporation (IFC) a number of studies (see Errunza, 
1983 and Harvey, 1995) show that the portfolio of developed market could be significantly 
shifted upward (i.e. the risk-return profile could be improved) when assets from emerging 
markets are included. However, all these studies assume absence of transaction costs, which is an 
unrealistic assumption for emerging markets where generally the transaction costs are 
significantly higher relative to developed markets (Solnik and McLeavey, 2009). Bekaert and 
Urias (1996) strive to overcome this problem by using closed-end country funds as the returns 
are attainable to investors. They report mixed evidence on the benefits of portfolio 
diversification. Errunza et al., (1999) using industry portfolios, multinational corporation stocks, 
closed-end country funds, and American depository receipts, demonstrate that U.S. investors can 
create mimicking portfolios from U.S. traded securities that are highly correlated with the IFC 
emerging market indices. However, they show that direct equity portfolio investment in five out 
of nine emerging markets provide significant diversification benefits beyond diversified 
portfolios created by U.S. traded securities.  However, their study does not include the effect of 
transaction costs.  
 
De Roon et al (2001) use the same IFC indices as in Harvey (1995) but they incorporate 
transaction cost. They conclude that if market frictions are ignored the resulting portfolios of 
United States, Europe or Japan show strong case of diversification benefit when emerging 
markets are added. However, the diversification benefit disappears when transaction costs and 
short sale constraints are incorporated. They demonstrate that with an investment horizon of six 
months and round trip costs of 0.5 percent, the diversification benefits from investing in 
emerging markets are absent. This clearly indicates that investors tend to underweight markets 
with higher transaction costs, particularly the emerging markets. 
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Of course, investor‟s decision to allocate greater proportion of capital to domestic securities may 
be influenced by the home bias. Investors may feel that they are informationally disadvantaged 
while investing in foreign markets and hence they are better off investing more in domestic 
securities. However, as noted earlier, if we control for home bias as well as for factors that have 
been found important in international diversification literature, we should be able to demonstrate 
whether transaction costs significantly influence the international equity portfolio allocations. By 
using a comprehensive dataset of bilateral cross-country foreign equity portfolio holdings and 
four different measures of transaction costs for 36 countries, we examine whether different 
components of transaction costs significantly influence international investor‟s decision to 
underweight or overweight country allocations.   
 
In spite of critical role of transaction costs acknowledged by previous studies, very few have 
examined its influence on international portfolio investment decisions. Chan et al. (2005) use 
transaction costs data of Elkins-Sherry co. in examining how mutual funds of 26 countries 
allocate their investment between domestic and foreign equity markets. However, they do not 
analyse the impact of each component (i.e., commission, fees, and market impact) that makes up 
the Elkin-Sherry co. transaction cost measure. Gelos and Wei (2005) merely control for 
transaction costs by using average turnover ratio as a proxy in examining how their newly 
constructed measures of transparency affect the investment choices of the emerging market 
equity funds. The apparent lack of research on the impact of transaction costs on international 
portfolio allocations is mainly due to unavailability of cross-border bilateral portfolio holdings 
data on a country-by-country basis and good estimates of transaction costs. In this study, we use 
bilateral country-by-country portfolio holdings data recently made available by the IMF and 
provide evidence of the extent to which portfolio allocation choices are influenced by using the 
country level transaction cost estimates maintained by Elkin-Sherry and reported by S&P global 
stock market fact book. 
 
Our study makes important contributions to the existing literature. First, while controlling for the 
home bias phenomenon we show the role of transaction costs in demonstrating why certain 
countries receive higher or lower levels of foreign equity portfolio allocations than others. 
Second, we use an extensive dataset comprising bilateral portfolio holdings for 36 developed and 
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developing countries over a recent period of 2001 to 2006 with over 500 bilateral cross sectional 
units and approximately 3000 observations enabling us to comprehensively examine our research 
hypotheses. Finally, in contrast to most of the previous studies that use cross-sectional approach, 
we test our hypotheses robustly by using the random effect, fixed and between effect panel data 
models. 
 
We test the following hypotheses: 
 
H1  Countries with lower level of average commission attract higher level of FEPA. 
 
H2 Countries with lower level of average fees attract higher level of FEPA. 
 
H3 Countries with lower level of average market impact cost attract higher level of FEPA. 
 
3.2 Summary of findings 
The results show that all three direct measures of transaction costs (commission, fees and market 
impact) distinctly and significantly affect investment allocation choices and countries with lower 
transaction cost seem to attract greater foreign equity portfolio investment. There are two 
important implications of this result. First, future research on international portfolio 
diversification cannot afford to ignore the role of transaction costs in country allocation 
decisions. Second, national policy makers should aim to reduce transaction costs for attracting 
higher levels of foreign equity portfolio investments.  
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3.3 What is the influence of country specific equity market characteristics on FEPA? 
What is the role of country-specific equity market characteristics in explaining cross sectional 
and temporal variation in foreign equity portfolio allocation? We answer the question using 
bilateral cross-country equity investments and various country-specific equity market features. 
As mentioned earlier, there could be direct legal barriers to foreign portfolio investment, such as 
different legal status accorded to foreign and domestic investors (Bekaert, 1995). Similarly, the 
presence of indirect barriers, such as quality, timely and reliable macro and corporate 
information, investor protection and accounting standards may also restrict foreign equity 
portfolio investment (see Bekaert and Harvey, 1995, 2003; Errunza, 2001; and Hunter, 2006). 
Further, market specific risks, such as size (breadth), liquidity (depth), transaction costs and 
informational efficiency of capital market, commonly known as stock market development 
factors, could also potentially affect foreign investment (Chan et al., 2005).  Our second 
empirical work focuses on country specific equity market characteristics and makes important 
contributions to the literature.  
 
First, we try to explain the role of country-specific equity market characteristics in explaining the 
cross sectional and temporal variation of why certain countries receive more or less foreign 
portfolio allocation than others? Apart from Gelos and Wei (2005) who focus on emerging 
markets only and Chan et al., (2005) who explain foreign bias, no study has undertaken 
comprehensive empirical study to investigate why different countries receive different level of 
foreign equity portfolio investments or foreign investors hold different level of FEPA.  
 
Second and as noted earlier, we pool bilateral data from 36 countries (developed and developing) 
for the period of 2001-2006 with over 500 cross-section units and over 3000 observations. Such 
comprehensive cross sectional and temporal dataset provide rich variation to test our hypothesis 
robustly by using panel data models. Baltagi (1995) suggests that a panel data set-up, compared 
to cross-section and/or time series data, is more informative, exhibit less collinearity among the 
variables and provide more variability, greater degrees of freedom and higher efficiency. Panel 
set-up thus produces more reliable parameter estimates. Similarly, application of fixed effect 
model controls for individual heterogeneity for more robust estimates. Models not controlling for 
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individual heterogeneity run the risk of resulting in biased estimates. Methodological details are 
explained in the subsequent chapters (see chapter 5).  
 
Finally, we show that in addition to the variables used in the existing literature there are other 
important market-specific factors that should be used in modelling foreign portfolio allocation. 
Such additional sources so far been ignored in the literature despite sound theoretical basis for 
their inclusion in modelling FEPA. Two such factors are market-specific stock market volatility 
and foreign exchange rate risk. We discuss the theoretical justifications for their inclusion in the 
subsequent sections.  
 
3.3.1 Stock market development/size and FEPA 
Levine and Zervos (1998) claim that market which is more developed in terms of size (breadth) 
positively enhances the ability of mobilizing capital and diversify risk. Bekaert and Harvey 
(2000) and Chan et al., (2005) propose that foreign investors tend to invest more in markets that 
are bigger and relatively more developed. Motivated by the measure used by Levine and Zervos 
(1998), our study uses the logarithmic ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP as a measure 
of stock market development and size. La Porta et al., (1998) note that the former measure 
reflects the breadth of equity market capitalization capturing the significance of stock market in 
the economy. The first hypothesis we test, as reported below, is whether stock market 
development/size matters for foreign investors. 
 
H4 Stock market development/size has positive influence on FEPA. 
 
3.3.2 Market liquidity and FEPA 
Ngugi et al., (2005) consider stock market microstructure as an institutional framework defining 
the return generating process. For our study, we use liquidity as one of the sources of micro-
structural effect. Liquidity refers to the ability to transact quickly without substantially moving 
prices (Glen, 1994). Ngugi et al., (2005) note that the definition of liquidity encompasses a 
number of transactional properties of the market. These properties are tightness (cost of turning 
around a position over a short period), depth (size of an order flow innovation required to change 
prices by a given amount) and resiliency (speed with which prices recover after a random 
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uninformative shock). Madhavan (1992) claims that market depth, which measures sensitivity of 
prices to order flow, is influenced by the quality of information acquired by market markers. 
Higher the information asymmetry lower will be market depth and consequently, lower the 
market liquidity. This suggests that market efficiency also has direct impact on market liquidity. 
However, Cornell and Sirri (1992) conjecture that market liquidity increases with information 
asymmetry as insiders are able to exploit private information and obtain superior trade relative to 
the contemporaneous liquidity trades. This implies that the presence of informed traders in the 
market may not reduce market liquidity (see Ngugi et al., (2005) for further discussion). 
 
Solnik and McLeavey (2009) conjecture that large institutional investors are generally careful 
and may only invest very small part of their portfolio in markets with smaller market 
capitalization and poor liquidity. It may be difficult for large institutional investors to get out of 
the small and illiquid market and even if they do, the cost could be potentially very high. In an 
illiquid market, an excellent positive performance on the overall index may not translate into 
similar gains for a particular portfolio because of significant price drop when the portfolio is 
liquidated. Thus, the effect of liquidity may partially explain why despite higher returns offered 
by emerging markets (Kohers et al., 2006) international investors underweight them. 
 
The other risk of liquidity is the imposition of capital control measures by state authorities 
preventing foreign investors from liquidating their portfolio positions and repatriate proceeds. 
For example, following the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Malaysian government decided to re-
impose capital control measures in order to prevent recurrence of stock market crisis caused by 
rapid exit by foreign investors (see Bekaert and Harvey, 2003). 
 
Solnik and McLeavey (2009) suggest that investors who believe that markets are not fully 
efficient may not hold investments in the same proportion as suggested by ICAPM. Lack of 
liquidity has been mentioned as one of the key factors that demands additional risk premium and 
the determination of the risk premium is one of the key inputs in the tactical asset allocation 
decision. It is generally known that trade on assets with lower liquidity is executed at lower price 
relative to their expected cash flows (e.g., Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Brennan and 
Subrahmanyam, 1996 and Datar et al., 1998). This implies that for illiquid assets investors 
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demand extra risk premium and therefore demand higher required rates of return. This further 
indicates that foreign investors may underweight countries with illiquid markets if liquidity risks 
are not adequately priced. The effect of liquidity may be more pronounced in emerging markets 
where it may take considerable time to execute transaction (Bekaert et al., 2007).  
 
Following Levine and Zarvos (1998) and Ngugi et al., (2005) we use the turnover ratio (Market 
Liquidity) as the proxy for capturing market liquidity. Turnover ratio measures trading volume 
associated with a unit change in stock price. Levine and Zarvos (1998) state that although not a 
direct theoretical measure of liquidity, higher turnover is negatively related to transaction costs. 
This suggests that turnover ratio can also proxy the level of trading costs. Bekaert and Hodrick 
(2009) claim that turnover is inversely related to costs of trading equities because high trading 
costs cause investors to trade less. Amihud and Mendelson (1986) also corroborate the inverse 
relationship between turnover and trading costs. Bekaert and Hodrick (2009) further suggest that 
turnover is often regarded as an indicator of liquidity although it can also reflect the arrival of 
news that instigates trades. Damodaran (2010) remarks that one of the minimum requirements 
for a market to be efficient and therefore prices to be the best estimates of true values is that 
trading should be inexpensive, instantaneous and easy. This conjecture implies that liquidity 
measures may also reflect the degree of market efficiency. Following the literature, we test the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H5 Foreign investors prefer to overweight markets with higher liquidity. 
 
3.3.3 Emerging markets and FEPA 
Studies show that compared to markets in advanced countries emerging capital markets are less 
developed in terms of market development/size (Chan et al., 2005) and market efficiency 
(Harvey, 1995a, b and Fama and French, 1998). Chan et al., (2005) demonstrate that foreign 
investors significantly underweight emerging equity markets relative to the suggestion of 
ICAPM. Emerging equity markets, in contrast to their developed counterparts, are not only 
smaller in market capitalization but the industrial diversification in their stock market is also not 
broad enough to achieve adequate diversification for mitigating firm specific risks. For details, 
please refer Solnik and McLeavey (2009). 
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Similarly, in case of pricing efficiency, Harvey (1995a, b) note that returns in emerging markets 
are more predictable than developed markets. Harvey (1995b) provides empirical evidence on 
the inefficiency of emerging markets and attributes it to infrequent trading and slower adjustment 
to information released in the market. Similarly, Fama and French (1998) and Rouwenhorst 
(1999) demonstrate that market characteristics in emerging markets can be exploited to generate 
excess return over a given benchmark. 
 
Damodaran (2010) argues that the release of timely and reliable information is an important 
element for valuing equity prices. However, information are sometime suppressed, delayed or 
fabricated by some firms, particularly if they hold bad news. He further claims that the potential 
for distortions is greater in emerging markets where information disclosure laws and corporate 
governance practices are weaker. For example, in 2008, the CEO and the top management of the 
highly acclaimed Satyam Computers stepped down after admitting to accounting fraud. Gelos 
and Wei (2005) use emerging markets mutual funds to demonstrate how lower level of 
transparency (corporate and macroeconomic policy) depresses the level of international 
investments. They also provide evidence that during 1997 Asian crises foreign investors left 
opaque markets at a much faster pace compared to the speed of exit in more transparent markets. 
Furthermore, Gelos and Wei (2002) claim that herding behaviour among investors tend to be 
more prevalent in less transparent countries, particularly emerging markets. They argue that 
when dealing with less transparent countries foreign investors‟ decisions are influenced more by 
what other investors are doing as opposed to a rational and independent assessment of market 
fundamentals. 
 
The above discussion on the level of stock market development and price/informational 
efficiency suggest that the emerging market dummy we use in our regressions should be 
negatively associated with portfolio allocation. The significance of the dummy should provide 
indication that foreign investors prefer markets that are well developed in terms of market 
breadth and pricing/informational efficiency. Consequently, we test the following hypothesis: 
 
H6 Foreign investors prefer to underweight emerging markets. 
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3.3.4 Market volatility and FEPA 
Drawing on the theoretical framework of Cooper and Kaplanis (1986), discussed in chapter 2, it 
is shown that variance negatively affects stock returns. Since variance is associated with total 
risk, foreign investor may avoid countries with higher stock market volatility. Similarly, equation 
2-14 of Cooper and Kaplanis (1986) framework suggest an inverse relationship between foreign 
investors‟ portfolio allocation (xi) and volatility (V) as shown below: 
 
   ( 
     )(        ) 
 
However, despite sound theoretical basis there are not many studies that use volatility measures 
in modelling FEPA.   
 
In line with our theoretical framework, we test the following hypothesis: 
 
H7 Foreign investors prefer to underweight markets with higher equity market volatility. 
 
3.3.5 Exchange rate risk and FEPA 
Solnik and McLeavy (2004) remark that currency risk premium must be earned by foreign 
investors for taking systematic risk which cannot be diversified away. They claim that despite 
diversification across countries, currency risk will always remain because currency movement 
influences all securities. The aggregate world market portfolio is sensitive to currency risk and 
should be taken into consideration in international portfolio management. This implies that just 
as volatility of equity markets denote the risk of the equity return, volatility attributed to currency 
movement should also affect investors‟ decision (see Solnik and McLeavey, 2004). Following 
the risk-return relationship argument of the international capital asset pricing model (ICAPM), 
investors should therefore underweight countries with higher movements in real exchange rate, 
particularly if pricing do not justify the risk. This may be particularly important when investing 
in emerging markets where exchange rates exhibit higher volatility relative to developed 
markets. In the following section, we explore the sources of exchanges rate risk encountered by a 
foreign investor. 
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As noted earlier, if the purchasing power parity relationship holds, there is no exchange rate risk 
because the movement in the differential inflation rate compensates the changes in exchange 
rate. However, there is extensive literature (see chapter 2 for details) which shows that deviations 
from absolute and relative purchasing power parity are observed almost all the time and between 
all the countries. Studies (see Alder and Dumas, 1983) claim that on average the PPP 
relationship tends to zero over long periods. However, there is extensive evidence that in the 
short run the PPP relationship fails to hold, thus adding a new dimension to international 
valuation theories that does not exist in the domestic asset pricing models (see section 2.5.1, 
Chapter 2). One of the principal reasons why PPP deviates from the theoretical prescription is the 
way real returns are determined. Domestic investors first convert the nominal return, gained by 
investing in foreign assets, into domestic return and subsequently deflate it with domestic 
inflation applying the domestic consumer price index (CPI). If the PPP relationship does not 
perfectly holds then investors in different countries have different notions of real return for the 
same asset because changes in inflation rates in both countries do not perfectly compensate 
movements in exchange rates. As such, the deviation of PPP is the core problem of international 
valuations affecting returns for domestic investors. Most of the asset pricing models define a 
country as a subset of investors who utilizes the identical CPI to deflate the nominal returns, 
which in reality is not the case.  
 
Zimmermann et al., (2003) also state that the assumptions of the international capital asset 
pricing model that all investors have the same tastes, face the same set of consumption 
opportunities and PPP holds all the time do not represent the real world. Investors do not have 
same preferences over consumption across countries. Additionally, transportation costs, taxes, 
tariffs, and other barriers to trade and international investment, are the sources of differences in 
the structure of relative prices across countries. Similarly, the structure of relative prices changes 
differently over different periods in different countries. This suggests, particularly in the short 
run, the representative consumption basket differ in a time-varying manner across different 
countries and therefore there is no reason for PPP to hold. Because of the differences in 
consumption opportunities investors face exchange rate risk. Further, Solnik (1974b) also 
demonstrates in his model that exchange rate risks originate from unforeseen deviations from 
PPP.  Any deviation from PPP affects the risk-return characteristics of internationally traded 
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assets and the effect is different for investors from different countries. This implies that the 
hedging properties of same asset, given changes in the cost of consumption, also varies 
according to countries. As investors are willing to hedge against the variability observed in the 
price of their consumption basket, prevalence of exchange rate risk causes different pricing 
demands of same set of assets across different countries and therefore different expected return. 
Consequently, investors in different countries choose different sets of efficient portfolios 
exposing them to real exchange rate risk when holding foreign assets. In line with 
aforementioned discussion, we test the following hypothesis: 
 
H8 Foreign investors tend to underweight markets which exhibit higher real exchange rate 
volatility. 
 
3.4 Summary of findings 
Our study confirms that country-specific stock market characteristics, i.e. market breadth, 
liquidity, transaction cost, market efficiency and market volatility, are the key factors in 
explaining the wide variation in bilateral FEPA. In our sample, we find that country-specific 
equity market characteristics explain almost 45% of the total variation in FEPA including the 
stock market and exchange risk volatility measures. An important implication of the findings, 
particularly for the developing countries, is that by improving the breadth, liquidity and 
information/transaction efficiency of capital markets, countries should be able to attract higher 
levels of foreign equity portfolio investments. 
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3.5 Does investor protection matter? 
Stulz (2005) notes that despite the theoretical case following the marginal productivity of capital 
and the evidence on the gradual removal of formal barriers in emerging countries foreign 
investors hold relatively larger proportion of foreign equities of developed countries compared to 
developing countries. He posits that in the presence of poor country governance firms are usually 
valued less by the capital markets. Stulz (2005) exemplifies that following the marginal 
productivity theory an equity portfolio investment of US$ 100 might be more productive in 
Indonesia than in United States. However, the investment will most probably not take place in 
Indonesia if investors expect to receive higher return on their investment in United States. Poor 
governance in Indonesia prevents foreign investors in receiving the full benefits on their 
investment because third parties reap the benefits before they are actually received by the outside 
investors. For example, the controlling shareholders might spin off the earnings for their own 
private benefit rather than providing the expected return to outside investors. Similarly, Stulz 
(2009) also argues that the quality and timely disclosure of important information by the state 
may have important influence on a country‟s welfare, firms and investors‟ portfolios, including 
the degree to which foreign shareholdings observe home bias.  
 
Bekaert and Hodrick (2009) argue that indirect barriers (information disclosure and investor 
protection) to international investments could be reduced through better corporate governance. It 
is well known that foreign investor made great losses during the 1997-98 East Asian crises due 
massive depreciation of currency and decline in their stock market. Johnson et al., (2000) note 
that the weakness of the legal institutions, which promotes effective corporate governance, in 
part, played an important role in the sharp depreciation of the currency and massive downfall of 
the East Asian stock markets fetching huge losses to foreign investors. Dialog (1999) 
demonstrates the vulnerability of foreign investors to expropriation during 1997-98 Asian crises. 
He notes that Korean minority shareholders (including foreign investors) of large firms, that 
included global companies such as Samsung Electronics, objected to the transfer of cash 
resources to other entities and private parties. These transfers were mainly targeted to support 
loss making subsidiaries, pay off the managements‟ personal debt and in some cases the funds 
went directly into foreign bank account.  
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The importance of investor protection has also been extensively emphasized as one of the key 
factors explaining the cross sectional differences in the development of capital markets and the 
ability of corporations to raise external finance. Stulz (2005) argues that if legal and contractual 
rights of minority shareholders are not well protected then those who control the firms‟ activities 
(large shareholders and managers, also called insiders) can more easily exploit the firm‟s 
resources for their own private benefits. The source of investor protection is described by Jensen 
and Meckling (1976)‟ classical agency problem. They note that insiders use the profits of the 
firm to benefit themselves rather than returning the benefits to outside investors.  The vast 
literature on the agency costs of managerial discretion (see La Porta et al., 1997 and Stulz, 2005) 
describes how management can pursue investment activities that are not in the interest of 
shareholders rather targeted to fulfil their own private welfare. Bekaert and Hodrick (2009) argue 
that private benefits of control by the insiders may lead a firm to make suboptimal decisions (for 
its shareholders, including foreign shareholders) with respect to investment, recruitment and 
others. They conjecture that such practices prevail in countries with poor investor protection and 
poor accounting standards. They further note that the list of such countries not only includes 
developing but also many European countries where the prevalance of private benefits of control 
may be substantial and can depress stock prices. 
 
Cross country differences in corporate governance are investigated in a number of influential but 
controversial articles by economist Rafael La Porta, Lopex-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Rob 
Vishny (LLSV, 1997, 1998, 2000). The LLSV studies show that the investor protection measures 
across the countries correlates strongly with a classification of the legal systems based on the 
idea of “legal origin”. The primary distinction being between English common law countries, 
such as Canada, U.S.A and U.K; French civil law countries, such as Belgium, France and Italy; 
German civil law countries, such as Austria, Germany and Switzerland and Scandinavian civil 
law countries, such as Denmark, Finland and Sweden. The general conclusion of LLSV articles 
is that the English common law countries provide higher investor protection rights compared to 
civil law countries and others. 
 
LLSV demonstrate that the legal origin correlates well with concentration of ownership, the size 
of the stock market, and the level of dividend payments. For instance, in civil law countries with 
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lower investor protection rights, corporate ownership is much more concentrated than the 
English common law countries. LLSV also confirm that countries with greater legal protection of 
investor rights have higher number of firms listed on the public stock market, larger corporate 
valuation and higher economic growth. LLSV (1997) conjecture that the differences observed in 
the breadth, depth, and market efficiency of financial system around the world can be partly 
attributed to the variations in investor protections against expropriation by insiders. This is 
reflected in the country‟s legal rules and the quality of their enforcement. They provide evidence 
that legal rules and the quality of enforcement greatly differ across countries. They further claim 
that although reputation and bubbles may help raise external funds in few cases, variations in 
legal protection and its enforcement are central to understanding why firms raise more funds in 
some countries than in others. To a significant extent external investors provide finance to firm 
because their rights to the premium for bearing risk are protected by law. Minority investors are 
more vulnerable to expropriation, and are hence dependent on the quality of a country‟s law and 
their effective observance. They are willing to invest more in countries where they hold higher 
confidence in the legal institutions.  
 
However, China reflects an important counterexample. Allen et al., (2005) argue that China does 
not have well-developed legal and financial system but is it still experiencing extraordinary real 
growth. Furthermore, while China constitutes a large state-controlled sector, yet it is the private 
sector that is driving their economic growth. This signifies that alternative financing channels 
and corporate governance mechanism, possibly based on reputation considerations, may also 
promote the growth of the private sector. This counterexample is somewhat moderated by 
Miskin (2006). He argues that like the former Soviet Union during 1950s and 1960s, China‟s 
economic growth is fuelled by high saving rate, massive build-up of capital and shifts of large 
pool of underutilized labour from subsistence agriculture to manufacturing. However, in case of 
Soviet Union, as the pool of subsistence labours was used up, growth slowed dramatically and 
the country was not able to keep up with Western economies. The Chinese example implies that, 
in the early stages of development, economic growth may be rapid even in the face of weak 
regulatory and financial development. However, to reach the next stage of development and 
eventually become rich, China may need to allocate their capital more efficiently. To achieve 
this, China needs to develop institutional infrastructure and develop their financial system 
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ensuring they direct capital to its most productive sector. Chinese leadership is well aware of this 
challenge but, as Miskin (2006) notes, whether China will succeed is an open question? 
 
LLSV (1997) further corroborate that developed countries are better at enforcing the investor 
protection measures than developing countries implying that as countries develop over time the 
quality of enforcing their legal rules protecting interest of shareholders and creditors also 
improves. Using 49 countries of different legal origin, they conclude that a good legal 
environment is significantly related to the development of a country‟s capital market. They argue 
that because good legal environment protect investors against expropriation by entrepreneurs 
(insiders), the potential financiers‟ willingness to surrender funds in exchange of securities is 
raised.   
 
LLSV (2000) suggest that investor protection turns out to be crucial because, in many countries, 
expropriation of minority shareholders by the controlling shareholders and managers is 
extensive. Foreign investors, who are among the outside investors, finance corporations not only 
in expectation of return but also how well their interest is protected from expropriation by the 
controlling shareholders, managers and the state. LLSV (1997) exemplify various forms of 
expropriation. They note that expropriation may be direct theft of profit or the selling of the 
outputs, assets or securities to other firms at a significantly cheaper price for private benefits of 
insiders. Although legal, but such form of transfer pricing, asset stripping, and investor dilution 
is regarded as theft and erodes trust. In other circumstances, expropriation takes the form of 
diversion of corporate opportunities from the firm, employing unqualified family members in 
managerial positions, or overpaying executives.  
 
Mishkin (2006) also suggests that usually there is a positive correlation between a good system 
of law and a well-developed financial system. He uses U.S. as an exemplar of Anglo-Saxon legal 
system, and claims that it is among the wealthiest countries in the world, with a financial system 
which is relatively more efficient at putting capital to new and productive uses, such as in the 
technology sector. He concludes that the Anglo-Saxon legal system is a big plus for the U.S and 
therefore conjectures that a sound legal system, establishing and enforcing good property right 
contracts, is important for producing wealth. He further notes that by just having laws on the 
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book and a high number of lawyers to protect property rights and enforce contract is not enough 
to encourage the allocation of capital to its most productive uses, which is key to economic 
growth. For example, Philippines has a legal system based on U.S. law, yet its judiciary is known 
to be one of the most inefficient in the world. As such, given the high cost of contract 
enforcement, the Philippines has enjoyed much lower growth rates than the rest of the Asia. 
  
Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) construct a model wherein an insider or an entrepreneur who sets 
up a firm has chances of being caught and fined if the entrepreneur expropriates minority 
shareholders. They demonstrate that the probability of such entrepreneurs of being caught is 
higher in countries with better shareholders protection. Similar to other studies their model also 
predicts that better investor protection leads to greater recourse to external finance by firms. 
 
Stulz (2005) develops model of international portfolio investment grounded in the stylized fact 
of LLSV (1999). He focuses on the issue that outside the U.S. and the U.K., firms ownership are 
not diffused but are rather controlled by large shareholders (also refer to Claessens et al., 2000 
and Faccio and Lang, 2002). They conjecture that all investors risk expropriation by the state and 
the outside investors additionally risk expropriation by the corporate insiders i.e. inside 
shareholders and/or firm managers. Efficient contracting dictates that when the state and 
corporate insiders‟ propensity to expropriate increase, the corporate insiders must co-invest more 
with other investors in equilibrium. These risks are country-specific because, subject to the 
constraints and trade-off based on the country‟s characteristics such as history, law, location, 
political ideology and economic development, those who control state activities can establish, 
enforce, and break rules affecting investors‟ payoff. When the risks of expropriation are high, it 
is optimal for the corporate ownership to be highly concentrated. Such concentrated ownership 
impedes economic growth, risk-sharing, financial development, and the beneficial impact of 
financial liberalization. As such, a model with market frictions, such as poor investor protection, 
explains that the beneficial impact of financial globalization is smaller than it would be in model 
without such frictions.  Stulz (2005) argues that country attributes are still critical to financial 
decision-making because of what he calls “twin agency problem” (described below). Twin 
agency problem explains the the practice where corporate insiders (major shareholders and 
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managers) and rulers of sovereign states purse their own interest at the expense of outside 
(minority) investors. 
 
Stulz (2005) notes that corporate insider appropriate private benefits and expropriate outside 
investors because they are always looking to maximize their own private benefits instead of 
putting the value maximization of outside investors as their primary objective. Such activity by 
the insiders generates “the agency problem of corporate insider discretion”. Such benefits could 
take any form, from overspending on corporate plans (receiving outside commission/financial 
bribes) to outright theft. The magnitude of the cost of extracting private benefits significantly 
depends on the rights granted and the degree to which these rights are protected by the state. 
When such costs of benefiting corporate insiders at the expense of outside investors are high, 
diffused ownership is dominated over concentrated ownership as co-investment by the corporate 
insiders aligns their benefits better with minority share holders and hence, limits expropriation of 
the outsider (minority) shareholders.  
 
Similarly, the “agency problem of state ruler discretion” is associated with the expropriation 
activities of the state. North (1981) discriminates between a predatory and contracting theory of 
the state. With the practice of contracting theory the state makes it easier for private parties to 
enter into mutually beneficial contracts and the state acts as protector by enforcing these 
contracts. However, how well does the state perform depends on the level of country‟s 
endowments, on its level of financial and economic development, efficiency of political 
institutions and on the incentives enjoyed by the rulers. It is extremely difficult for a state to 
perform the role of protecting contruactual rights efficiently when anarchy and disorder prevail. 
Though the state has the power to fight anarchy and disorder, they may themselves abuse the 
power to maximize their own private welfare. By doing so, state affects the payoffs of investors 
and corporate insiders, benefiting some (corporate insiders) and hurting others (outside 
shareholders). By “state expropriation”, this study refers to the action initiated by the state to 
improve their private welfare and negatively affect the return on corporate investments.  Stulz 
(2005) documents that state expropriation can take the form of outright confiscation to 
formulating and imposing regulations that favours the current rulers. Such discretion of rulers 
who abuse their power and authority for their private benefits creates agency problem referred as 
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“the agency problem of state ruler discretion”. When such agency problem is substantial it leads 
to inefficiency in the practice of corporate professional management and atomistic shareholder 
base. The widespread ownership structure becomes inefficient because mangers are able to 
reduce the risks of state expropriation by initiating activities that improves their own discretion 
and makes the effort of monitoring (by outsiders) their activities difficult. In such case, the 
managers become entrenched and therefore can take advantage of atomistic shareholders. In 
contrast, the controlling shareholders have far greater incentives to take action against state 
expropriation than the professional managers do and therefore ownership concentration tends to 
increase as the importance of state ruler agency problem becomes more prevalent.  Stulz (2005) 
specifies wide range of state expropriation activities such as taxing the cash flows, confiscating 
assets, forbidding particular activities, or requiring bribes to acquire personal benefits. For 
technical details of the model please refer Stulz (2005). 
 
Based on the model of “twin agency problem” Stulz (2005) shows how the agency problem 
could affect the decision of foreign investor in a pair country circumstance.  Their model predicts 
that countries with poor governance have relatively lower proportion of wealth owned by foreign 
investors because corporate insiders have larger ownership of share in such countries. Similarly, 
countries with higher state expropriation have lower fraction of wealth owned by foreign 
investors, all else equal. This implies that as the investor protection environment improves, 
ownership becomes more atomistic and foreign investors share should increase. He also notes 
that foreign investors typically have portfolios that exhibit a number of biases suggesting many 
variables may turn out to be useful in explaining the portfolio they hold. 
 
In a similar study Doige et al., (2007) differentiate between investor protection granted by the 
state and investor protection adopted by individual firms. They show that the extent to which 
individual firms select to improve upon investor protection is dictated by the state requirements 
of the costs and benefits of doing so. They claim that in countries with weaker legal 
development, it is expensive for firms to improve investor protection because the lack of 
institutional infrastructure and good governance in such countries is associated with higher 
political costs. They further add that in such countries the payoffs from improving governance 
are smaller because the capital markets lack the required depth and breadth. They find that there 
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is complementarity between county level investor protection and firm level governance. 
However, they also argue that as country gradually move towards financial globalization, the 
country characteristic are reduced increasing the incentives for good governance. 
 
Further, as hinted earlier, there is extensive literature that relates important features of capital 
market to the differences in the legal protection accorded to investors from expropriation by the 
controlling shareholders and managers. For example, LLSV (1997) suggest that better protection 
of shareholders is associated with higher number of listed stocks, whilst Eleswarapu and 
Venkataraman (2006) show that with better investor protection regulations; stocks of listed firms 
enjoy larger turnover and higher liquidity. Others have reported that a strong legal framework for 
investor protection leads to: higher firm valuation relative to their book value (Claessens et al., 
2002), higher dividend pay-outs (La Porta et al., 2000), widespread control of ownership (La 
Porta et al., 1999) and reduced managerial private benefits (Zingales, 1994 and Nenova, 2003).  
 
In summary, if a country exhibits extensive expropriation of outside investors, it undermines the 
efficient functioning of a financial system. It therefore follows that if the quality of investor 
protection has positive influence on the ability of entrepreneurs to raise more capital then this 
should also influence foreign equity portfolio investors‟ decision in cross-country allocation. 
Thus, the quality and credibility of investor protection frameworks, among other factors, may 
explain why developed countries are better at attracting higher volumes of international equity 
portfolio investments than developing countries despite the evidence that most of the developing 
markets have been growing faster and offering higher equity yields (Bekaert and Harvey, 2003 
and Kohers et al., 2006). 
 
Bekaert and Harvey (2003) note that despite the announcement and implementation of financial 
liberalisation measures initiated by emerging markets there could be many barriers impeding 
foreign portfolio equity investments. Bekaert (1995) differentiates between three different kinds 
of barriers deterring foreign investments. First are the direct or formal legal barriers arising from 
different legal status accorded to domestic and foreign investors. However, whether removal of 
formal barriers helps attracting foreign investors is debatable. Studies (see Bekaert and Harvey, 
1995; Errunza, 2001; Bekaert et al., 2003 and Hunter, 2006) demonstrate that indirect barriers 
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(2
nd
 type of barriers) resulting from differences in available information, accounting standards 
and investor protection are also important determinants of foreign investments. The third type of 
barriers is the market specific risk factors, particularly related to emerging markets, such as 
liquidity risk, broad country risk and foreign exchange risk. Although Bekaert and Harvey 
(1995), Bekaert et al., (2002), and Bekaert and Harvey (2003) have done significant work in 
demonstrating how different barriers affect cost of capital, volatility and asset pricing issues, 
they do not directly test how the effectiveness and efficiency of investor protection affect foreign 
equity portfolio investment.   
 
Drawing on the arguments describing the positive correlation between investor protection and 
capital market developments it seems that investor protection frameworks could be one of the 
potential drivers of foreign equity portfolio investments. However, evidence available in the 
current literature is scarce and findings are inconclusive as discussed below.  
 
Dahlquist et al., (2003) show that there is a close association between corporate governance and 
the portfolio held by U.S. investors. They provide evidence that their estimate of shares held by 
controlling shareholders serves as proxy for investors‟ rights and show that U.S investors are 
more reluctant to invest in countries with weaker investor protection rights. Their study 
demonstrates that an improvement in investor protection increases the share of a country and of a 
firm in the free float portfolio (freely investable) held by U.S. investors. Similarly, Agarwal et 
al., (2005) also show that U.S. investor tends to invest more in countries with better investor 
protection measures However, Chan et al. (2005) demonstrate that foreign investors tend to be 
more influenced by stock market development and bilateral familiarity factors and investor 
protection does not play significant role.  
 
Furthermore, empirical studies have also added novel dimension to the investor protection issues 
when it comes to foreign portfolio investment. Constructing a novel measure of exogenous 
growth opportunity based on a country‟s industrial price earning (PE) ratio and global PE ratio, 
Bekaert et al., (2007) indirectly reveal the importance of international investment in aligning 
with the growth opportunities. They suggest that higher the international investments received by 
a country higher are the chances of exploiting the growth opportunities. In their investigation, 
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they first employ a general measure of investor protection proxy, which they call broader quality 
of institution measure.  The quality of institution measure is compiled from ICRG‟s overall 
political risk rating sub-components (see Table 4-2, page 108) and reflects corruption, law and 
order and bureaucratic quality. They find that the broader quality of institution proxy does not 
align with growth opportunity measure. However, when they use investment profile, a proxy that 
specifically measures and reflects government‟s attitude towards foreign inward investments 
capturing factors such as risk of expropriation/contract viability, payment delays and the ability 
to repatriate profits, they report significant positive relationship with growth opportunities. The 
overall measure of ICRG‟s political risk index, which is a composite measure and includes both, 
quality of institution and investment profile, is also highly significant. Consequently, they claim 
that the positive influence of political risk rating is not due to variable capturing broader quality 
of institution but is attributable to investment profile. Based on their findings, they further posit 
that their study is an indication that foreign investors may not heed to the overall broader quality 
of regulation but may be only concerned with specific aspects of regulation directly protecting 
their interest, i.e. investment profile. However, they do not empirically test this economic claim.  
 
Similarly, Dahlquist et al., (2003) model U.S. investors‟ portfolio holdings and report none of the 
investor protection measures, accept for the risk of expropriation (investor protection measure 
specific to foreign investments), is significant. They conclude that U.S. investors‟ decisions are 
not affected by the level of investor protection rights as long as there is enough supply at their 
disposal to hold foreign equity. 
 
With the objective of assessing the indirect claim of Bekaert et al., (2007) and re-assessing the 
conclusion reported by Dahlquist et al., (2003), our study employs the ICRG‟s investment profile 
measure as one of the variables to study the role investment profile  on the country allocation 
decisions of foreign equity portfolio investors.  The use of ICRG‟s measures is constrained by 
the unavailability of other proxies having time dimension.  
 
In light of the previous discussion, this study tests the following thee hypotheses: 
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H9 Higher levels of investor protection measures specifically related to foreign investment 
are associated with higher levels of FEPA. 
 
The first hypothesis tests whether foreign investors are influenced by investor protection 
measures specific to foreign investments. Again, in line with existing studies, we use ICRG‟s 
investment profile as a proxy of investor protection specifically related to foreign investments. 
 
H10 Higher levels of general investor protection measures are associated with higher levels of 
FEPA. 
 
The second hypothesis tests whether foreign investors take account of the general investor 
protection measures when considering foreign investments. We use the quality of institution 
measure, constructed by ICRG (described in chapter 4), as the proxy of general investor 
protection measure. 
 
H11 Countries adopting English common law attracts higher levels of FEPA. 
 
Following LLSV (1997) we use the dummy taking the value one if countries follow English 
common law and zero otherwise. It is shown that countries following English common accords 
highest protection to outside investors (LLSV, 1997, 1998). We should find the regression 
coefficient associated with Enlgish common law dummy to carry postive sign. 
 
3.6 Summary of findings 
The findings of the study suggest that after controlling for host of confounding variables, 
investor protection rights, particularly those related to foreign investments have positive impact 
in attracting international equity investments. We conclude that foreign investors prefer investing 
in markets that have better investor protection frameworks safeguarding the interest of foreign 
investors. The evidence suggests that by improving the effectiveness and enforcement efficiency 
of legal protections accorded to foreign investors, higher level of foreign portfolio equity 
investments could be attracted.  We discuss the detailed empirical findings in chapter 8. 
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3.7 What is the impact of foreign equity portfolio flows on global financial linkages of 
Asian emerging markets? 
The impressive growth in foreign equity investments in emerging markets and the debate on the 
likely implications for their integration with the global equity markets has prompted intense 
research interest in this subject matter. The current credit crises caused by the high defaults in the 
US sub-prime market and its spill-over effects to other economies in both developed and 
developing part of the world have further highlighted the need to investigate the role of foreign 
institutional investors in emerging stock markets. Although there are a number of studies which 
provide evidence of increasing integration of emerging markets with the global markets 
(Syriopoulos, 2007; Chelley-Steeley, 2005 and Dungey et al, 2004), none have so far examined 
the role played by foreign investors on the long and short run financial linkages of emerging 
markets. In view of the global spread of current financial crisis and its likely implications for a 
number of emerging markets, it is both topical and theoretically desirable to understand the role 
and influence of foreign investors on the process of integration of emerging equity markets with 
the global markets.  Similarly, as noted earlier, there has been intense debate about the 
destabilizing impact of portfolio flows, particularly in emerging markets. As such, within the 
limitation of data availability, the final empirical work of the thesis focuses on the role of equity 
portfolio flows on domestic returns and world returns for four Asian emerging markets. 
 
This study draws inspiration from two main strands of the literature. The first one deals with 
integration of emerging equity markets with the global equity markets by investigating the 
correlation structure and comovements in returns. There is a growing body of research that 
provides evidence on the extent to which equity markets around the world have become 
integrated (see for example, Chang, 2001; Kanas, 1998, 1999; Kwan, et al, 1995; Masih and 
Masih, 1997; Corhay, et al, 1993, 1995, Dickinson, 2000; Gerrits and Yuce, 1999; Pymonen and 
Knif, 1998). Focussing on the global linkages of Australian equity market with equity markets of 
its major trading partners and using data prior to 1996, Roca (1999) examines the price linkages 
between the equity markets of Australia and other developed markets, particularly US, UK, 
Japan, Singapore and developing markets of Hong Kong, Taiwan and Korea. Their result only 
supports the short term dynamic linkages of the Australian equity markets with US and UK. 
Further, Dungey et al. (2004) reports that equity markets in Australia are influenced by shocks 
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common to all other markets around the world. Their study concludes that the U.S. market plays 
a significant role in explaining the Australian equity market‟s movement whilst Australia‟s 
domestic output has minimal impact on its own equity market. Yet in another investigation 
aimed at examining the linkages in stock indices amongst the US, European and Asia-Pacific 
developed markets, Hsin (2004) finds evidence consistent with extant findings of a strong 
linkage and transmission effects among the regional participants in Europe, such as Germany, 
Britain and France and Asia-Pacific markets of Japan, Australia, Hong Kong, and Singapore.  
 
Evidence on integration of emerging equity markets with the developed markets is somewhat 
mixed. For instance, Chan et al. (1992) examine data for the Asian emerging markets and find 
that the markets are segmented. Similar assessment is further supported by Lamba (2005) who 
uses data for the period 1997-2003 from the South Asian emerging markets and concludes that 
most of the markets in his sample are segmented. Further, Bekaert and Harvey (1995) measure 
the degree of integration using equity returns and conclude that some countries have become less 
integrated over time. In contrast to the findings mentioned above, there are a number of studies 
including one by Jong and Roon (2005) which show that emerging equity markets have become 
more integrated with the developed markets. In another recent study, Tai (2007) examines Asian 
emerging market data and concludes that these markets have become integrated with world 
capital markets since the time when these markets were first liberalised. Soydemir (2000) 
investigates the co-movements relationship between developed and emerging market economies 
using the economic fundamentals and trade linkages as the basis. He concludes that Mexico and 
USA show stronger linkages whereas Argentina and Brazil exhibit sign of weaker association 
and attributes the differences to the trade flows. However, Soydemir does not consider the short-
run dynamics and long run association of the trading activities of foreign investors, which is 
reported to be one of the key causes leading to the closeness of equity market (Errunza, 2001).  
 
The second strand of literature deals with the dynamics of foreign investment flows and equity 
returns in emerging markets (see, Froot et al., 2001, Bekaert, et al., 2002, Richards, 2005). There 
are two main streams that flow from this body of research. The first seeks to enquire whether 
foreign equity investors are attracted by higher returns offered by foreign equity markets (see, 
Bohn and Tesar, 1996). The second attempts to investigate whether the impact of foreign equity 
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flows on stock prices is permanent or just temporary as a consequence of the „price pressure‟ 
exerted by these flows (see, Bekaert, et al., 2002).  
 
Despite the conjectures that foreign portfolio investors play an important role in increasing the 
global linkages (Errunza, 2001; Bekaert and Harvey, 2003 and Soyedemir, 2000), empirical 
evidence on the influence of foreign investors in the context of the global financial linkages of 
the Asian emerging markets is lacking. This paper fulfils the gap by bringing together these two 
strands of the literature and provides empirical evidence on the effect of foreign equity 
investment flows on the integration of the Asian emerging equity markets of India, Korea, 
Taiwan and Thailand with the global markets.
4
 Most previous studies use foreign equity flow 
data up to 2002. There is information which suggests that quite a few of the emerging markets, 
especially those in Asia, have introduced significant changes in the foreign ownership 
restrictions and have raised the limits on foreign ownership since 2001.
5
 Given this, there is a 
need to investigate the extent of the impact foreign equity flows have had on the global linkages 
of the Asian emerging equity markets in recent years. More recently, Li and Rose (2008) 
conducted a study using S&P‟s Emerging Market Data Base on 34 emerging markets. They use 
the ratio of global and investable indices to show the impact of foreign participation on extreme 
comovements for the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation. They use copula model with constant 
and time varying extreme correlation models and find affirmative result on the extreme 
movements in the APEC equity markets.  
 
Our study does not focus on extreme co-movements among these markets but on the role of 
foreign portfolio investor‟s trading activity on the long-run relationship and short-run dynamics 
with local equity markets. Our study not only shows the long run association (co-integration 
hypotheses) and short run dynamic linkages (feedback and price pressure hypothesis) of the 
emerging Asian equity markets with global counterparts but also provides evidence on the 
potential role played by foreign investors in driving the growth in the global linkages.  
 
                                                 
4
 Our choice of markets is restricted by the lack of availability of good quality daily data on other emerging equity 
markets. 
5
 For instance, Taiwan increased the foreign equity ownership limit to 75% in 2000 from 50% in 1999 before 
removing any limit towards the end of 2000. 
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One of the reasons for relatively less research on this subject matter is that good quality high 
frequency data on foreign equity flows for emerging markets is not easily available. Thus 
previous research by Froot et al. 2001 uses proprietary data for equity flows from State Street 
Bank and Trust whilst Bakaert et al., 2002 have had to rely on monthly capital flow data for their 
research that involved 20 emerging markets. The foreign equity flow data in this empirical study 
uses the same source as the one used by Richards (2005) but with two significant differences. 
First, we use more recent data (from 2001 to 2007) so that the impact of more recent increases in 
the foreign equity ownership limits can be captured in the integration process of emerging equity 
markets.  Second, unlike Richards (2005), instead of measuring integration with the US equity 
market, we use MSCI World Equity Market returns as a proxy for global markets because the 
foreign equity flow data from CEIC is aggregated and includes foreign investments from 
different countries including the US. Thus, our paper provides evidence with respect to the 
integration of emerging equity markets globally rather than with the US market alone. The data 
used on foreign equity investments is daily which allows us to investigate long-run stochastic 
equilibrium relationship as well as short-term dynamics. As our objective is to understand the 
impact of foreign equity investments flows not only on long-term basis but also on the short-run 
dynamics, the use of aggregated daily foreign portfolio investment flows rightly justifies the use 
of high frequency daily data. Also except Richards (2005), no other paper has used high 
frequency data in integration studies.  
 
In view of above discussion, we test the following hypotheses: 
 
H12 Foreign equity portfolio flows drive the global integration of the Asian emerging markets 
with the global equity markets. 
 
H13 Foreign investors are “return chasers”, i.e., flows are caused by changes in expected 
returns (i.e. feedback hypothesis). 
 
H14 Increase in foreign equity portfolio flows raises domestic stock market price (i.e. price 
pressure hypothesis). 
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Our research has important theoretical and policy implications. The rolling correlation of the 
Asian emerging market equity returns with the world market returns has grown over the years 
(see Figure 9-1-Figure 9-4 page no.200). Further, the interest of foreign investors in these 
markets has also grown with time (see investment flow figures in Table 9-1 page no. 191). These 
developments should have significant impact on asset pricing and portfolio allocations. 
Historically, one of the main motivations for investing in emerging markets was that these 
markets had low correlations with developed markets. However, if the present magnitude and 
pace of foreign investments are sustained over time then the emerging markets would become 
fully integrated with the global markets. This may have detrimental effect on diversification of 
risk since emerging equity markets have long been viewed by international investors as 
segmented markets offering excellent diversification benefits to international investors (see 
Chatrath et al., 1996). Further, there is evidence that increased foreign equity flows seems to 
cause greater volatility in the emerging equity markets which is a matter of concern to the policy 
makers.
6
 Thus, the impact of increasing foreign equity investment flows on the integration of 
emerging equity markets is of high interest to both academics and policy makers. This is 
particularly relevant since there is evidence to suggest that foreign investors appear to have 
short-term investment horizon and at the sign of the slightest of trouble, foreign equity portfolio 
investments tends to leave at a much greater pace than the pace at which it arrives in emerging 
markets (see, Bekaert et al., 2002).  
 
Our study makes three important contributions to the existing literature. First, we extend the 
literature by investigating both the long and short-run dynamics of the impact of foreign equity 
investment flows on global integration of the selected Asian emerging markets. Second, we use 
more recent foreign equity flow and return data to capture the effect of increased foreign 
investment activity in emerging markets as a result of further relaxation of foreign ownership 
restrictions. Finally, unlike previous studies we use MSCI world return index that comprise 
                                                 
6
 There are several examples of interventions by policy makers concerned with the negative impact of foreign equity 
flows. For instance, Malaysia imposed capital controls in 1998 following the Asian financial crisis with an aim to 
control the excessive volatility that appears to have been caused by a rapid outflow of foreign capital. In December 
2006, the Thai government tried to impose tough controls by requiring investors with more than $20,000 of 
investment to remain invested for a minimum period of one year or face severe penalties if this investment is 
removed within a year. However, the government had to reverse this decision following a steep fall in the stock 
market after shares suffered their worst daily fall in 16 years and closed down by 14.8%.  
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twenty-three stock markets of industrialized countries which is a better proxy for measuring the 
dynamics of global linkages.  
 
3.8 Summary of findings 
Our findings suggest that the foreign equity investment flows contain significant information in 
explaining the short-run dynamics and long-run relationship of the selected Asian emerging 
equity markets with the global markets. Our results are robust in terms of synchronization and 
statistical sensitivity of VAR based VEC and cointegration tests. We conclude that the rapid 
growth in the foreign equity flows is leading to greater integration of the Asian emerging equity 
markets with the global equity markets. This may have significant implications for pricing of 
assets and international portfolio allocations in the Asian emerging markets. 
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Chapter 4 Data  
 
4.1 Foreign portfolio holdings 
Drawing on the theoretical framework of Cooper and Kaplanis (1986) and following Chan et al., 
(2005), our main dependent variable is foreign equity portfolio allocation (weights) from country 
i into country j and is defined as 
        (
      
∑       
  
   
) 
 
Where wijt is the foreign equity portfolio allocation (FEPA) from country i into country j for the 
year t and FPHijt is the stock of foreign equity portfolio holding in USD million. Our bilateral 
data on the 36 recipient countries is from International Monetary Fund (IMF). The numbers of 
investor countries are 16 (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and USA). 
 
In October 1997, IMF undertook a survey whereby 29 participating countries reported the 
position of portfolio investments, on bilateral country basis. This survey is named Coordinated 
Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS). It is being conducted on annual basis since 2001 with more 
country joining the survey. The prime motive for undertaking the survey is to have better 
understanding of the global asymmetries in the reported balance of payment data, particularly 
those in portfolio investment. All participating countries are required to report a breakdown of 
their stock of portfolio investments, including portfolio equity investment (assets), by the country 
of residency of the non-resident issuer. This provides a detailed data on country-by-country 
foreign equity portfolio investments holding data. The data could be downloaded from the IMF‟s 
website. The choice of the countries is dictated by the availability of data points for the 
dependent and most importantly for the independent and control variables For example, no 
bilateral trade data were available for Taiwan. Also, no transaction cost data were available for 
China, Poland and Russia. Similarly, the trading costs measures we have used in this study are 
handpicked data from S&P‟s global stock market factbook. Trading costs data for the year 2001 
are only reported for 40 countries out of which we have used for 36 countries. The rest of the 
countries are either off shore financial centres (such as Luxembourg) or there are not enough 
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data points for other control variables used in our study. As in other studies (Fidora et al, 2007) 
on international equity investment, we have not included Luxembourg in our dataset. 
Luxembourg is considered as an offshore financial centre and is related to the issue of third-
country holdings and round-tripping. For example, for the year 2003 the total holding reported 
by German investors alone in Luxembourg was 152 billion whereas Luxembourg‟s total market 
capitalization was less than 40 billion. 
 
We have made every attempt to make the panel data set as balanced as possible because 
estimations with highly unbalanced data set do not have best of the desirable properties. As such, 
although data for 1997 is also available, most of them are missing. Also, no data are available for 
the 1998-2000 periods compelling us to use the data set for the period 2001-2006, except some 
missing data points not reported in the IMF website. Most of the investments are from developed 
into other developed and developing countries with negligible investments from developing 
countries. This resulted in considering only developed markets as investor countries.  
 
In terms of coverage of the survey, most of the financial market participants included in the 
survey, but not limited to, are the primary end-investors (e.g. banks, security dealers, pension 
funds, insurance companies, mutual funds, non-financial corporations, households) and primary 
custodians, who hold or manage securities on behalf of others. However, some caveats deserve 
due attention in using the data. Any investment below USD 500,000 is not reported. Also, some 
data despite being available may not be reported by a country due to confidentiality reasons. 
 
Please refer to table 4.1 below which provides brief description and sources of all the variables 
used in all the empirical studies. 
 
…………….Insert Table 4-1 here, see page 103 …………. 
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4.2 Transaction cost and FEPA 
We test our transaction costs hypotheses (H1, H2, and H3) using three different measures of 
country level transaction costs measures
7
. These measures are the country level yearly trading 
cost figures estimated and maintained by Elkins/McSherry (E/M) and reported in the yearly 
global stock market fact book of Standard and Poor (S&P). E/M analyses global trading costs 
for 150 global institutions (pension funds, investment managers, banks and brokers) and provides 
estimates of the country level transaction cost figures for their use by international investors. 
E/M measures of country level transaction cost, which are based on an average transaction in 
USD for the particular country, comprise three components.  
 
4.2.1 Commission (TC1) – for hypothesis H1 
The first is the average commission paid (TC1). According to Solnik and McLeavy (2004) 
commission represent payments made to brokers for allowing access to brokerage services and 
proprietary research resources for informational advantage. We use this variable to test the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H1 Countries with lower level of average commission attract higher level of FEPA. 
 
4.2.2 Fees (TC2) - for hypothesis H2 
The second measure is the average fee paid (TC2) which includes any costs incurred for 
obtaining additional services, such as the post-trade settlement costs. It is worth mentioning that 
for UK, the buying fees is significantly higher because of the stamp duty. We have taken the 
average of the buy and sell costs (round trip trading cost) as investor pay more for buying but are 
compensated by paying significantly lower fee for selling. Using the fee measure, we test the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H2 Countries with lower average transaction fees attract higher level of FEPA. 
 
                                                 
7
 These are the only aggregate country level proxies for average transaction cost measures sourced from the 
literature and are available for country level studies in the panel data framework. 
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4.2.3 Market impact (TC3) - for hypothesis H3 
The third measure is the average cost of market impact (TC3). The S&P global stock market 
factbook (2007) defines market impact as the difference between the price at which a trade is 
executed and the average of the stock‟s high, low, opening and closing prices during the trade. 
More precisely, it is the average cost of trade versus the average price. Market impact is 
therefore defined as the difference between the actual execution cost and the price that would 
have been availed had the investor not been involved in the trading.  We use this proxy to test the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H3 Countries with lower average cost of market impact attract higher level of FEPA. 
 
4.2.4 Control variables 
The first issue to control is the widely studied home bias phenomenon. It is evident from the 
literature (see French and Poterba 1991; Tesar and Werner, 1995; Karlsson and Norden, 2007, 
Chan et al., 2005 and  Fidora, et al., 2007) that despite the theoretical prescription investors tend 
to significantly overweight their home market and therefore significantly deviate from holding 
the world market portfolio. Chan et al., (2005) note that if foreign investors over-weight their 
local market, then the remaining allocation that they invest should also be disproportionately 
lower suggesting home bias should be an important explanatory variable explaining the foreign 
allocation. As investor deviate from holding world market portfolio and overweight their 
domestic market, instead of using the world market portfolio as benchmark, following Fidora et. 
al., (2007) we construct the following bilateral home bias (Hbiasijt) to control for the automatic 
impact of home bias on foreign equity portfolio allocation. 
 
            (           ) 
 
where Hbias is bilateral home bias observed by investor country i for country j at time t.  BWTijt 
is defined as the benchmark weight and is computed as  
 
            (∑     
  
    )  
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where MCjt is the market capitalization of the recipient or destination country j at time t.  
 
The size of the capital market and level of stock market development have also been shown to 
affect international portfolio investments (Chan et al., 2005). We use the ratio of stock market 
capitalization to GDP as a measure of stock market development obtained from World 
Development Indicator of World Bank. We also include two broad country risk measures 
obtained from the Political Risk Group (PRS). The „economic policy risk’   is measured on a 
scale of 0-50 points and captures five potential sources of economic risk (GDP per head, Real 
GDP growth, inflation rate, budget balance as % of GDP and current account as % of GDP). The 
„financial policy risk’ measure is also constructed on a scale of 0-50 and reflects five potential 
sources of financial risk components (foreign debt as % of GDP, exchange rate stability, foreign 
debt as % of total export and services, current account as % of exports and services and 
international liquidity).  
 
Agarwal et al., (2005) note U.S. funds tends to invest in open markets exhibiting stronger 
shareholders rights and legal frameworks. We have included a composite measure of investor 
protection measure sourced from World Bank Governance Indicator [Investor protection 
(WBGI)] controlling for two broader aspects of regulatory environment. The first is the 
regulatory quality based on the scale of 1-100 capturing the perceptions of local government‟s 
ability to formulate and implement sound policies effective for the private sector development. 
The second, also measured on a scale of 0-100, is the rule of law. The latter captures the 
perception of the extent to which agents show confidence and follow the rules of society, 
especially the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police and the courts. We 
aggregate both the investor protection measures and scale it by 0.5 yielding risk-rating scale of 0-
100. Higher ratings indicate better investor protection rights and therefore greater confidence by 
foreign investors. The investor protection is expected to carry positive sign in our regression in 
line with existing studies (Bekaert and Harvey, 2003 and Agarwal et al., 2005) which show that 
investors prefer countries having better investor protection measure in place. However, in sharp 
contrast, other studies (Dahlquist et. al., 2003 and Chan et al., 2005) claim no relationship 
between investor protection and investment decision of foreign investors. 
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We also control for any capital control measure that a country might have imposed on inward 
foreign portfolio investment. As a proxy for the degree of financial liberalization (market 
integration) we have used the capital control intensity measure (Equity market openness) 
prescribed by Edison and Warnok (2003). It is constructed by taking the ratio of market 
capitalization represented by S&P/IFC investable indices, which correct for foreign ownership, 
to the market capitalization denominated by S&P/IFC Global Indices. The openness measure 
ranges from zero to one with one implying the total domestic market capitalization is freely open 
to foreign investors and zero completed closed market. Since these indices are only available for 
developing countries in the S&P Global stock market fact book, the ratios have been set to 1 for 
all developed countries. For more details, see Edison and Warnok (2003) and various issues of 
S&P Global stock market fact books (2001-2006). Equity market openness also represents time 
variation in the financial liberalisation process (De Jong, 2005) and is expected to display 
positive sign. Our equity market openness measure is based on the assumption that all the 
developed markets stocks are fully free floated, which may not be the case. Dahlquist et al., 
(2003) note that only a small portion of the market capitalization in most countries is available to 
international investors who are not controlling shareholder. They compute percentage of firms 
closely held for a number of countries and demonstrates it significantly explains U.S investors‟ 
home bias. We employ the variable (closely held firms) of Dahlquist et al. (2003) as percentage 
of closely held shares of market capitalization to complement the equity market openness and 
investor protection measure.  This proxy captures the prevalence of „closely held firms, in 
countries with poor investor protection frameworks and is expected to yield negative coefficient. 
 
Motivated by the use of gravity models in modelling international trade of securities discussed 
earlier, we also control for bilateral familiarity variables.  It is highly likely that the bilateral 
investments are influenced by long-term bilateral relationship, geographic proximity and market 
familiarity. We include a language dummy (Common language) which takes the value of one if 
pair country shares a common language. Countries like United States, United Kingdom, 
Australia, New Zealand and India share common language (i.e. English). Similarly, we also 
include the distance (Distance) between the capital cities of the pair countries. On average, 
European countries are closer to each other with Australia and New Zealand being the furthest. 
Both variables are obtained from www.nber.org/~wei/data.html used by Subramanian and Wei 
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(2006). Chan et al., (2005) suggest that investors are more confident in holding stocks of foreign 
companies whose goods and services are well known to them. We add the bilateral trade 
(Bilateral trade) obtained from Bilateral Trade Statistics of IMF and is constructed by adding the 
logarithmic value of the pair country‟s total export and import. Countries such as United States, 
United Kingdom and Germany share the highest average bilateral trade. Most of the emerging 
countries score lower on this measure. All the bilateral measures controls for informational 
asymmetries that might exist between foreign and domestic investors. They predict the 
probability of information flow and measure the barriers that foreign investors encounter for 
seeking overseas information (see Chan et al, 2005 and Fidora et al, 2007).  
 
Studies (Bekaert and Harvey, 2003; Solnik, 1974 and Errunza, 1988) show that by including 
foreign securities with lower stock market correlation relative to home country spans the 
efficient frontier to the upper left corner in the mean variance analysis framework. The lower 
correlation of foreign securities thus improves the risk return profile. It may be that investors 
take advantage of lower correlation and increase their allocation. Although the use of home bias 
significantly controls for diversification prospects (Chan et al, 2005 and Fidora et al, 2007), we 
also construct correlation coefficient for each pair country based on the six years of monthly total 
return index data and use the correlation coefficient (Equity market correlation) to control for 
diversification opportunities. Following the normative economics of mean-variance analysis, we 
expect the coefficient to carry negative sign, although almost all the existing studies show it to be 
weak predictor. 
 
Following Gelos and Wei (2005), we also include a three-year moving average return (Historical 
Return) to capture the possibility that investors may prefer countries with higher historical 
returns, commonly referred as return chasing hypothesis or feedback hypothesis (Bohn and 
Tesar, 1996; Froot et. al., 2001; Richards, 2005; Bekaert et al., 2002 and Griffin et al., 2004). 
Following the return chasing hypothesis, we expect the regression coefficient on this variable to 
bear positive sign. However, again almost all existing studies finds this variable to be 
insignificant. We do not include withholding taxes following French and Poterba (1991) who 
show that there is no significant relationship between taxes and international investment. Also, 
following the withholding tax figures in S&P‟s Global stock market factbooks, we do not find 
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any significant cross sectional difference for the countries used in our study. For evidence, please 
refer to different editions of S&P Global stock market fact books (2001-2006). 
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4.3 Country-specific characteristics and FEPA 
The second empirical study of the thesis uses bilateral foreign equity portfolio investment and 
different measures of country specific equity market characteristics along with host of other 
control variables, including time invariant country-specific, bilateral cross-country specific and 
time effects.  The focus of the second empirical study is on the role of country specific equity 
market characteristics. We use five different variables to capture different country specific equity 
market features
8
  and test the following five hypotheses (H4, H5, H6 H7 and H8):  
 
4.3.1 Stock market development/size – for hypothesis H4 
We use the stock market development/size to test hypothesis number four (H4). It captures the 
size and breadth of the equity market reflecting the significance of capital market in the 
economy. Although large markets may not necessarily function well and taxes may distort 
incentives to list companies, Levine and Zarvos (1998) remark that many studies (La Porta et al., 
1997, 1998, 2000) use this measure as an indicator of stock market developmen. The assumption 
is that stock market size is positively correlated with the ability to mobilize capital and diversify 
risk. We obtained this proxy of stock market development from World Bank Indicator (WDI). 
Since this variable is very important in terms of capturing the characterisics of stock market 
development/size (see La Porta et al., 1997, 1998 and Chan et al., 2005) we have re-used it as a 
key variable for our current empirical study and test the following hypothesis: 
 
H4 Stock market development/size has positive influence on FEPA. 
 
4.3.2 Market Liquidity – for hypothesis H5 
As noted earlier, following Bekaert and Harvey (2000), this study uses a micro-structural 
variable to capture the liquidity of the equity market (Liquidity), also known as market turnover 
ratio. Levine and Zarvos (1998b) state that turnover ratio complements stock market 
development/size measure as a large market may not be the most active one. For example, the 
value of stocks traded for Canada for the year 2006 is USD 1,290,246 million (market 
                                                 
8
 We also considered number of listed companies scaled by total population and trade volume scaled by GDP as 
alternative measures. However, because these measures are highly correlated with stock market development and 
the turnover ratio, we do not include them. However, when we run the bivariate regression, both these measures are 
highly statistically significant. 
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capitalization of USD 1,700,708 millions) with turnover ratio of 81%. For the same year, value 
traded for Sweden is almost half of Canada, i.e. USD 677,122 million (market capitalization of 
USD 573,250 millions) but the turnover ratio is 139%.  We have incorporated the average value 
traded as a percentage of mean market capitalization sourced from different issues of global 
stock market factbook of S&P.  Bekaert and Hodrick (2009) also claim that turnover is often 
regarded as an indicator of liquidity, although it can also reflect the arrival of information that 
instigates trades. Turnover has also been reported to be inversely related to costs of trading 
equities because high trading costs cause investors to trade less (see Levine and Zarvos, 1998a, 
b; Amihud and Mendelson, 1986 and Bekaert and Hodrick, 2009). The following hypothesis is 
tested using the liquidity proxy: 
 
H5 Higher equity market liquidity is positively associated with greater level of foreign equity 
investments. 
 
4.3.3 Emerging market dummy – for hypothesis H6 
It is known (see Bekaert and Harvey, 2003 and Chan et al., 2005) that relative to their advanced 
counterparts emerging equity markets are not as well developed in terms of market breadth 
(size), and price/informational efficiency. In line with the discussion in chapter 3 (section 3.3.3) 
on stock market development issues in emerging markets, we use an emerging market dummy 
variable to further represent for the level of stock market development. The variable takes the 
value of one for emerging markets (following IFC/S&P classification) and zero for developed 
markets. We expect the coefficient to be negative as mentioned in following hypothesis: 
 
H6 Foreign investors prefer to underweight emerging markets. 
 
4.3.4 Equity market volatility – for hypothesis H7 
We further add two additional variables capturing the equity and exchange rate volatility. The 
first variable we include is the three-year moving average cross sectional standard deviation 
(Equity market volatility) of the equity returns based on MSCI‟s monthly total return index for 
each country
9
. We test the following hypothesis: 
                                                 
9
 We also used the five-year moving average but the results obtained are similar in all regressions.  
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H7 Foreign investors prefer to underweight markets with higher equity market volatility. 
 
4.3.5 Exchange rate volatility – for hypothesis H8 
The second measure captures the potential uncertainty of returns in domestic currency due to 
movement in exchange rate. We use the three-year moving average standard deviation 
(Exchange rate volatility) based on  monthly figures of trade weighted real effective exchange 
rate (REER) obtained from Bank of International Settlement (BIS). The trade weighted effective 
exchange rate is a superior indicator of the macroeconomic effects of exchange rates than purely 
a single bilateral rate (see Klau and Fung, 2006)
10
.  The REER we use in this study is the 
nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) adjusted by relative consumer prices levels. The NEER 
is calculated as the geometric weighted average of a basket of bilateral exchange rates, which 
implies that variation in the REER incorporates both, developments in nominal exchange rates 
and the inflation differential vis-à-vis trading partners.  The BIS REER basket comprises 52 
economies, including the emerging markets.  
 
Theoretically, if the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) relationship holds then there should not be 
any risk to foreign investors arising from exchange rate movements as they will merely reflect 
inflation differentials (Solnik, 1974b).  However, in practice, the PPP rarely holds, at least not in 
the short run, and therefore investor faces exchange rate risk not explained by inflation rate 
differentials between two countries (Solnik, 1974b; Sercu, 1980 and Adler and Dumas, 1983). In 
a recent study, Carrieri et al., (2006) note that it is more appealing to use REER than nominal 
exchange rate because inflation rates are generally non-random and working with nominal 
exchange rate does not reflect the true effect of exchange rate risk. Since REER measures are 
based on the combined effect of changes in the inflation differentials and changes in nominal 
currency value, they are a better measure because they capture the true effect of exchange rate 
risk arising from the deviation of PPP.  Further, Carrieri et al., (2006) conjecture “…using 
changes in the real exchange rate helps overcome possible complications due to fixed exchange 
                                                 
10
 Although the use of REER could be justified in light of the existing studies, we also employed the NEER 
calculated as the geometric weighted average of a basket of bilateral exchange rates. However, our results remain 
unchanged. Also, instead of the three year moving, we also used five year moving average but obtain similar results 
which are not reported here. 
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rate regimes or discrete changes in nominal exchange rates due to devaluations or currency peg 
management (p.514)”. They also argue that nominal exchange rate index may confound with 
other information, particularly for emerging markets. It is difficult to be sure, whether the 
nominal exchange rate risk measure captures deviation from the PPP or other factors. Hence, 
REER captures the actual real exchange rate risk not explained by changes in inflation rate 
differential. We test the following hypothesis and expect the variable to carry negative regression 
coefficient. 
 
H8 Foreign investors tend to underweight markets with higher real exchange rate volatility. 
 
4.3.6 Control measures 
We breifly describe the controls here as they have been extensively discussed in section 4.2.2. 
The first control we use is the home bias effect as defined earlier. We also use a composite 
measure of transaction cost comprising of three different components of yearly trading cost 
figures maintained by Elkins/McSherry (E/M) and documented in the yearly Global stock 
Market Factbook of S&P. E/M measure of total trading cost is composed of three sub-
components. Similarly, as described earlier, we also use the two broad country risk measures 
obtained from the Political Risk Group (PRS), the „economic policy risk’ and the „financial 
policy risk’ measures of International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). 
 
We also include a composite measure of investor protection (WBGI) measure sourced from 
World Bank Governance Indicator as described earlier.  Next we control for any capital control 
measure that a country might have with regard to foreign portfolio investment and include capital 
control intensity measure (Equity market openness) constructed by Edison and Warnok (2003). 
Following Dahlquist et al., (2003) we also include the variable (closely held firms) as percentage 
of closely held shares of market capitalization to complement the equity market openness 
measure.  As noted earlier, this measure is expected to capture the prevalence of closely held 
firms in countries with poor investor protection rights and expected to carry negative coefficient. 
 
We also control for bilateral familiarity factors by adding a language dummy (Common 
language) which takes the value of one if a pair country shares a common language. Similarly, 
                
97 
we add the distance (Distance) between the capital cities of a pair country and include the 
bilateral trade (Bilateral trade) obtained from Bilateral Trade Statistics of IMF.  Further, we use 
the correlation coefficient (Equity market correlation) to control for diversification.  Finally, we 
also include a three-year moving average return (Historical Return) to control the return chasing 
behaviour of foreign investors. 
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4.4 Investor protection and FEPA 
Although panel data set offers a number of advantages, most of the investor protection measures 
used in the literature lack time dimension. Therefore, out of the three measures used in our study, 
two of them are obtained from The Political Risk Services Group’s International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG). ICRG provides monthly ratings for political, economic and financial risks for 
large number of countries assigning ratings to each component and sub-component of the three 
types of risks. The ratings are developed from 22 underlying variables. The highest number of 
points indicates lowest potential risk with lowest point (0) indicating highest potential risk. The 
maximum point assigned to a particular component is preset within the system depending on the 
importance (weighting) of that component to the overall risk for the country. ICRG personnel 
collects information on economic, financial and political risks and assesses them for assigning 
risk points for each individual risk component. The political ratings are solely based on 
subjective analysis of the collected political information whereas economic and financial risk 
components‟ ratings are based on objective data. These indexes are forward looking measures 
and capture the potential risks. Many researchers have used these ratings (see La Porta et al., 
1998; Chan et al., 2005; Gelos and Wei, 2005 and Bekaert et al., 2007 among others) as country 
level investor protection proxies. 
  
Two of the three investor protection measures used in this study are from the sub-components of 
overall political risk ratings as shown in the Table 4-2. The purpose of the political risk rating is 
to provide a common platform for assessing the political stability in countries covered by ICRG. 
The risk rating comprises 12 components with each component‟s rating based on pre-set 
questions. In our study, we use the annual average based on the monthly ratings for the 
respective year.  The third measure is a dummy variable used by La Porta et al., (1998) who 
show that English common law system provides better legal protection to shareholders compared 
to the German and French civil law systems. We use a legal dummy taking the value of one for 
common law countries and zero otherwise.  Detailed descriptions of the investor protection 
measures are as follows: 
 
…………….Insert Table 4-2 here, see page 108 …………. 
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4.4.1 Investor protection- IPI (Investment Profile) - for hypothesis H9 
Out of the 12 sub-components of ICRG‟s political risk rating, we use the aggregate of three 
components as measure of investor protection (investment profile) reflecting government‟s 
attitude toward foreign inward investment (see Bekaert et al, 2007 and Table 4-2). The investment 
profile rating, based on the scale of 0-12, reflects PRS‟s assessment of the quality and 
enforcement efficiency of three sub-components of political risk: (i) contract viability or risk of 
expropriation (ii) payment delays and (iii) repatriation of profits. As shown in Table 4-2, each 
subcomponent is scored on a scale of 0 - 4, with zero being highest potential risk to 4 reflecting 
very low potential risk. Increases in the ratings indicate improvement in the establishment and 
enforcement of regulations related to foreign investments. 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) point out that the yield on cash flows from investment projects 
cannot be taken for granted as insiders of the firms may use these resources for their own 
benefits hurting outside or minority investors. Jensen and Meckling define financial claims as 
contracts that give outside investors, such as shareholders and creditors, claim to the cash flows. 
Similarly, these contracts also provide them rights to exercise their power, such as the right to 
change directors, force dividend payments, impede operations benefiting insiders at the cost of 
outside investors, sue directors and claim compensations and liquidate the firm and receive the 
proceeds. These rights to contract viability are protected and even specified by legal system. 
Contract laws deal with privately negotiated arrangements, whereas company, bankruptcy, and 
securities laws prescribe the rights of corporate insiders and outsider investors. Many studies 
claim that investor protection laws and the quality of their enforcement by the regulators and 
courts are essential elements of corporate governance and finance (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998). 
When legal rights are extensive and well enforced by regulators or courts, investors are more 
willing to finance firms. In contrast, when the legal systems do not protect outside investors, 
corporate governance and external finance do not work well. Similarly, risk of expropriation to 
foreign investors is the risk of “outright confiscation” or “forced nationalization” imposed by the 
state, particularly a potential risk in emerging markets, 
 
Risk of payment delays is concerned to the hold-up in export payment and is extensively used by 
international investors as a time dimension measure of investor protection. Repatriation risk is 
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the risk of making profit or capital captive by the government, particularly during crisis or 
distress circumstance
11
.  
 
We use investment profile measure to test the following hypothesis: 
 
 
H9 Higher level of investor protection measures specifically related to foreign investments 
are associated with higher levels of FEPA. 
 
4.4.2 Investor protection -IPII (Quality of Institutions) 
Quality of institutions or general measure of investor protection comprises three sub-components 
of ICRG‟s political risk rating components. The three components are: (i) corruption, (ii) law and 
order and (iii) bureaucratic quality (see LLSV, 1998 and Bekaert et al., 2007, for details).  
 
ICRG posits that corruption may pose a threat to foreign investments because it may distort the 
economic and financial environment, affect the efficiency of government and business, 
encourage placement of incumbents on the basis of political connection rather than ability and 
create inherent instability in the political system, thanks to unhealthy competition for power by 
corrupt authorities. The most common types of risks in this category are demand for excess 
payments and bribes for official paper works, exchange control, tax assessments etc. Corrupt 
practices impede the effective running of foreign enterprises, diminish the confidence of foreign 
investors and may compel investors to withdraw or withhold investment.  
 
ICRG assesses law and order separately. Each component of law and order is assigned maximum 
of three points. The subcomponent law is an assessment of the strength and impartiality of the 
legal system. The order subcomponent is an assessment of popular observance of the law. A 
country may score high (3) rating for quality of law in terms of its judicial system but may score 
very weak (0) if the law is ignored without being sanctioned effectively. ICRG (2008) claims 
that the strength and quality of bureaucracy acts as a shock absorber which tends to minimize the 
                                                 
11
 For example, Malaysia imposed capital control in 1998. Brazil prohibited convertibility of local foreign currency 
during December 2001 and multinationals were forced to export food and bullion incurring heavy liquidation costs.  
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risk of policy instability when government changes. ICRG assigns high points (maximum of 6) 
to countries where the quality of bureaucracy is strong and efficient enough to govern without 
drastic changes in the policy or interruptions in government services. In low risk countries, the 
quality of bureaucracy is somewhat autonomous from high degree of political influence and 
exhibits well established mechanism of recruitment and training. Countries scoring poorly on 
this measure (minimum zero) may lack the cushioning effect because a change in government 
tends to be traumatic for policy formulation and other administrative functions. For further 
details, please refer to PRS‟s ICRG methodology. We use this measure to test the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H10 Higher levels of general investor protection measures are associated with higher levels of 
FEPA. 
 
4.4.3 Investor protection III (Common English Law) 
 
Our third variable used as a proxy of investor protection is borrowed from La Porta et al., (1998). 
They show that English common law system provides highest legal protection rights to 
shareholders, while German and French civil law system the least. We use a Legal Dummy 
taking the value of one for English common law countries and zero otherwise. We use this 
dummy to test the following hypothesis: 
 
H11 Countries adopting English common law attracts higher levels of FEPA. 
 
4.4.4 Control measures 
As in the first two empirical works, we control for stock market development/size, emerging 
market dummy, market liquidity, equity market volatility, exchange rate volatility, transaction 
costs, economic policy risk, financial policy risk, equity market openness, closely held firms, 
common language dummy, bilateral trade, distance, equity return correlation, historical returns 
and time effects. The controls are already explained in the previous sections. 
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4.5 Impact of foreign equity portfolio flows on global financial linkages of Asian 
emerging markets 
The fourth empirical study uses daily data in our analysis for a sample period of six years 
beginning 1 January 2001 to 30 March 2007. The proxy for global return index is calculated 
from MSCI global total return index, a composite index of 23 developed markets.
 12
 Similarly, 
the MSCI total return emerging market indices denominated in US$ are also used for four Asian 
emerging markets, i.e. for India, Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. Our choice of emerging markets 
was restricted because of the lack of availability of daily net equity portfolio investment data for 
other emerging equity markets. A further reason is that a considerably long period has elapsed 
since these countries opened up their equity markets for foreign investments. Therefore, it is both 
timely and appropriate to investigate the short and long run influence of foreign equity 
investments given the rapid increase in the investment flows in more recent periods. The MSCI 
indexes are obtained from DataStream international and net daily foreign equity portfolio flows 
data are sourced from CEIC emerging market database. 
                                                 
12
 Since our Net Foreign Equity Investment (NFEI) data represents total of all foreign portfolio investments, we use 
the MSCI world index as proxy of global equity returns. 
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Table 4-1: Data description and sources 
First Three Empirical Studies: Determinants of Foreign Equity Portfolio Holdings (2001-2006) 
     
Dependent Variable 
Variable   Description   Source 
wijt   
wijt is the foreign equity portfolio allocation (weights) from country i into country j. It 
is constructed as the ratio of portfolio holdings from country i into country j to the total 
portfolio holding reported by investor/source countries. 
 
Co-ordinated Portfolio Investment Survey - 
International Monetary Fund 
  
 
 
 
  
First Empirical Chapter: TC and FEPA - Key Independent Variables 
     
TC1 
 
Average commission paid based on the average traded stock price in USD. These costs 
represent the estimate of country level commission cost paid to the brokers for 
allowing access to brokerage services and research resources. 
 
Maintained by Elkins/McSherry and reported 
in the yearly Standard and Poor Global Stock 
Markets Factbook.  
     
TC2 
 
Average fee paid based on the average traded stock price in USD. These are estimate 
of the country level additional costs paid to compensate for additional services, 
particularly post-trade settlement costs.    
 
Maintained by Elkins/McSherry and reported 
in the yearly Standard and Poor Global Stock 
Markets Factbook.  
     
TC3 
 
Average market impact cost based on the average traded stock price in USD. The S&P 
global stock market book (2007) defines market impact as the difference between the 
price at which a trade is executed and the average of the stock‟s high, low, opening and 
closing prices during the trade. 
 
Maintained by Elkins/McSherry and reported 
in the yearly Standard and Poor Global Stock 
Markets Factbook.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                
104 
 
Second Empirical Chapter: CSEMC and FEPA - Key Independent Variables 
Stock market development/size 
 
 The size of the capital markets and level of stock market 
development. It is constructed as the log ratio of stock market 
capitalization to GDP. 
 
World Bank's World Development 
Indicator 
     
Liquidity 
 
The average value traded divided by mean market capitalization. 
 
Standard and Poor Global Stock 
Markets Factbook 
     
Emerging market mummy 
 
Serves as a proxy of stock market development/size and market 
efficiency. Takes value 1 for emerging markets as classified by S&P 
IFC. 
 
Standard and Poor Global Stock 
Markets Factbook 
     
Equity Market Volatility 
 
Cross sectional standard deviation of the stock returns for each 
country used as proxy of potential total stock market risk. It is 
constructed based on three year moving average monthly total return 
index in USD 
 
Morgan Stanley Capital International 
Exchange Rate Volatility 
 
Three year moving average standard deviation of bilateral trade 
weighted Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER) sourced from Bank 
of International Settlement.   The REER used in this study is the 
nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) adjusted by relative 
consumer prices levels. The NEER is calculated as the geometric 
weighted average of a basket of bilateral exchange rates.  The BIS 
REER basket includes 52 economies, including the emerging market 
economies. For more details, please see Klau and Fung (2006). 
 
Bank of International Settlement 
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Third Empirical Chapter: Investor protection and FEPA - Key Independent Variables 
     
IPI (Investment profile) 
 
Investor profile is constructed on a scale of 0-12 rating.  The rating of 
the investor profile is determined by PRS‟s assessment of three 
components: (i) contract viability or risk of expropriation (ii) payment 
delays; and (iii) repatriation of profits. Each subcomponent is scored 
on a scale with zero being very high potential risk to four reflecting 
very low potential risk. Increase in this rating indicates improvement 
in the effectiveness and enforcement of regulations specifically 
related to foreign investments. 
 
Political Risk Services' International 
Country Risk Guide 
     
Quality of institution (IPII) 
 
Quality of institutions or general measure of investor protection 
comprises three sub-components of ICRG‟s political risk rating 
components: (i) corruption (ii) law and order and (iii) Bureaucratic 
Quality 
  
     
Legal Dummy 
 
1 for countries following common English Law and 0 otherwise. 
 
La Porta (1998) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Control Variables for first three empirical studies 
     
Home Bias 
 
Home Bias is bilateral home biased observed by host or investor country i 
for country j at time t. It is constructed as Home bias =1-log(wijt/BWTij  ). 
Where BWTijt is defined as the benchmark weight and is computed as 
BWTjt=MCjt / ∑MCjt. MCjt is the market capitalization of the recipient or 
host country j at time t.  
 
Co-ordinated Portfolio Investment Survey - 
International Monetary Fund and Standard 
and Poor Global Stock Markets Factbook 
Economic policy risk 
 
Economic policy risk is measured on a scale of 0-50 points and which 
captures five potential sources of economic risk (GDP per head, Real GDP 
growth, inflation rate, budget balance as % of GDP and current account as 
% of GDP).  The economic policy risk ratings are solely based on objective 
economic data ICRG collects and then uses a fixed scale to translate 
particular statistics into risk points. 
 
Political Risk Services Group's ICRG 
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Financial policy risk 
 
Financial policy risk measure is also based on a scale of 0-50 and captures 
five potential sources of financial risk components (foreign debt as % of 
GDP, exchange rate stability, foreign debt as % of total export and services, 
current account as % of exports and services and international liquidity).  
 
Political Risk Services Group's ICRG 
Investor protection (WBGI) 
 
A composite measure of investor protection measure. This variable is 
composed of two broader aspects of regulatory environment. The first is the 
regulatory quality based on the scale of 1-100 capturing the perceptions of 
local government‟s ability to formulate and implement sound policies 
effective for the private sector development. The second which is also 
measured on a scale of 0-100 is the rule of law. The latter captures the 
perception of the extent to which agents show confidence in and follow the 
rules of society, especially the quality of contract enforcement, property 
rights, the police and the courts. Both these variables have been aggregated 
and scaled by 0.5 to produce a rating of 0-100. Increase in rating denotes 
improvement in investor protection rights .  
 
World Bank Governance Indicator - 
World Bank 
Equity market openness 
 
This measure is constructed by taking the ratio of market capitalization 
represented by S&P/IFC Investable Indices, which correct for foreign 
ownership, to the market capitalization represented by S&P/IFC Global 
Indices. This variable ranges from 0 to 1 with 1 indicating completely open 
market to foreign investors 
 
Standard and Poor Global Stock Markets 
Factbook 
     
Closely held ownership 
 
Percentage of closely held shares of market capitalization 
 
Dahlquist et al. (2003)  
     
Common Language 
 
Language dummy which takes the value of 1 if pair country shares a common 
language.  
Subramanian and Wei (2006), 
www.nber.org/~wei/data.html 
     
Bilateral Trade 
 
Log bilateral trade data measured as the log of the total import and export 
reported by investor country i.  
Bilateral Trade Direction - IMF 
     
Distance 
 
The log distance between the capital cities of the pair countries 
 
Subramanian and Wei (2006), 
www.nber.org/~wei/data.html 
     
Equity Return Correlation 
 
Equity market return correlation coefficient for each pair country based on 
the six years monthly total return index data.  
Morgan Stanley Capital International 
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Historical Return 
 
Three year moving average historical log return  
 
Morgan Stanley Capital International 
Fourth Empirical Chapter -  Variables (1 January 2001 - 30 March 2007) 
     
Domestic return index 
 
log daily returns from 1 January 2001 to 30 March 2007 for India, Korea, Taiwan 
and Thailand.  
Morgan Stanley Capital 
International 
     
World return index 
 
MSCI global total return index which is a composite index of 23 developed 
markets.  
Morgan Stanley Capital 
International 
     
Net foreign equity investment 
 
Daily net foreign equity portfolio flows. 
 
CEIC Data Company Ltd - A 
product of ISI Emerging 
Markets 
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Table 4-2: Decomposition of ICRG’s Political Risk Components 
 
Panel A: Overall Political Risk Components 
Sequence Component Points (Max) 
   
A Government Stability 12 
B Socioeconomic Condition 12 
C Investment Profile 12 
D Internal Conflict 12 
E External Conflict 12 
F Corruption 6 
G Military in Politics 6 
H Religious Tension 6 
I Law and Order 6 
J Ethnic Tensions 6 
K Democratic Accountability 6 
L Bureaucracy Quality 4 
      
TOTAL   100 
   
 
 
  
 
Panel B: Investment Profile: Investor Protection Measures Specific to Foreign Investment 
Sequence Sub-Component Points (Max) 
   
C Contract Viability/Expropriation 4 
C Profit Repatriation 4 
C Payment Delays 4 
   
TOTAL   12 
   
 
 
  
 
Panel C: General Investor Protection Measure 
Sequence Components Points (Max) 
   
F Corruption 6 
I Law and Order 6 
L Bureaucracy Quality 4 
   
TOTAL   16 
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Chapter 5 Methodology 
 
Our study utilizes panel and time series methods. We use two different econometric frameworks. 
For the first three empirical studies, we utilize the panel data models explaining determinants of 
foreign equity portfolio allocation (FEPA). For the final empirical study, we use the vector error 
correction (VEC) model. The following sections describe both methodological approaches in 
detail. 
 
5.1 Panel Data Models 
Given the wide cross sectional differences and temporal variations in FEPA, we employ panel 
data regression models. A panel data framework allows us to utilize both cross-section and time 
series data as explained in equation 5-1.  
 
 
Where, i represents investor country, j the recipient country and t denotes time. ij represents the 
cross section or bilateral cross-country dimension and time t the time series dimension. α is an 
intercept term.      
   represents the country j specific variables and       
  denotes the bilateral 
cross-country factors. For simplicity, we denote both the xs by xit (i representing both, i and j) 
and the associated coefficients by β. Our interest is on the robust and efficient estimations of the 
K × 1 vector β of the following model 
 
 
Before discussing the choice of the models for estimation purpose, it is worth exploring the 
advantages of using panel data relative to purely cross sectional or time series methods.   
 
5.2 Advantage of panel data framework 
A number of econometricians have listed the benefits of using panel data. Hsiao (1985, 1986), 
Klevmarken (1989) and Solon (1989) describe the following benefits of using panel data: 
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5.2.1 Controlling for unit specific effect or individual heterogeneity 
Every cross section unit in the panel data set, i.e. individuals, firms, states or countries are 
heterogeneous. Econometric models using purely cross section or time series data, which are 
unable to control these individual effects, runs the risk of obtaining biased estimates (see 
Moulton, 1986, 1987).  
 
For example, if the data set includes individual firms, we are not able to observe factors like 
individual management philosophy or style, which are firm specific and time invariant but may 
be correlated with the dependent variable. Let us demonstrate the effect of unit specific factors 
using a state level empirical example. Baltagi and Levin (1992) model consumption of cigarette 
as a function of lagged consumption, price and income across 46 American states for the year 
1963-88.  They claim that in addition to the time varying variables, there could be state-specific 
and time invariant variables influencing the level of consumption. However, the latter are 
difficult to observe. For example, religion and education could be unobserved variables which 
may not change materially over time and the exclusion of these variable leads to bias in the 
resulting estimates.  
 
Similarly, if we are using country as our cross section units, each country may differ in terms of 
their colonial history, financial institutions, religious affiliations, political regimes etc. In case of 
pair country data set, some pairs may enjoy special relationship which does not change over time 
because of their common language, common colonial history, similar historical legacy (e.g. pair 
of common wealth countries) etc. In the literature, the unit specific effect is also called fixed 
effect as shown in the following model 
 
 
Note that subscript i on the intercept. Each of the intercept term    is different for each 
individual, country, or pair-countries data structure and is generally known as fixed or unit 
specific effect. In estimating such model, we would ideally want the error term to be pure white 
noise with E (   ,    )   . Assuming we have controlled for all the time variant variables, the 
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coefficients are unbiased if E (      ) = 0 for all i. In such case we assume that the intercepts are 
different for different individuals but they are random drawings from a distribution with mean μ 
and   
 . In the panel data literature, such estimates are estimated using random effect model 
because the individual effects    are treated as random.  The error term in the random effect 
model is composed of time invariant individual effect    and the remainder component     is 
uncorrelated over time and is written as: 
 
where   denotes the intercept term. 
 
However, if E (      )    for any i, then    is captured by the error term and therefore the 
estimates are biased. As such, if we are not able to control for unit specific effects, which do not 
vary over time, we run the risk of obtaining biased estimates. Panel data set-up resolves the 
problem by using dummies for each unit specific effect or employing the more commonly used 
fixed effect estimation.  
 
The choice of fixed or random effect model depends on the assumption of   , i.e. whether      is 
treated as fixed parameters to be estimated or as random drawings. Panel data models are either 
estimated using fixed or random effects assumption. We extensively discuss these models in 
section 5.3 and 5.4 below. 
 
5.2.2 Less collinearity and higher efficiency 
Baltagi (2003) notes that time series data are plagued by collinearity problems. For example, in 
the above case of cigarette consumption, income and price have been shown be highly collinear 
in aggregate time series for the USA. However, the addition of cross section units adds 
significant information mitigating the problem of collinearity. Similarly, in our case when we 
consider only a single investor country, most of the variables are highly collinear. However, 
inclusion of 16 investor countries highly reduces this problem adding significant additional 
information allowing the estimation of the estimates more efficiently. To illustrate the problem, 
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let us consider the following general expression for the variance of OLS estimator of as single 
coefficient    in a multiple regression framework with an intercept. 
 
 
where    is the squared multiple correlation coefficient between     and other explanatory 
variables (i.e.    from regressing     upon the remaining regressors and a constant). If  
  is 
close to one,     can be closely approximated by the linear combination of all other variables and 
the variance of    will be large. However, if there is enough variation in     and the sample is 
decently large resulting in smaller error variance, a large    may not create problem. In fact, 
there are two forms of information in the panel data set and that can be decomposed into 
variations between individual units (between variations) and variations within (temporal 
variations) individual units. Because we are using both the variations in       i.e. the between 
variation represented by i and the within variation represented by t, we ensure more reliable 
estimates are yielded. We provide such decomposition of our data set and describe it in section 
5.6 (page 122).  
 
Verberk (2009) shows that because panel data sets are larger than pure cross-section or time 
series and the explanatory variables vary over both dimensions (individuals and time), 
estimations are more accurate than those obtained using time series or a cross section approach. 
He further notes that even if the sample sizes are identical, panel data set results in more efficient 
estimators than using a series of cross-sections (where different cross units are used for each 
period). The following illustrates the point. Let us postulate the following random effects model, 
which includes only the time dummies i.e.  
 
 
Where each    is an unknown parameter corresponding to the population mean in time t. Let‟s 
suppose we are not interested in the mean    in a particular period, but the change of   , from 
 (  )  
  
    
 
 
 
⌈
 
 
∑(     ̅ 
 
   
)⌉
  
               5-5 
                5-6 
                
113 
one period to another period. In general, the variance of the estimator for       (   )  ̂  
 ̂   is given by 
 
with  ̂  
 
 
 ∑    
 
    (        )   In most cases when the panel data is used, the covariance 
term will be positive. For instance, in case of the random effects assumptions, it equals 
  
 
 
.  
However, if we use two independent cross sectional data sets, different period will have different 
individuals and hence the covariance will be zero. Hence, if we are interested in analysing the 
changes from one period to another or wish to use the information on the same unit over 
different period, a panel data set will result in more efficient estimators than a series of cross-
sections. Clearly, at an intuitive level, the panel data set should provide more information 
because not only we are able to use the cross sectional variations but also we can use the within 
variation of all the units over the period considered in the data set. Hence, any change in the 
independent variable may also affect the change in dependent variable and such temporal 
information is also used in panel data estimation. 
 
5.2.3 Panel data provides internal instruments 
Verbeek (2009) argues that in many cases where panel data is applied, there is no need to look 
for external instrument in case the variable is suspected to be endogenous or subjected to 
measurement error. This is particularly useful in dynamic models when one of the independent 
variables in lagged value of the dependent variable. Similarly, in the practice, most the studies 
(see Gelos and Wei, 2005) have used one-year lag to resolve the reverse causality problem, 
particularly if the data is of yearly frequency and is in line with the theoretical intuition. We have 
followed a similar approach in our study. 
 
5.3 Fixed effect estimation 
The most common estimation methods used in the panel data set up are the fixed effect and 
random effect models. We first describe the technical details of the fixed effect model followed 
by the random effect. Most of the discussion follows from Verbeek (2009). The fixed effect 
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model is a static linear model that assumes that the intercept terms (i.e. the unit specific effects) 
varies over individual units, i.e.  
 
The assumption of the above model is that all the      are independent of      . We can project 
this in the usual regression approach by including N number of dummies for all the individual 
units. That is, 
 
where              and 0 if otherwise. Hence, we have N number of dummy variables in 
specification 5-9 where the parameters          and β can be estimated by ordinary least 
squares. Specification 5-9 is called the least square dummy variable (LSDV) and the estimator as 
LSDV estimator. However, if there are high number of individual units, as it is in our case (more 
than 500), it is unattractive to report all the regressors. This problem can be resolved by using a 
simple transformation process. It is shown that the same estimator   could be obtained if the 
above specification is run in deviation from individual means. What this means is that when we 
deduct each of the K variables from their individual means, we get rid of all time invariant 
variables i.e. all the dummies which varies over individuals but not over time. Let us first denote 
equation 5-9 in their mean form. 
 
where   ̅   
  ∑      and  ̅  and  ̅  are also defined in similar way. Now if we deduct equation 
5-10 from equation 5-9, we get 
 
Regression 5-11 is the model in deviations from the individual means. As the mean of the time 
constant variable is same, the model does not include any of the individual effect   . Such 
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transformation yielding the model 5-11, which is the deviation from their individual means, is 
called within transformation. The estimated   using ordinary least square is called the within 
estimator or the fixed effect estimator. This estimator is the same as the LSDV estimator as 
estimated in equation 5-9 and is given by: 
 
 
The above estimated parameter  ̂   is unbiased if it is assumed that all     are independent of all 
   . Additionally, if normality of     is imposed, the estimator  ̂   is also assumed to follow 
normal distribution. Similarly, for consistency, the requirement is  
 
The above condition implies that if  *      +                  we refer     as strictly exogenous, 
which means that the variable is not allowed to depend on current, future and past values of error 
term. However, in many applications this assumption is too restrictive, particularly in our case. 
For example, it is well known in the literature that foreign investment has beneficial effect on the 
institutions and market developments and therefore current value of institutional and market 
development variables could possibly be correlated with past error terms. We have addressed 
using practical solution prescribed in the literature and is discussed in the empirical chapters. 
 
The covariance matrix of   ̂   , under the assumption that     is i.i.d. across individual units and 
time with variance of   
   is given by 
 
 ̂   (∑∑(     ̅ )
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Equation 5-14 implies that unless T is large, the standard OLS estimate of the covariance matrix 
will underestimate the true variance because the error covariance matrix is singular (as the T 
transformed errors of each individual add up to zero) and the variance of      ̅  is (T-1)/T  
  
instead of the usual   
 .  The estimator of   
  , which is consistent, can be obtained by from the 
sum of the squared residuals from the within estimator, scaled by N (T-1). As such, if we define 
 
 ̂        ̂     
  ̂        ̅  (     ̅ )
  ̂    
 
we can now estimate   
  as 
 
Verbeek (2009) notes that under weak regularity conditions, the fixed effects estimators are 
asymptotically normal and therefore the usual inference procedures, like the t and Wald test, can 
be used. As seen from the above equation, the fixed effects model uses the „within variation‟. It 
explains to what extent     differs from  ̅  . The assumption on the parameter of   implies that a 
change in   has the same (ceteris paribus) effect, whether the change is measured from one 
period to other or from one individual to another. Hence, it is important to understand that the 
parameters in fixed effect estimation is identified only through the within dimension of the data. 
 
5.4 Random effect estimation 
In multiple regression analysis, it is generally assumed that all the factors affecting the dependent 
variable but not included in the model are captured by the error term. In the panel data set-up the 
individual effect    is then part of the error term and is assumed to be identically and 
independently distributed over individuals. If we use the random effect model, the general 
specification can be written as 
 
 
 ̂ 
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where        is the composite error term composed of the individual effect assumed to be time 
invariant and the remainder component is assumed to be uncorrelated over time. This implies 
that all the correlation of the error term over time is attributed to the individual effect. In 
addition, we impose the assumption that    &     are mutually independent and are independent 
with     (for all j and s). These assumptions ensure that the OLS estimators from 5-16 are 
unbiased and consistent. The structure of the error components implies that the composite error 
term        exhibits a particular form of autocorrelation (unless   
   ). This implies that the 
routinely computed standard errors are incorrect and therefore a more efficient (GLS) estimator 
could be obtained by exploiting the structure of the error co-variance matrix.  
 
In order to derive the GLS estimator, let us first note that for any individual i all the error terms 
could be stacked as          where    = (       )
  of dimension T and    (         )
   
The covariance matrix of the vector is (see Hsiao, 2003, section 3.3) 
 
 
where    is the T-dimensional identity matrix. We can use this to derive the generalised least 
square (GLS) estimator of the parameters in (5-16). Using the omega matrix we can transform 
the panel data by pre-multiplying the vectors    (          )
 , etc., by   , which is given 
by 
 
 
Equation 5-18 can also be written as 
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where 
 
  
  
 
        
 
 
Note that    (   )    
  transforms the data in deviations from individual means and (   )    
  
takes the individual means. Thus the GLS estimator for   can be written as 
 
 
where  ̅  (  (  ))∑        is the overall average of    . From equation 5-20, it is easy to see 
that if     the random effect estimator is effectively the fixed effect estimator. Verbeek (2007) 
notes that because the     when      the fixed and the random effect estimation produces 
almost identical parameters in case of large T. However, if    , the random effect estimation 
reduces to simple OLS estimation (and   is diagonal).  
 
Referring to the general formula for the GLS estimator, it can be derived that 
 
 
Where 
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is the between estimator for  . It is simply the OLS estimator in the model for individual means, 
i.e.  ̅      ̅ 
       ̅                
 
Here the matrix   is called the weighting matrix and is proportional to the inverse of the 
covariance matrix of  ̂  (see Hsiao, 2003, section 3.4 for details). The GLS estimator is thus a 
matrix-weighted average of the between estimator and the within (fixed effect) estimator. The 
weight depends on the relative variances of the two estimators (the higher the accuracy, the 
greater the weight). 
 
The between effect estimator ignores the time series dimension in the data set. The GLS 
estimator is the optimal combination of the within estimator and the between estimator and hence 
is relatively more efficient than either of the two estimators. The OLS estimator when     is 
also a linear combination but is not the most efficient one, implying the GLS is superior 
estimator when competing in terms of efficiency. Now if we impose the independence of all 
explanatory variables with     and   , random effect estimators are unbiased. It is also consistent 
estimator for N and T or both, tending to infinity, if it also holds that  ( ̅    )    and most 
importantly  ( ̅   )   . Both these conditions are also required for the between estimator to be 
unbiased and consistent. 
 
A more convenient way to obtain the GLS estimator is to show that the random effect GLS 
estimator is the OLS estimator in transformed model and given by 
 
 
Where           leading to an error term which is i.i.d. over individuals and time leading to 
more efficient estimator those of the OLS. What we again note from the above equation is that if 
   , it  leads to fixed effect estimation (   ). What the above equation denotes is that a 
fixed proportion of the mean is subtracted from the data to obtain the transformed model. 
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The variance components (  
        
 ) which makes the   are unknown in practice. In such case 
we have to use the feasible GLS (FGLS) whereby the unknown variances are consistently 
estimated in the first step. For the   
 , we can use 5-15 and for between regression, the error 
variance is   
  (   )   
   and can be estimated consistently by  
 
 
where  ̂   is the between estimator for   . The consistent estimator for   
   can now be obtained 
as 
 
As usual, this estimator can also be adjusted for degrees of free correction deducting K+1 
regressors from the denominator of 5-24. The resulting FGLS estimator is referred as the random 
effect estimator for   (and   ) denoted as  ̂  , also known as Balestra-Nerlove estimator. The 
covariance matrix of the  ̂   is given by 
 
 
Equation 5-26 shows that the random effect estimator is more efficient than the fixed effect 
estimator as long as    . The gain in the efficiency is due to the use of the between 
variation (    ̅). 
  
5.5 Robust inference 
The random and fixed effect models assume that the unit specific effect    captures all 
correlation between the unobservables in the different periods. This implies that the     is 
uncorrelated with individuals and time. If the exogeniety assumptions of the      is imposed, the 
presence of autocorrelation in error term does not affect the consistency of the standard 
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estimator. However, it implies that the standard errors are no longer correct and this invalidates 
the hypotheses tests leading to misleading inferences. One way to correct such standard error, 
without imposing any assumptions on the structure of covariance matrix, is to adjust the standard 
error for general form of hetoroskedascity and autocorrelation. In panel data language this is 
usually referred as the panel-robust or cluster-robust covariance matrix and can be applied for the 
fixed and random effect models. For technical details on how the correction is made please see 
Verbeek (2009, chapter 10, section 10.2.6).  
 
Petersen (2006) advocates the use of panel-robust standard errors clustered by individuals for 
sufficiently large N. In all our random and fixed effect estimations, the standard errors are 
corrected for general form of hetoroskedascity and auto-correlation. 
 
5.6 Summary and choice of the models 
Given the nature of our panel data and types of models discussed above, we revisit the treatment 
of the error components and briefly summarize the choice of the models for our study. The error 
component can be decomposed into following three sub-components: 
 
 
where    denotes the unobservable time invariant country specific effect or bilateral cross-
country effect, λt denotes the unobservable time effect and  uit is the remaining stochastic 
disturbance term. As noted earlier, based on the assumption of    and λt, literature provides 
different model choices. In case of random, between and OLS estimation, if       (    
 ) 
      (    
 )            (    
 ) are independent of each other and if xit is independent of     
λt, and uit for all i and t, then regressions could be estimated using the two-way random, between 
or the simple OLS estimation. The reason we call it two-way model because we assume that even 
the time effect is uncorrelated with the regressors. The random effect approach to estimating the 
β puts the individual country effect and time effect into the error term under the assumptions that 
the individual effects are orthogonal to xit. It further takes accounts for the implied serial 
correlation in the composite error term using the GLS solution as shown above. This implies that 
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the random effect estimator is more efficient than the OLS estimator and also because it uses 
both within and between variation, is also more efficient than the between effect estimator 
exploiting only the between dimension of the data. Consequently, the optimal choice when 
competing for efficiency is the random effect model. 
 
However, in many applications the main purpose of using panel data is to allow the individual 
effect to be arbitrarily correlated with xit. For cases where dataset has a small number of cross 
section units, the usual approach of taking care of individual effects and time effects is to model 
the individual effects explicitly using dummies for each cross-section unit and employing 
dummies for each period. Our data offers a large number of cross section units and therefore we 
have not considered using this approach as it becomes practically infeasible to report hundreds of 
parameters. Another alternative is the use of the fixed effect model, which removes all time 
invariant individual effects since the model uses within transformation approach as detailed 
above. Fixed effect model allows the individual effect to be correlated with the xit and mitigates 
any bias (see the technical details in the previous sections and refer Baltagi, 2003 & Wooldridge, 
2002).  The robustness in fixed effect model, however, comes at a cost since time constant 
variables need to be excluded. In our case, some variables such as emerging market dummy, 
logarithmic distance between capital cities and common language dummy are time constant 
variables. Furthermoer, fixed effect estiamtion does not take account of the information supplied 
by the between variation in the data set 
 
Given the constraints of fixed effect model discussed above, we estimate most of our regressions 
using random effects model. Further, as suggested by Wooldridge (2002), the fixed effects model 
is not appropriate where the key variables do not exhibit significant variation over time. We 
compute a general approximation of the between and within variations for our variables. 
Defining the cross-country specific or group mean for any variable yit 
 
 
yit can be decomposed into 2 orthogonal components: 
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                       =       within      +   between 
 
 where   ̅  (∑ ∑    
  
   )
 
    (∑   
 
   )  
 
N is the number of cross section units and Ti is time dimension for yit. The corresponding 
decomposition of the sum of squares is: 
 
 
                  Overall Variation           =   Within Variation      +   Between Variation. 
 
Between and within variations in our dataset are shown in Table 5-1.  The first three columns 
show the overall, between and within variations (standard deviation) for all variables. The fourth 
column shows proportion of between variations (ratio of square of between standard deviation to 
square of overall standard deviation) and the fifth column indicates within variations (ratio of 
square of within standard deviation to square of overall standard deviation). 
 
…………….Insert Table 5-1 here, see page 129 …………. 
 
The figures in Table 5-1suggest that except for market impact, equity market volatility, exchange 
rate volatility, and historical returns, all other variables exhibit significant between variations. 
Furthermore, as explained earlier, we are unable to use the dummies with fixed effect model. 
This constrains us to employ random effect model in most of our estimations. In our random 
effect models, although we are unable to control time invariant pair-country effects, we are able 
to include all observed control variables and the time dummies.  Since the random effect model 
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utilizes both, the within and between country variations, it is more efficient than the fixed effect 
model. Wooldridge (2003) further notes that under the random effects assumption the estimator 
is consistent and asymptotic normal as the cross sectional units (N) gets larger with constant time 
dimension (T). In our case, the number of N is over 550 with T of only 6 years. Given the results 
in Table 5-1, we use random effect model in all the specifications containing dummy or time 
invariant variables. However, in order to make our study more robust, we also use the fixed effect 
model only including time variant variables and the between effect model to ignore the effect of 
temporal dimension for the sake of robustness. We also report the test statistics of the standard 
Hausman and Breusch-Pagan unit specific tests (results footnoted) justifying the use of fixed 
effect model on statistical ground. For technical details of the tests, please refer Wooldridge 
(2002). 
 
5.7 Co-integration and vector error correction model 
We take a non-structural approach for investigating the impact of foreign equity investment 
flows on the short and long run dynamics of Asian equity markets with the global markets.
13
  
 
We use the cointegration and „vector error correction‟ model. Cointegration approach is widely 
used for examination of long-run stochastic relationship between equity markets (see Kearney 
and Lucey, 2004 for a comprehensive review). For short-run dynamics, the use of Vector 
Autoregression (VAR) analysis is quite widespread (see Froot et. al., 2001; Bekaert et al., 2002 
and Richard, 2005).  
 
5.7.1 Cointegration 
We examine the long run relationship using VAR-based cointegration approach proposed by 
Johansen (1988) and Johansen and Juselius (1990). The Johansen-Juselius (JJ) approach is 
preferred because it is considered superior to regression-based approach suggested by Engle and 
                                                 
 
13
 Use of a non-structural approach in linkage studies is advocated by Bekaert and Harvey (2000) who suggest 
that because of lack of theoretical basis, non-structural approach should be preferred in conducting portfolio flow 
studies. Further, Tesar and Werner (1995) report that even in the relatively open markets, the substantial increase in 
cross border flows do not comply with the theoretical foundations of optimal portfolio theory due to home bias 
effects. 
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Granger in 1987.
14
 The JJ approach uses maximum likelihood estimates and allows testing and 
estimation of more than one cointegrating vector in the multivariate system without requiring a 
specific variable to be normalized. This way, the JJ test overcomes the problem of carrying over 
the errors from the first step into the second step commonly encountered in Engle and Granger‟s 
(1987) approach. Further, Johansen‟s method is independent of the choice of endogenous 
variable within a vector autoregression (VAR) framework. This enables testing for various 
structural hypotheses involving restricted versions of cointegrating vectors and speed of 
adjustment parameters using likelihood ratio tests. The general VAR equation can be rewritten 
as: 
 
 
 
Where: 
  
 
Since our objective is to investigate the long-run relationship, we will focus on the elements of 
matrix . If vector y contains m variables, matrix  will be of the order m x m, with a maximum 
                                                 
14
 The Johansen-Juselius procedure resolves the problem of endogeneity in that we do not need to normalise the 
cointegrating vector on one of the variables as required in the Engle and Granger (EG) test (see Cheung and Lai, 
1993).  
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possible rank of m (or full rank). Equation 5-33, except for the yt-p term, is in the form of the 
traditional VAR with first difference. The  term determines whether the system of equations is 
cointegrated, i.e., whether a long-run equilibrium relationship exists. The feature to note is that 
the rank of matrix  is equal to the number of independent cointegrating vectors. If rank of 
matrix  = 0, the matrix is null, i.e., all the elements in this matrix are zero, which implies no 
cointegration or a lack of a long-run equilibrium relationship and the error correction 
mechanism, yt-k, therefore, does not exist. In determining the rank of matrix  (number of 
cointegrating vectors), we calculate the characteristic roots or eigenvalues iˆ  of . Johansen 
(1988) and Johansen and Juselius (1990) propose trace (trace) and maximum eigenvalue (max) 
test statistics to establish whether the characteristic roots are significantly different from zero. 
The likelihood ratio (LR) statistic for the trace test (trace) is:  
 
 
Where iˆ  are the estimated values of the characteristic roots (also known as                     
eigenvalues) obtained from estimated  matrix. The null hypothesis to be tested is that the 
number of cointegrating vectors is less than or equal to r against the alternative hypothesis that 
the number of cointegrating vectors is more than r. For example the null hypothesis r  0 against 
alternative r = 1, r  1 against alternative r = 2, and so forth.  The „maximum eigenvalue‟ test is 
used to evaluate the null hypothesis of r cointegrating vectors against the r + 1 cointegrating 
vectors. The LR test statistic is given by: 
 
 
The computed values of trace and max  statistics are evaluated using the critical values provided 
by Osterwarld-Lenum (1992). The optimal system lag length is determined by using the Schwarz 
Information Criteria (SIC). Specifically, the appropriate number of lags for each variable is 
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obtained by computing the SIC over different lag schemes within a range of 1 to 20 and by 
choosing the number of lags that yields the lowest value for the SIC.  
 
5.7.2 Error correction representations 
Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) is employed on the cointegrated return series as this 
provides us with an effective way to analyse the short-run relationship including causality and 
the speed at which the error is corrected for establishing the long-run relationship found in the 
cointegration analysis. If variables are cointegrated they tend to converge in the long-run despite 
short-run deviations. VECM examines this equilibrium relationship and provides a feedback 
mechanism, the error correction term, which gradually moves in tandem with the equilibrium 
relationship. VECM also provides the mechanism to identify the magnitude and length of 
information transmitted from one series to another through the system, referred as variance 
decomposition and impulse response function respectively. The VECM is employed on first 
difference of I(1) variables as shown below.  
 
 
 
Equation 5-38 is a three variable model with y and x being return series and w being the net 
foreign equity investment. The other representations with ∆x and ∆w could be similarly 
presented. The cointegrating vector zt-1 is the error correction term which will be I (0) if the 
above series in their level term have long-run equilibrium relationship. This term corrects the 
short-term deviations and helps convergence of the series towards a long run equilibrium state. 
The parameter 3  measures the speed of adjustment in the short-term deviations whilst 11  and 
12
  capture the short run causality. The lag length and coefficients are determined by OLS 
regression using the SIC criteria.
15
 
 
                                                 
15
 Lag length problem can be solved by alternative information criteria, such as AIC, SIC and HQIC. SIC embodies 
a much stiffer penalty than AIC whereas HQIC is somewhat in between. Although inefficient compared to other two 
criteria, we prefer SIC because it is strongly consistent. Hence, on the trade-off between consistency and efficiency, 
we prefer former to the latter. 
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5.7.2.1 Impulse response function 
Impulse response function explains the responsiveness of one variable in the VAR framework to 
the shocks in its own as well as other variables. It explains the extent to which a unit shock in 
one variable in isolation of the others affects the movement in other variables. In each of the 
equation, one unit shock is applied to detect the change in the VAR system over time by 
representing the VAR as VMA (Vector Moving Average) representation: 
 
 
Where, bij are unit normalized innovation coefficients of impulse response function following the 
normalization by the Cholesky factor
16
 and 
0
11
b  is the simultaneous effect of a unit shock to ti , . 
The contemporaneous innovation is stated in standard deviation form and have non-unit 
coefficient in contrast to its unit coefficients in the equation.  
 
5.7.2.2 Forecast error variance decomposition 
Previous research has shown that variance decomposition analysis is quite effective in examining 
dynamic interactions amongst economic time series (Lutkepohl and Reimers, 1992). Whilst the 
impulse response function traces the effects of a shock in one endogenous variable on other 
variables in the VAR, variance decomposition enables further analysis by decomposing the 
forecast error variance of domestic return index and net foreign equity investment that will 
provide us with a quantitative measure of the short run dynamic relationship among the 
variables. The variance decomposition thus offers greater insights on the relative significance of 
each random innovation that affects the variables in VAR by showing the proportion of changes 
in variance caused by a shock in its own lags and by shocks in variance of other variables as well 
as the magnitude of the effects.  
 
                                                 
16
 See Diebold (2004). 
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Table 5-1: Between and Within Variation 
Variables 
Standard Deviation   
Proportion of 
between 
variations (%) 
Proportion of 
within 
variations (%) 
Overall Between Within   
Commission 11.252 10.486 4.102  86.85 13.29 
       
Fees 6.854 6.474 2.208  89.20 10.37 
       
Market Impact 9.062 6.148 6.867  46.03 57.41 
       
Turnover ratio 0.563 0.527 0.203  87.66 13.04 
       
HBIAS 1.233 1.150 0.498  86.91 16.33 
       
Portfolio allocation  2.234 2.196 0.548  96.66 6.01 
       
Log of market development/size 0.662 0.596 0.287  81.08 18.78 
       
Equity market volatility 0.231 0.101 0.209  19.20 81.64 
       
Exchange rate volatility 0.350 0.285 0.204  66.33 34.03 
       
Historical return 0.235 0.124 0.200  27.86 72.48 
       
Emerging market dummy 0.500 0.500 0.000  100 0.00 
       
Log bilateral trade 0.234 0.211 0.055  80.99 5.46 
       
Log distance 1.107 1.104 0.000  100 0.00 
       
Common language dummy 0.348 0.348 0.000  100 0.00 
       
Equity market correlation 0.230 0.229 0.000  100 0.00 
       
Economic development/policy risk 4.626 3.995 2.358  74.58 25.97 
       
Financial policy risk 5.706 4.922 2.920  74.40 26.18 
       
Investor Protection – world bank 0.447 0.444 0.058  98.93 1.71 
       
Investment profile - ICRG 1.871 1.819 0.482  94.61 6.65 
       
Quality of institution - ICRG 3.247 3.204 0.516  97.34 2.53 
       
English common law dummy 0.416 0.416 0.000  100 0.00 
       
Equity market openness 0.156 0.146 0.053  88.3 11.68 
       
Closely held firm  19.344 19.328 0.000   100 0.00 
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Chapter 6   First empirical study: Transaction costs and FEPA 
 
Our first empirical study focuses on the relationship between country level transaction costs and 
foreign equity portfolio allocation. We test the following hypotheses: 
 
H1  Countries with lower level of average commission attract higher level of FEPA. 
 
H2 Countries with lower level of average fees attract higher level of FEPA. 
 
H3 Countries with lower level of average market impact cost attract higher level of FEPA. 
 
We first present the descriptive statistics of our dependent and independent variables. Although 
not as robust as panel regressions, descriptive analysis does provide useful information.   
 
6.1 Statistics on FEPA and transaction costs 
Table 6-1 presents the averages (over cross-section and time) of FEPA and transaction costs (in 
basis points) for all host countries (j) for the period 2001-2006. It is worth nothing from the 
figures in the first column that Peru received the lowest average foreign equity portfolio 
allocation (0.02%) whereas USA received highest (37.76%). In terms of the top ten ranking 
competing for FEPA, most are developed countries (USA, UK, Switzerland, Sweden, Japan, 
Italy, Germany, France, Finland and Canada) and the bottom ten mostly comprises developing 
countries (Argentina, Chile, Czech Republic, Malaysia, Peru, Philippines, Thailand and Turkey) 
with the exception of New Zealand and Portugal which also received relatively lower foreign 
equity portfolio investment. 
 
…………….Insert Table 6-1 here, see page 139 …………. 
 
Columns 3, 4, and 5 of Table 6-1 show the average of various components of transaction costs 
(i.e., commission, fees and market impact cost, respectively). Column 6 presents the total 
transaction costs (sum of commission, fees and market impact cost). In terms of total cost 
(column 6), it is evident that Japan has the lowest total transaction costs followed by USA, 
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Austria, Belgium, Canada, Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden and Switzerland. Not 
surprisingly, all of these countries have relatively more developed equity markets. The univariate 
analysis provides prima facie evidence that generally lower transaction costs are associated with 
higher foreign portfolio allocations.  
 
Table 6-2 shows correlation coefficients between different components of transaction costs. 
Except for TC1 (commission) and TC2 (fees) that are somewhat correlated (0.40), other 
combinations have lower or negative correlations. This suggests that multicollinearity is not a 
significant problem among the various measures of transaction cost.  
 
…………….Insert Table 6-2 here, see page 140 …………. 
 
6.2 Regression analysis  
The analysis of the summary statistics presented in previous section offers good indication that 
countries with relatively lower transaction costs seem to attract higher equity portfolio allocation. 
To confirm this, we employ a number of regressions by including different variables that could 
potentially compete with transaction cost measures in explaining portfolio allocations. All 
significant coefficients are shown with asterisks and the test statistics are shown in parenthesis. 
Regression specification 6-1 includes home bias (HBIAS) variable in addition to each of the 
different components of transaction costs (TC1, TC2 and TC3) as independent variables. The 
results are presented in Table 6-3. 
 
 
As expected home bias is highly significant and bears the expected negative sign. Estimations 
show that one percent increase in home bias decreases bilateral portfolio holdings by nearly 1%. 
This finding is consistent with other studies (French and Poterba, 1999; Cooper and Kaplanis, 
1994; Tesar and Werner, 1995, Lewis, 1999, Ahearne et al, 2004, Chan et al., 2005 and Fidora et 
al. 2007) and confirms existence of home bias in international portfolio allocations. However, 
after controlling for the home bias, all transaction cost measures are highly significant at 5% 
                                              6-1 
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level of significance. This shows that transaction costs have substantial effect on foreign 
portfolio allocations.  
 
…………….Insert Table 6-3 here, see page 140 …………. 
 
The above results may be biased since specification 6-1 excludes macroeconomic, institutional 
and bilateral control variables. Thus in regression 6-2, we include a number of control variables 
and the time dummies.  
 
 
Results in Table 6-4 show that the coefficient for home bias is still negative and statistically 
significant. Although, the magnitude of transaction costs coefficients is somewhat reduced, they 
remain statistically significant. The changes in magnitude are not surprising since inclusion of 
the control variables and time dummies mitigates any bias inherent in regression 6-1. 
 
…………….Insert Table 6-4 here, see page 141 …………. 
 
Next, we run a number of different specifications of the model to ensure that our estimates are 
robust. The outputs of different specifications of the model are shown in Table 6-5. We first 
discuss the results of the transaction cost measures followed by discussion about the impact of 
control variables. 
 
6.3 All in one – Random effect 
As multicollinearity amongst the different transaction cost measures is not a significant problem, 
we include all four transaction cost variables in a single regression and jointly estimate the 
coefficients via the following regression using random effect model: 
 
                                                                            6-2 
                                                                             6-3 
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The findings reported in Table 6-5 (column 2: All in one – RE) show that not only the 
coefficients for transaction cost measures are highly significant, but they also carry expected 
signs with improved R
2
 of 82%. This suggests that each of the transaction cost measure has a 
distinct and statistically significant influence on foreign portfolio allocations. 
 
…………….Insert Table 6-5 here, see page 143 …………. 
 
6.4 All in one – Fixed effect 
Our regression coefficients may still be suspected of being bias since each country may have its 
individual effect through the time invariant variables and time invariant pair-country bilateral 
effects, such as common colonial history, special bilateral treaty, favourite partner nation status, 
etc
17
. If this is the case then the unobserved time invariant variables may be correlated with the 
regressors and the estimates may be biased. We use the fixed effect model to address this issue. 
As discussed earlier, although fixed effect estimates are not as efficient as the estimates of 
random effect model, particularly where variables have lower temporal variation, it does account 
for of all the country specific and bilateral cross-country time invariant effects. As our 
transaction costs and other control variables have time dimension, we are able to use the fixed 
effect model using only the time variant variables. We run regression specification 6-4 using a 
fixed effect model:  
 
 
The results reported in Table 6-5 (column 3: All in one - FE) show that the explanatory power of 
the model is reduced since all time invariant variables are not used. However, the reported 
goodness-of-fit of the fixed effect model is explained by the within transformation of the 
                                                 
17
 The Hausman test statistic, Chi-square = 41.01, also confirms that the coefficients estimated by the efficient 
random effect model are not the same as the ones estimated by the consistent fixed effects model. As such, on 
statistical ground, it is reasonable to use the fixed effect models as they always produce consistent results. In 
addition, the standard Breusch-pagan test for unit specific effect, Chi-square = 391 also confirms the estimates from 
random effect model are not systematic. 
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independent variables and cannot be interpreted in the usual way (see Wooldridge, 2003). All our 
key variables, i.e., commission, fees, and market impact cost variables remain statistically 
significant without any major change in either their statistical significance or signs.  
 
6.5 All in one – between effect 
In order to further make our study more robust we also run the between effect (BE) estimation. 
Verbeek (2009) notes that the BE estimation effectively discards the time series information in 
the data set and exploits the between dimension of the data (i.e. differences between individual 
cross section units).  As mentioned earlier, it is determined using OLS in the regression of 
individual averages of the dependent variable and the individual averages of independent 
variables. We run the following regression using the BE estimation. 
 
 
As shown in Table 6-5 (column no. 4: All in one – BE), all the transaction cost estimates are still 
statistically significant. The change in the size of the estimates are obvious because the 
regression only uses the between information in the data neglecting the time series information. 
 
6.6 Free float home bias 
The home bias (HBIAS) variable that we used is based on the assumptions that the all countries 
follow an open market policy allowing free entry and exit of foreign investors. However, despite 
vigorously pursuing liberalisation of financial markets, many emerging markets in developing 
countries have regulations that impede the free inflow and outflow of portfolio investments. Our 
measure of equity market openness does reflect this issue to considerable extent because it 
captures the level of restriction imposed on the ownership. To address the issue of free float 
securities, we construct a free float home bias (F_HBIAS) measure using the S&P IFC‟s freely 
investable market value index. Again, a caveat is worth noting here. The investable measure is 
only available for the markets in developing countries and therefore in our analysis we assume 
that developed markets are completely open for foreign investors. However, even if this may not 
be the case for some developed countries; the closely held firms variable included in our model 
                                                                          6-5 
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should be able to capture the effects of investment restrictions, if any. We run the following 
regression specified with freely floated home bias (F_HBIAS). The estimation outputs are 
reported in Table 6-5 (column 5: Free float home bias). 
 
 
Results suggest that the quantitative size of the home bias coefficient is slightly lower than in the 
previous specification. However, qualitatively it is still statistically significant. The transaction 
cost coefficients remain highly significant at the conventional 5% level. 
 
6.7 Reverse causality 
In our regressions, reverse causality may also be a potential problem. As noted in our 
introductory chapter, there is theoretical conjecture that the increase in the foreign equity 
investment develops the liquidity and informational efficiency of the market suggesting increase 
in foreign investments itself may have impact on the level of transaction costs. To overcome the 
potential endogeneity problem and following Gelos and Wei (2005), we use one-year lag value 
of all transaction costs variables in the following regression 6-7 and estimate with RE model.  
 
 
As can be observed from estimates in Table 6-5 (column 6: One year lagged) the regression 
coefficients of the lagged values of transaction costs remain statistically significant. The 
magnitude of the estimates does change as they reflect lag rather than the level effect. Despite 
using lagged values, the transaction cost measures remain statistically significant confirming that 
transaction cost variables used in our estimations do not appear to suffer from reverse causality 
problem.  
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6.8 Major financial centres 
Here we consider the possibility of international investors buying depositary receipts/global 
shares listed in major financial centres instead of investing directly in shares trading in the 
foreign equity markets. International investors may be tempted to use major financial centres 
because of the lower transaction costs (Warnock, 2002 and Bekaert and Hodrick, 2009). If this 
may be the case then our transaction cost estimates may be affected because our sample includes 
USA, UK and Japan, considered major financial centres where depositary receipts/global shares 
are listed and actively traded. To address this issue, we exclude USA, UK and Japan as the 
investor countries from our sample and run the following specification 6-8 using RE estimation. 
 
 
As seen in Table 6-5 (column 7: No major investors), despite excluding USA, UK and Japan, the 
coefficients all transaction cost measures exhibit significant effect. This confirms that even after 
removing the effect of the major financial centres, transaction costs do seem to matter in the 
foreign portfolio allocation decisions. 
 
6.9 Control variables 
Most of the control variables have expected and consistent signs in the different specifications, 
except for few as seen from reported coefficients and associated test statistics in Table 6-5. As 
far as the Stock market development/size is concerned, all the estimates carry expected sign and 
is highly significant across all specifications. The results make sense since they indicate that 
foreign investors are keen to invest more of their money in countries with larger stock markets. 
Chan et al., (2005) also report similar assessment. Economic development and policy risk 
variable of ICRG, which captures the potential of economic policy, economic development and 
economic growth risk, is generally significant across specifications signifying that investors tend 
to overweight counties with potential lower economic policy risk. Similarly, the financial policy 
risk is also significant in most of the specifications. Again, it signifies that investor may avoid 
countries with higher level of financial risk. The findings on broad country risk measures are also 
consistent with previous studies (Gelos and Wei, 2005).  
                                                                                  6-8 
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The broad measure of investor protection is significant across all regressions; accept for the 
between effect estimation model and free float home bias, implying the investor may not be 
willing to invest in countries which does provide higher level of investor protection rights. The 
issue of investor protection is debatable in the literature with mixed conclusion reported by a 
number of existing studies (Agarwal et al., 2005 and Chan et al., 2005). We explore the issue of 
investor protection in more detailed in our third empirical study. Further, the equity market 
openness measure is significant across all specifications. As predicted, investors are more willing 
to invest in countries that are more open to foreign investors in terms of limit on foreign 
ownership (Stulz, 2001 and Dahlquist et al., 2003).  
 
Similarly the significance of closely held firm variable indicates that investors tend to 
underweight countries where ownership is highly concentrated.  Except for the equity return 
correlation, which is not significant in most of the specifications, all the bilateral gravity or 
information asymmetry variables are significant. The insignificance of equity return correlation 
has also be previously reported in the literature (see Chan et al., 2005) indicating that 
diversification opportunity may not be the only factor when considering foreign investments. 
The significance of common language across all specifications show investors are more willing 
to invest in countries sharing common language as this reduces the information asymmetry 
problem (Chan et al., 2005 and Fidora et al., 2007). Similarly, investors tend to invest more of 
their wealth in countries nearer than farther as reflected by the significance of distance variable. 
In addition, the significance of bilateral trade in all specifications is again a strong indication of 
the presence of information asymmetry problem when it comes to foreign investments. Investors 
are more willing to invest in countries having lower bilateral information asymmetry (see Portes 
and Rey, 2005; Chan et al., 2005 and Fidora et al., 2007). Finally, although they have expected 
sign, the historical return seems to be statistically insignificant across different specifications 
and hence, inconsistent with the return chasing or feedback hypothesis reported in the literature 
(Bohn and Tesar, 1996; Froot et al, 2001; Richards, 2005; and Bekaert et al, 2002; Dahlquist and 
Goran, 2004 and Griffin et al, 2004). Such findings are also reported by previous study (Chan et 
al., 2005) indicating that foreign investors do not solely base their country allocation decision on 
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the past historical returns, although this may not be true for emerging markets as reported in our 
fourth empirical chapter. 
 
6.10 Chapter summary 
In spite of the critical role of transaction costs there are not many papers that have explicitly 
examined its influence on international equity portfolio allocation decisions. Using bilateral 
cross-country equity portfolio holdings data and three direct measures of transaction cost for 36 
host countries, we provide evidence that markets where transaction costs are lower attract greater 
equity portfolio investments. The results imply that future research on international portfolio 
diversification cannot afford to ignore the role of transaction costs and policy makers, especially 
in emerging markets, should encourage efforts to reduce transaction costs for attracting higher 
levels of foreign equity portfolio investments.  
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Table 6-1: Descriptive statistics (average over cross-section and time) on foreign portfolio allocation 
and transaction cost measures 
 Country Portfolio 
allocation 
Commission Fees Market 
Impact 
Total 
Cost Argentina 0.0005 32.77 3.12 37.67 73.56 
Australia 0.0146 23.13 2.08 8.85 34.06 
Austria 0.0045 17.43 0.43 12.78 30.63 
Belgium 0.0108 18.49 0.38 10.47 29.34 
Brazil 0.0054 26.41 1.92 17.66 45.99 
Canada 0.0171 18.78 0.51 13.05 32.35 
Chile 0.0004 41.80 8.03 23.60 73.43 
China 0.0041 NA NA NA NA 
Czech Republic 0.0009 41.39 6.57 10.09 58.05 
Denmark 0.0056 19.38 0.22 15.92 35.52 
Finland 0.0210 18.20 0.75 24.21 43.16 
France 0.1081 17.90 0.64 9.44 27.98 
Germany 0.0882 17.88 0.62 9.02 27.53 
Greece 0.0028 31.77 15.35 12.45 59.57 
Hungary 0.0020 42.36 4.99 11.17 57.96 
India 0.0031 41.38 2.88 18.65 62.92 
Indonesia 0.0101 45.53 10.80 15.96 72.29 
Italy 0.0343 18.00 0.58 12.78 31.36 
Japan 0.0794 13.53 0.20 6.42 20.15 
Korea 0.0107 30.01 13.19 16.40 59.61 
Malaysia 0.0015 34.75 6.63 15.49 56.87 
Mexico 0.0042 27.30 0.27 10.48 38.04 
New Zealand 0.0015 22.49 0.24 14.85 37.58 
Norway 0.0057 19.00 0.25 13.26 32.51 
Peru 0.0002 36.46 8.01 22.07 66.54 
Philippines 0.0004 47.83 30.13 12.25 90.20 
Poland 0.0017 NA NA NA NA 
Portugal 0.0027 18.53 0.67 14.74 33.94 
Russia 0.0058 NA NA NA NA 
Sweden 0.0209 18.33 0.47 12.29 31.10 
Switzerland 0.0533 17.74 0.95 10.42 29.11 
Taiwan 0.0058 25.85 13.04 14.69 53.58 
Thailand 0.0018 43.27 1.79 13.26 58.33 
Turkey 0.0019 33.66 2.80 20.61 56.51 
UK 0.1573 14.40 24.77 14.14 53.31 
USA 0.3776 15.47 0.41 9.19 25.07 
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Table 6-2: Correlation among different transaction measures 
  TC1 TC2 TC3 
    
TC1 1.00   
TC2 0.40 1.00  
TC3 0.20 0.05 1.00 
 
 
 
Table 6-3: Base model regressions 
The dependent variable is the log value of country wise bilateral foreign portfolio allocation from country 
i in country j at time t (wi,j,t). The independent variables are home bias (HBIAS) and the three measures of 
transaction cost in basis points (scaled by 100). TC1 denotes commission, TC2 fees and TC3 market 
impact. 
 
                     
                          
 
Test-statistics are given in parentheses (based on robust standard error (SE) allowing for clustering within 
the bilateral asset allocation i.e. cluster adjusted SE corrected for arbitrary heteroskedasticity and auto-
correlation).  All the coefficients are interpreted as elasticity. Significant coefficients are indicated with * 
denoting significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. 
 TC1 TC2 TC3 
Home bias -0.931*** -0.935*** -0.942*** 
 (-59.25) (-59.86) (-60.98) 
    
TC1 -2.836*** -0.602** -0.631*** 
 (-14.59) (-2.23) (-7.42) 
    
Overall R
2
 0.471 0.304 0.311 
Number of observations 3011 3011 3011 
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Table 6-4: Regression with all controls 
In all regressions, the dependent variable is the log value of country wise bilateral foreign portfolio allocation from 
country i in country j at time t (wi,j,t). The three key measures of Transaction Costs (in basis points and scaled by 
100) include TC1 (commission) TC2 (fees) and TC3 (market impact).  
 
The controls are bilateral home bias, stock market development/size, country economic development/policy 
risk(components are: GDP per head, Real GDP growth, inflation rate, budget balance as % of GDP, current account 
as % of GDP), country financial risk (components are: foreign debt as % of GDP, exchange rate stability, foreign 
debt as % of total export and services, current account as % of exports and services and international liquidity), 
investor protection, equity market openness, closely held firms, bilateral trade, common (pair countries) language 
dummy (pair countries), log distance between capital cities of the pair countries, equity return correlation, three year 
moving average historical return and Time Dummies. Regressions are estimated using random effect model. 
 
                       
                       
                                 
 
Test-statistics are given in parentheses (based on robust standard error (SE) allowing for clustering within the 
bilateral asset allocation i.e. cluster adjusted SE corrected for arbitrary heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation). All 
the coefficients are interpreted as elasticity. Significant coefficients are indicated with * denoting significance at 
10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. 
 
 TC1 TC2 TC3 
Home bias -0.927*** -0.925*** -0.929*** 
 (-96.70) (-97.62) (-97.30) 
    
Transaction cost -0.605*** -1.091*** -0.206** 
 (-5.77) (-5.65) (-2.30) 
    
Stock market development/size 0.551*** 0.579*** 0.583*** 
 (21.85) (22.63) (28.44) 
    
Economic policy risk 0.560*** 0.669*** 0.484*** 
 (2.98) (3.60) (2.92) 
    
Financial policy risk 0.682*** 0.631*** 0.561*** 
 (4.67) (4.33) (3.79) 
    
Investor protection (WBGI) 0.900*** 0.937 0.859*** 
 (11.14) (1.25) (12.38) 
    
Equity market openness 1.585*** 1.707*** 1.650*** 
 (11.56) (12.92) (11.76) 
    
Closely held firms -3.999*** -4.087*** -4.145*** 
 (-16.74) (-15.77) (-16.96) 
    
Common language 0.527*** 0.546*** 0.525*** 
 (6.37) (5.80) (5.98) 
    
Bilateral trade 2.614*** 2.481*** 2.520*** 
 (14.24) (13.27) (13.58) 
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Distance -0.143*** -0.155*** -0.156*** 
 (-3.54) (-3.51) (-3.70) 
    
Equity return correlation -0.184 -0.212 -0.0416 
 (-0.93) (-0.97) (-0.21) 
    
Historical return 0.341*** 0.318*** 0.327*** 
 (11.12) (9.99) (11.13) 
    
Year 1 dummy -0.204*** -0.218*** -0.228*** 
 (-12.64) (-13.30) (-13.62) 
    
Year 2 dummy -0.217*** -0.201*** -0.209*** 
 (-14.60) (-14.18) (-14.13) 
    
Year 3 dummy -0.240*** -0.215*** -0.233*** 
 (-14.82) (-13.74) (-14.03) 
    
Year 4 dummy -0.256*** -0.236*** -0.247*** 
 (-13.53) (-13.04) (-13.05) 
    
Year 5 dummy -0.145*** -0.217 -0.229 
 (-11.78) (-10.14) (-12.12 
Overall R
2
 0.794 0.786 0.788 
Number of observations 2917 2917 2917 
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Table 6-5: Regression output with different specifications 
In all regressions, the dependent variable is the log value of country wise bilateral foreign portfolio allocation from country i in country j at time t (wi,j,t). The three key 
measures of Transaction Costs (in basis points and scaled by 100) include TC1 (commission) TC2 (fees) and TC3 (market impact).  
 
The Controls are bilateral home bias (HBIAS), stock market development/size, country economic development/policy risk(components are: GDP per head, Real GDP growth, 
inflation rate, budget balance as % of GDP, current account as % of GDP), country financial risk (components are: foreign debt as % of GDP, exchange rate stability, foreign 
debt as % of total export and services, current account as % of exports and services and international liquidity), investor protection, equity market openness, closely held 
firms, bilateral trade, common (pair countries) language dummy (pair countries), log distance between capital cities of the pair countries, equity return correlation, three year 
moving average historical return and Time Dummies. Different specifications and estimation methods used as noted below 
 
                     
                                                
 
Specification „All in one – RE’ includes transaction cost, control variables, time dummies and uses random effect model. 
Specification „All in one – FE’ includes home bias, transaction costs, all time variant control variables, time dummies and uses fixed effect model. 
Specification „All in one – BE’ includes home bias, transaction costs, all time variant control variables, time dummies and uses between effect model. 
Specification „Free float home bias’ includes free float home bias, transaction cost, all control variables, time dummies and uses random effect model. 
Specification „One year lagged’ includes home bias, lagged transaction costs, all control variables, time dummies and uses random effect model. 
Specification „Major financial centres’ includes home bias, transaction costs, all control variables, time dummies and uses random effect model but the sample excludes 
USA, UK and Japan as investor countries to address the effect of major financial centres. 
 
Test-statistics are given in parentheses (based on robust standard error (SE) allowing for clustering within the bilateral asset allocation i.e. cluster adjusted SE corrected for 
arbitrary heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation). All the coefficients are interpreted as elasticity. Significant coefficients are indicated with * denoting significance at 10%, 
** at 5% and *** at 1%. 
 All in one - RE All in one - FE All in one - BE Free float home bias One year lagged Major financial 
centres 
Home bias -0.927*** -0.928*** -0.947*** -0.827*** -0.954*** -0.933***  
 (-95.52) (-76.35) (-28.57) (-67.10) (-91.91) (-90.20)  
        
TC1 -0.650*** -0.383*** -9.312*** -0.590*** -0.740*** -0.662***  
 (-5.73) (-2.77) (-14.68) (-4.21) (-6.46) (-5.19)  
        
TC2 -1.108*** -1.083*** -1.007*** -1.092*** -0.906*** -1.101***  
 (-5.18) (-4.13) (-2.81) (-4.61) (-4.37) (-4.61)  
        
TC3 -0.298*** -0.187*** -9.694*** -0.141** -0.195** -0.288***  
 (-3.07) (-2.95) (-14.02) (-2.23) (-2.53) (-2.65)  
                
144 
        
Stock market development/size 0.600*** 0.601*** 1.255*** 0.569*** 0.469*** 0.593***  
 (28.80) (25.00) (15.44) (21.56) (15.57) (25.41)  
        
Economic development/policy 0.309* 0.752*** 10.51*** 0.832*** 0.732*** 0.323*  
 (1.83) (5.18) (7.57) (3.58) (2.67) (1.71)  
        
Financial policy Risk 0.670*** 0.626*** 0.852* 0.410** 0.766*** 0.685***  
 (4.42) (4.77) (1.82) (2.28) (4.69) (4.05)  
        
Investor protection (WBGI) 0.809*** 0.909 0.517 0.739 0.471*** 0.812***  
 (11.46) (1.58) (0.84) (1.25) (4.85) (10.24)  
        
Equity market openness 1.705*** 1.609*** 0.629*** 2.944*** 2.661*** 0.489***  
 (12.61) (9.99) (2.51) (17.49) (17.56) (3.27)  
        
Closely held  firms -3.878*** NA -1.297*** -4.428*** -4.141*** -3.912***  
 (-18.25)  (-5.33) (-15.76) (-18.83) (-16.52)  
        
Common language 0.539*** NA 0.433*** 0.355*** 0.655*** 0.511***  
 (7.07)  (4.74) (3.20) (8.34) (6.17)  
        
Bilateral trade 2.702*** 1.956*** 2.293*** 1.885*** 2.825*** 2.572***  
 (15.44) (8.06) (12.95) (12.67) (18.05) (12.22)  
        
Distance -0.142*** NA -0.218*** -0.352*** -0.140*** -0.184***  
 (-3.97)  (-6.02) (-7.38) (-3.76) (-4.43)  
        
Equity return correlation -0.254 NA -0.629*** -0.725 -0.242 0.0583  
 (-1.48)  (-3.08) (-1.20) (-1.27) (0.29)  
        
Historical return 0.312 0.328*** 0.114 0.367*** 0.228*** 0.316***  
 (1.21) (1.66) (0.78) (8.96) (7.00) (9.24)  
       
       
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Overall R
2
 0.821 0.679 0.794 0.641 0.796 0.813 
Number of observation 2917 2917 2917 2910 2392 2362 
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Chapter 7  Second empirical study: Country specific equity market 
characteristics and FEPA 
 
Our second empirical study examines the role of country-specific equity market characteristics 
(CSEMC) on the country allocation decision of foreign investors. As mentioned earlier (chapter 
3), despite strong theoretical reasoning consistent with international capital asset pricing model, 
described in chapter 2, there are relatively less number of studies demonstrating the significance 
of CSEMC on FEPA. The unavailability of good quality cross-country bilateral data has been the 
main hurdle limiting the number of investigations. With the availability of CPIS (IMF) data, it is 
now possible to undertake comprehensive examinations. In line with the arguments developed in 
chapter three (see section 3.2), we test the following hypotheses: 
 
H4 Stock market development/size has positive influence on FEPA. 
 
H5 Foreign investors prefer to overweight markets with higher liquidity. 
 
H6 Foreign investors prefer to underweight emerging markets. 
 
H7 Foreign investors prefer to underweight markets with higher equity market volatility. 
 
H8 Foreign investors prefer to underweight markets with higher real exchange rate volatility. 
 
7.1 Summary statistics 
Before examining the regression results, it is worth exploring the descriptive statistics (average 
over cross-section and time) providing valuable information on the expected relationship. Our 
key variables of interest are equity market development/size, turnover ratio, emerging market 
dummy, equity market volatility and exchange rate volatility. As seen in Table 7-1 (column 3), 
the top ten countries ranking against stock market development/size measure are all developed 
markets with the exception of Chile and Malaysia. Similarly, the bottom ten countries generally 
represent emerging markets with exception of Austria, New Zealand and Portugal. Furthermore, 
as seen in the same table, most of the countries that receive higher level of foreign equity 
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portfolio allocation are also developed markets. As such, going by this association, it indicates 
that foreign investors are motivated to hold higher equity portfolio investments in bigger and 
more developed equity market.   
 
In addition, most of the countries with highest turnover ratio are also developed countries with 
the exception India, Taiwan and Korea as exhibited in Table 7-1 (column 4).  As noted earlier, a 
market may show good performance in terms of overall index but may not translate into similar 
performance due to significant changes in price when portfolios are liquidated (Solnik and 
McLeavey, 2009). As seen from Table 7-1 (column 4) most of the emerging markets exhibit 
thinner trading activities relative to their developed counterparts suggesting foreign investors 
may be inclined to lower their portfolio allocation in the illiquid markets. In line with 
aforementioned argument, the regression coefficient is expected to bear positive sign. 
 
In terms of volatility of equity market, Table 7-1 (column 5) documents the summary statistics. 
Except Belgium, all the top ten countries with higher volatility are emerging markets signifying 
greater potential risk. Investors may shy away from markets having higher market volatilities 
reflecting higher uncertainty. The regression coefficient on this variable should bear negative 
sign. 
 
The ten markets with highest exchange rate volatility are generally all emerging countries with 
the exception of Australia and New Zealand. Turkey reveals the highest exchange rate volatility. 
Similarly, ten countries with lowest exchange rate volatility are all developed markets except for 
Malaysia and Thailand. Austria in our sample exhibits the lowest real exchange rate volatility 
with 1.9% of three-year moving average standard deviation for the sample period. 
 
………….Insert Table 7-1 about here, see page 154…………… 
 
7.2 Basic regression 
Do foreign investors allocate more funds to more developed and relatively stable equity markets? 
Our univariate analysis does indicate so. We run a number of regressions addressing various 
issue to ensure our study is as robust as possible. We first estimate the following basic regression 
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model with each of the five variables, discussed above, individually in following regression. The 
results are reported in Table 7-2.  
 
 
As seen, all the CSEMC coefficients are highly statistically significant and carry expected sign. 
The most notable figures are the R
2
 for stock market development/size and emerging market 
dummy regressions, which are 36% and 43% respectively. The emerging market dummy variable 
captures most of the market specific risk including market development and market efficiency as 
noted in our earlier discussion. This clearly shows that investors are inclined to invest in more 
developed markets. The significance of other variables suggests foreign investor are more leaned 
to allocate higher proportion of their wealth in markets which are larger in size, relatively more 
liquid and efficient, and with lower equity market and exchange rate volatility. As discussed 
earlier in our hypotheses development chapter, the results are consistent with existing studies 
(Harvey, 1995, a,b; Kawakatsu and Moorey, 1990; Fama and French, 1998; Rouwenhorst, 1999; 
Gelos and Wei, 2005 and Chan et al. 2005). 
 
………….Insert Table 7-2 about here, see page 155…………… 
 
As multi-collinearity is not a major problem (see Table 7-3) for our country specific equity 
market characteristic (       ) factors, we include all the five variables in the following 
specifications. 
 
………….Insert Table 7-3 about here, see page 156…………… 
 
 
7.3 All in one and without home bias 
We next run the random effect model including all our five CSEMC variables in a single 
regression but without any controls. The results are reported in Table 7-4 (column 2). 
 
                                      7.1 
                         7.2 
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We find that all the       variables are highly significant at 1% significance level except for 
the exchange rate volatility, which is statistically significant at 10% level. The overall R
2
 of the 
above specification shows that       accounts almost 45% of cross sectional and temporal 
variation in FEPA, again suggesting that level of equity market development and efficiency are 
most influential factors contributing to foreign investors‟ country allocation decision. The 
significance of stock market development/size is in line with previous studies validating the 
claim that investors prefer to over-weight bigger and more developed markets. Similarly, the 
statistical significance of emerging market dummy again is an indication that foreign investors 
not only prefer bigger but also markets with higher liquidity and efficiency in terms of 
information dissemination and the pace at which adjustment of the price takes place. As noted 
above, it is well known that emerging markets not only lack depth and breadth but also are 
relatively inefficient. As such, despite theoretical prescription, investors tend to invest less in 
emerging markets.  
 
The micro-structural variable, liquidity, also supports our claim of investor preferring efficient 
and liquid market. Better market liquidity also seems to have positive  impact suggesting foreign 
investor are more leaned to invest in markets having liquid assets and underweight illiquid 
markets. The findings are consistent with our analysis of summary statistics supporting the 
evidence that most of the relatively more liquid markets are also the major recipients of foreign 
equity portfolio investments. As we noted earlier, most of emerging markets are relatively 
illiquid (Bekaert and Harvey, 2003 and Solnik and Mcleavey, 2009) and hence, the significance 
of liquidity factor is in line with the predicted theory. 
 
Similarly, equity market volatility is also highly significant with expected negative sign 
following our theoretical framework of Cooper and Kaplanis (1986). The statistical significance 
provides strong indication that investors tend to avoid relatively more volatile markets. 
 
The exchange rate volatility, capturing the portion of volatility arising from movement in foreign 
exchange rate, is significant at 10% level. The expected sign provides strong indication that 
foreign investors seek currency risk premium with respect to uncertainty observed in exchange 
rate movement.  The significance is an indication that PPP theory does not hold, at least in the 
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short run, suggesting foreign investors are exposed to real exchange rate risk (see Alder and 
Dumas, 1983; Dumas and Solnik, 1995; Solnik, 1974 and Zimmerman et. al., 2003). 
 
As noted earlier, although most of our variables are statistically significant, they may be biased 
and inefficient in the absence of other control variables. In order to ensure our study is robust in 
the presence of controls and alternative estimations, we run different regressions challenging the 
robustness of our estimates. 
 
………….Insert Table 7-4 about here, see page 157…………… 
 
7.4 Regression only with home bias 
We next run the following specification including the home bias only as the control and all the 
      variables. The findings are reported in Table 7-4 (column 3) 
 
 
As expected, addition of home bias measure has significantly improved adequacy of the model. 
As reported in our previous empirical chapter, the home is highly significant and alone explains 
18% (63-45) of the variation in FEPA. This shows that strong home bias still exists in the 
international equity allocation. All our CSEMC are still statistically significant. The changes in 
size of the estimates are expected with specification 7.3 suffering less from omitted variable bias 
compared to previous specifications. 
 
7.5 Observed controls and omitted variable bias 
All estimates in the above specifications may still be biased in the absence of other factors 
correlated with CSEMCs.  Similarly, because we have used 36 countries with six years of time 
dimension, there could be significant country specific and time effect rendering our specification 
inadequate. Accordingly, we first run the following specification including CSEMC, home bias, 
all observable controls and time dummies. The results are presented in Table 7-4 (column 4). 
 
                                      7.3 
                                                                     7.4 
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Notably, the R
2
 significantly increases to 84% implying the controls and time dummies have 
additional explanatory power of almost 21% (84-63). The significance of home bias measure 
again corroborates the claim that investors still prefer their home markets relative to mean 
variance prescription. All coefficients on CSEMC are still statistically significant, even at 1% 
significance level, and bear expected sign. The size of coefficients changes, which is 
understandable as the addition the control variables mitigates bias to a significant extent.   
 
7.6 Unit specific effect 
The main purpose of employing panel data framework is to allow for unit specific effect, which 
if correlated with any of the regressors, may potentially render our estimates bias. Although we 
have been able to control most of the time varying and time invariant variables, there could still 
be unit specific effect driving the allocation
18
. Examples of such effect could be special treaty 
between pair countries, favourite country, cultural ties, and common colonial history. We address 
the issue of unobserved individual heterogeneity by running the following specification and 
estimate our model with fixed effect estimation method discussed in methodology chapter. 
 
 
 
As shown in Table 7-4 (column 5) all our CSEMC variables are still statistically significant at 
5% significance level. This confirms that after including observed and unobserved controls, all 
the CSEMC measures have significant influence on foreign equity investors‟ country allocation 
decision. 
 
7.7 Between effect estimation 
Here we only use the information on the individual differences between the entire cross sectional 
units and totally neglect the time series dimensions. Although this estimation method is not as 
efficient as the random effect procedure, for the purpose of further robustness, we estimate 
following specification using the between effect model. 
                                                 
18
 The Hausman test, Chi-square = 117, confirms that the fixed effect model is statistically preferred model. 
Similarly, the Breusch-pagan test statistic, Chi-square = 342, also confirms the presence of unit specific effect. 
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As shown in Table 7-4 (column 6), all our CSEMC variables are statistically significant as the 
conventional 5% level. This shows that we are able to test our hypotheses even by using the 
between variation information in our panel data model. However, as expected the size of the 
coefficients do changes with the use of between variation information only compared to between 
and within in the random effect model. 
 
7.8 Reverse causality bias 
Our estimates may still be biased, with respect to reverse causality problem. It is well known in 
the literature (see Errunza, 2001) that the increase in international investment also has positive 
impact on the development of local capital markets, an issue extensively discussed in chapter 1. 
If this is to be true, it is likely that our estimates suffer from endogeneity problem arising from 
reverse causality. We address this using one-year lag value for all our CSEMC variables and run 
the following specification. 
 
 
As reported in Table 7-5 (column 2), all our estimates are still highly statistically significant, 
even at 1% level of significance. However, it is worth noting that the size of these estimates 
represent lag effect rather than the level and therefore are not comparable to previous 
specifications. 
 
………….Insert Table 7-5 about here, see page 160…………… 
 
7.9 Free float home bias 
As noted earlier our home bias measure is constructed under the assumptions that entire market 
value is freely available to foreign investors. This may not be true, particularly for emerging 
markets. In order to address this issue we included the equity market openness measure 
correcting for the issue of free float. We construct freely floated home bias measure using the 
                                                                       7.6 
                                                                       7.7 
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S&P/IFC‟s freely investable market value as the benchmark weight instead of the standard 
global market value. Again, a caveat is worth noting here. This measure is only available for the 
emerging markets. We assume that for developed markets, the entire market value is freely 
available to foreign investors, which may not be true. However, we believe the inclusion of 
closely held firms captures the deficiency, if any. We run the following specification using freely 
floated (Fl_Home bias). The estimation outputs are reported in Table 7-5 (column 3). 
 
 
The results for the float-adjusted home bias, while less pronounced, are qualitatively the same as 
those for the unadjusted home bias. All our variables of interest, i.e., CSEMC remain highly 
significant.   
 
7.10 Major financial centres 
We next address the issue of major financial centres. As noted in our previous chapter, our 
dataset on international equity portfolio investments includes direct purchase in the domestic 
markets, global shares and depository receipts. Solnik and McLeavey (2004) note that big and 
internationally active companies issue/cross-list their stocks on multiple and major stock 
exchanges (such as London, New York and Tokyo). These listings are motivated to acquire 
wider investor base, greater visibility, higher liquidity and to avoid stringent and costly home 
regulatory stipulations. If this case, CSEMC measures may not matter to international investors 
as they can have exposure to the foreign stocks in their own major financial centres. We address 
this issue by running the following specification that exclude USA, UK and Japan as the investor 
countries. 
 
 
As shown in Table 7-5 (column 4), even after removing the investors from the major financial 
centres, the coefficient of all our CSEMC factors are still highly significant implying stock 
market development/size, market liquidity/efficiency and market stability significantly influence 
foreign investors‟ decision of country allocation. 
                                                                        7.8 
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7.11 Control variables 
As in the previous chapter, after the addition of CSEMC variables, most of the controls have 
expected sign and their statistical significance are robust across different specifications except 
for the equity market correlation, historical return and investor protection measures. The 
inconsistency of correlation and historical return are similar to that reported in our first empirical 
study. The investor protection measure, as indicated in our hypotheses development chapter, is a 
contentious issue and we pay comprehensive attention in the following empirical chapter. 
 
7.12 Chapter summary 
Empirical research on foreign equity portfolio investments has been limited by unavailability of 
cross border equity portfolio investment data. We use the recently available cross-country equity 
portfolio holdings data for 36 countries, sourced from IMF and several proxies capturing 
different features of CSEMC. Employing various panel data models, we show that stock market 
development/size, liquidity, stock market and exchange rate volatility are important factors 
explaining the temporal and cross-section variation in foreign equity portfolio allocation. The 
implications are that policy makers, particularly in emerging markets, must endorse reforms 
aimed at developing their local equity market for attracting foreign equity portfolio investors.  
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Table 7-1: Summary statistics (average over cross-section and time) of key variables 
Country 
Portfolio 
Allocation 
Equity market 
dev./size (% of 
GDP) 
Turnover 
Ratio (% 
of MCap) 
STD of Equity 
Returns (%) 
Exchange Rate 
Volatility (%) 
Argentina 0.0005 51.20 10.38 50.57 15.98 
Australia 0.0146 110.39 76.70 17.08 7.20 
Austria 0.0045 30.05 76.68 25.85 1.91 
Belgium 0.0108 72.08 25.13 33.36 2.36 
Brazil 0.0054 45.14 35.50 52.10 15.50 
Canada 0.0171 110.50 66.45 21.10 5.08 
Chile 0.0004 104.53 11.71 24.64 7.36 
China 0.0041 45.67 88.30 32.68 6.36 
Czech Republic 0.0009 24.54 67.52 34.21 5.02 
Denmark 0.0056 61.87 75.23 27.83 2.32 
Finland 0.0210 115.00 116.28 26.81 2.89 
France 0.1081 82.55 83.83 21.30 2.46 
Germany 0.0882 46.52 131.00 26.77 3.38 
Greece 0.0028 51.91 40.10 20.66 4.01 
Hungary 0.0020 25.54 63.22 22.69 5.26 
India 0.0031 51.35 133.67 31.27 4.41 
Indonesia 0.0101 24.65 43.82 31.28 13.14 
Italy 0.0343 45.63 120.27 23.14 2.68 
Japan 0.0794 78.59 97.17 20.19 6.66 
Korea 0.0107 65.31 249.15 18.24 5.24 
Malaysia 0.0015 144.92 27.87 12.66 3.32 
Mexico 0.0042 25.47 26.49 23.47 6.51 
NZL 0.0015 39.56 41.80 18.47 6.88 
Norway 0.0057 53.11 102.80 28.11 5.05 
Peru 0.0002 34.37 7.50 27.29 3.79 
Philippines 0.0004 45.19 12.96 25.91 5.51 
Poland 0.0017 24.68 31.84 42.50 7.76 
Portugal 0.0027 40.10 50.73 17.63 2.04 
Russia 0.0058 55.82 45.98 21.36 13.19 
Sweden 0.0209 107.61 117.16 33.76 4.17 
Switzerland 0.0533 246.67 93.00 15.95 3.50 
Taiwan 0.0058 76.05 182.28 14.51 4.36 
Thailand 0.0018 60.42 101.51 32.18 3.76 
Turkey 0.0019 32.82 44.96 49.18 16.77 
UK 0.1573 138.75 112.83 16.85 3.90 
USA 0.3776 133.22 160.50 20.49 3.76 
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Table 7-2: Base Model Regressions 
The dependent variable is the log value of country wise bilateral foreign portfolio allocation from country i in country j at time t (wi,j,t). The independent variables 
are home bias (HBIAS), the five measures of country specific equity market variables (CSEMC), which includes stock market development/size, emerging 
market dummy, market liquidity, equity market volatility and exchange rate volatility. Regressions are estimated using random effect model. 
 
                       
               
 
Test-statistics are given in parentheses (based on robust standard error (SE) allowing for clustering within the bilateral asset allocation i.e. cluster adjusted SE 
corrected for arbitrary heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation). All the coefficients are interpreted as elasticity. Significant coefficients are indicated with * 
denoting significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. 
 
                                 
 Stock market 
development/size 
Emerging 
market dummy 
Liquidity 
 
Equity market 
volatility 
Exchange rate 
volatility 
Home bias -0.923*** -0.890*** -0.885*** -0.888*** -0.919*** 
 (-68.96) (-52.53) (-50.23) (-52.29) (-65.27) 
      
Stock market development/size 0.911***     
 (42.87)     
      
Emerging market dummy  -2.894***    
  (-21.88)    
      
Liquidity   10.03***   
   (4.73)   
      
Equity market volatility    -0.156***  
    (-4.49)  
      
Exchange rate volatility     -7.026*** 
     (-23.00) 
Overall R
2
 0.356 0.426 0.172 0.132 0.197 
Number of observations 3196 3196 3196 3196 3196 
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Table 7-3: Correlation between country specific equity market characteristics/risk 
  
Stock market 
development/size 
Emerging 
market 
dummy 
Market 
Liquidity 
Equity 
market 
volatility 
Exchange 
rate 
volatility 
Stock market development/size 1.00 
    Emerging market dummy -0.40 1.00 
   Liquidity 0.26 -0.19 1.00 
  Equity market volatility -0.15 0.16 -0.12 1.00 
 Exchange rate volatility -0.30 0.45 -0.29 0.29 1.00 
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Table 7-4: Regression with different specification and estimation methods 
In all regressions, the dependent variable is the log value of country wise bilateral foreign portfolio allocation from country i in country j at time t (wi,j,t). The 
independent variables includes the key five measures of country specific equity market variables (CSEMC), which includes stock market development/size, 
emerging market dummy, market liquidity, equity market volatility and exchange rate volatility. Regressions are estimated using random effect model. The 
controls include home bias, transaction cost, economic policy risk, financial policy risk, investor protection, equity market openness, closely held ownership, 
common language dummy, bilateral trade, distance between capital cities of the pair country, equity return correlation, historical return and time dummies. 
 
                                      
 
Specification „CSEMC‟ only includes the CSEMC variables. Regression is estimated using random effect model. 
Specification „With home Bias‟ includes CSEMC variables and the home bias measure. Regression is estimated using random effect model. 
Specification „All control-RE‟ includes CSEMC variables, home bias measure and all other controls including time dummies. Regression is estimated using 
random effect model. 
Specification „All control-FE‟ includes CSEMC variables, home bias measure and all other controls including time dummies. Regression is estimated using fixed 
effect model. 
Specification „All control-BE‟ includes CSEMC variables, home bias measure and all other controls including time dummies. Regression is estimated using the 
between effect model. 
 
Test-statistics are given in parentheses (based on robust standard error (SE) allowing for clustering within the bilateral asset allocation i.e. cluster adjusted SE 
corrected for arbitrary heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation). All the coefficients are interpreted as elasticity. Significant coefficients are indicated with * 
denoting significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. 
 CSEMC With home bias All control - 
RE 
All control -  
FE 
All control -  
BE 
Stock market development/size 0.791*** 0.838*** 0.656*** 0.648*** 1.180*** 
 (17.90) (39.76) (29.73) (30.98) (16.75) 
      
Emerging market dummy -2.065*** -2.222*** -1.206*** NA -0.685*** 
 (-15.99) (-22.62) (-11.47)  (-4.37) 
      
Liquidity 3.75*** 11.17*** 9.213*** 2.836** 14.8*** 
 (8.13) (6.21) (5.09) (1.94) (13.95) 
      
Equity market volatility -0.191*** -0.171*** -0.168*** -0.153*** -1.004** 
 (-3.74) (-9.06) (-6.67) (-5.46) (-2.11) 
      
Exchange rate volatility -1.475* -3.757*** -1.505*** -1.598*** -4.623*** 
 (-1.83) (-11.42) (-5.34) (-7.02) (-3.32) 
                
158 
      
Home bias  -0.938*** -0.933*** -0.935*** -0.887*** 
  (-90.17) (-99.80) (-82.87) (-32.57) 
      
Transaction cost   -0.502*** -0.283*** -7.120*** 
   (-6.82) (-5.14) (-13.60) 
      
Economic policy risk   0.141* 0.508** 6.774*** 
   (1.82) (2.54) (4.84) 
      
Financial policy risk   0.641*** 0.423*** 4.538*** 
   (3.67) (3.20) (5.16) 
      
Investor protection (WBGI)   0.230*** 0.632*** 1.358 
   (3.00) (8.04) (1.16) 
      
Equity market openness   1.618*** 1.344*** 1.609*** 
   (10.54) (6.24) (4.17) 
      
Closely held firm   -2.899*** NA -0.255** 
   (-17.50)  (-2.13) 
      
Common language   0.376*** NA 0.389*** 
   (5.58)  (5.12) 
      
Bilateral trade   2.712*** 1.836*** 1.894*** 
   (16.66) (7.59) (12.63) 
      
Distance   -0.131*** NA -0.175*** 
   (-4.07)  (-5.31) 
      
Correlation   -0.852*** NA 0.422 
   (-4.37)  (1.05) 
                
159 
      
Historical return   0.317*** 0.338*** -0.90 
   (8.76) (12.96) (-1.24) 
      
Time fixed effects   Yes Yes Yes 
Overall R
2
 0.449 0.630 0.841 0.861 0.812 
Number of observations 3290 3196 2917 2917 2917 
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Table 7-5: Regression addressing different issues 
In all regressions, the dependent variable is the log value of country wise bilateral foreign portfolio allocation from 
country i in country j at time t (wi,j,t). The independent variables includes the key five measures of country specific 
equity market variables (CSEMC), which includes stock market development/size, emerging market dummy, market 
liquidity, equity market volatility and exchange rate volatility. Regressions are estimated using random effect model. 
The controls include home bias, transaction cost, economic policy risk, financial policy risk, investor protection, 
equity market openness, closely held ownership, common language dummy, bilateral trade, distance between capital 
cities of the pair country, equity return correlation, historical return and time dummies.  All regressions estimated 
using random effect model. 
 
                                      
 
Specification „Lagged‟ includes CSEMC lagged by one year, home bias measures and all controls including time 
dummies.  
Specification „Free float home bias‟ includes CSEMC, home bias based on free float market capitalization and all 
controls including time dummies. 
Specification „Major financial centres‟ includes CSEMC, home bias, all controls including time dummies but 
excludes major investor countries (USA, UK and Japan). 
 
Test-statistics are given in parentheses (based on robust standard error (SE) allowing for clustering within the 
bilateral asset allocation i.e. cluster adjusted SE corrected for arbitrary heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation). All 
the coefficients are interpreted as elasticity. Significant coefficients are indicated with * denoting significance at 
10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. 
 Lagged Free float home 
Bias 
Major financial 
centres 
    
Stock market development/size 0.289*** 0.631*** 0.648*** 
 (7.80) (22.64) (26.42) 
    
Emerging market dummy -1.567*** -1.230*** -1.268*** 
 (-16.66) (-8.85) (-10.59) 
    
Liquidity 12.85*** 7.976*** 8.957*** 
 (6.77) (3.28) (4.50) 
    
Equity market volatility -0.210*** -0.189*** -0.168*** 
 (-5.02) (-6.83) (-5.98) 
    
Exchange rate volatility -0.808*** -0.914*** -1.494*** 
 (-3.37) (-2.96) (-4.73) 
    
Home Bias -0.950*** -0.825*** -0.941*** 
 (-83.16) (-67.62) (-94.70) 
    
Transaction cost -0.323 -0.361*** -0.491*** 
 (-0.37) (-4.04) (-5.99) 
    
Economic policy risk 0.730*** 0.512* 0.131* 
 (2.77) (1.94) (1.90) 
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Country financial risk 1.412*** 0.435** 0.654*** 
 (6.87) (2.18) (3.43) 
    
Investor protection (WBGI) -0.139 0.230 0.247*** 
 (-1.53) (1.18) (2.91) 
    
Equity market openness 2.630*** 2.938*** 1.611*** 
 (17.11) (15.99) (9.31) 
    
Closely held firm -3.308*** -3.428*** -2.909*** 
 (-20.41) (-13.94) (-15.64) 
    
Common language 0.435*** 0.138 0.419*** 
 (6.02) (1.37) (5.75) 
    
Bilateral trade 3.085*** 1.672*** 2.353*** 
 (21.66) (11.92) (11.44) 
    
Distance -0.128*** -0.388*** -0.154*** 
 (-4.25) (-8.64) (-3.99) 
    
Equity return correlation -0.982*** -1.391*** -0.981*** 
 (-5.20) (-5.49) (-4.30) 
    
Historical returns 0.397*** 0.406*** 0.323 
 (10.56) (8.73) (1.03) 
    
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Overall R
2
 0.845 0.689 0.852 
Number of observations 2392 2910 2362 
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Chapter 8 Third empirical study: Investor protection and FEPA 
 
We have used a composite measure of investor protection measure obtained from World Bank 
Governance Indicator to control for the level of investor protection in the various specifications 
estimated in our previous two empirical studies. The results have been inconsistent across 
different specifications. In this chapter, we specifically focus on the concern of investor 
protection taking a more robust approach and use relatively more reliable, forward-looking and 
extensively used investor protection measures of ICRG (see Bekaert et. al., 2007 and Bekaert 
and Hodrick, 2009). Most of the investor protection proxies used in the literature (see LLSV, 
1997, 1998, 2000) lacks time dimension. Therefore, given the panel set-up of our dataset, we 
resort to using the time varying investor protection measures maintained and reported by ICRG. 
 
As noted earlier, the results on the role of investor protection on foreign portfolio allocation are 
mixed. Agarwal et al., (2005) using U.S. data find that U.S. investors are inclined to allocate 
more funds to countries with better investor protection rights in place. However, Chan et al., 
(2005) using data on 26 countries (emerging and developed) show that investors are influenced 
more by stock market development and bilateral familiarity issues and investor protection does 
not play any significant role. In fact, their study finds that the investor protection measures carry 
unexpected sign. In addition and as discussed earlier, studies have also added novel dimension to 
the investor protection issues when it comes to foreign portfolio investment. Bekaert et al., 
(2007) construct a novel measure of exogenous growth opportunity based on a country‟s industry 
PE ratio and global PE ratio for over 50 countries. They demonstrate that the general investor 
protection measure, which they refer to as quality of institution, maintained by ICRG, does not 
seem to better align with growth opportunities.  However, when using measures of investment 
profile, a measure also maintained by ICRG and one that specifically reflects government‟s 
attitude towards foreign investments capturing risk of expropriation/contract viability, payment 
delays and the ability to repatriate profits, they find significant relationship with growth 
opportunities. The overall measure of ICRG‟s political risk index measure is also highly 
significant, which include quality of institutions and investment profile are part of overall 
political risk measure. Based on their findings they claim that the overall positive influence of 
political risk rating is not due to broader quality of institution but due to investment profile. They 
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conjecture that foreign investors may therefore only care about investor protection issues that 
directly affect them, i.e. investment profile.  However, they do not empirically test this economic 
claim. With the objective of assessing this indirect claim of Bekaert et al., (2007) our study uses 
the ICRG‟s investment profile measure as one of the variables to study the role of investor 
protection influencing the decision of foreign portfolio equity investment.  
 
Following the discussion above, we tests following thee hypotheses: 
 
H9 Higher levels of investor protection measures specifically related to foreign investment 
are associated with higher levels of FEPA. 
 
The first hypothesis tests whether foreign investors are influenced by investor protection 
measures specific to foreign investments or not? We use ICRG‟s investment profile as measure 
of investor protection measure directly related to foreign investments. 
 
H10 Higher levels of general investor protection measures are associated with higher levels of 
FEPA. 
 
The second hypothesis tests whether foreign investors take account of the general investor 
protection measure when considering foreign investments or not? We use the quality of 
institution measure as constructed by ICRG as proxy of general investor protection measure 
applicable to all investors. 
 
H11 Countries adopting English common law attracts higher levels of FEPA. 
 
As noted earlier, following LLSV (1997, 1998) and Chan et al., (2005), we use the dummy 
taking the value of one if countries follow English common law and zero otherwise. We now 
discuss the empirical findings of our various tests. 
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8.1 Descriptive statistics 
We first explore descriptive statistics shown in Table 8-1. The second column shows average 
foreign portfolio allocation received by different countries over the period of six years (2001-
2006). Third and fourth columns report average rating of each country in terms of investor 
protection indicators, IPI (i.e. investment profile) and IPII (quality of institution). The fifth 
column presents the composite rating of IPI and IPII and the final column shows the dummy for 
the legal system (English common law or otherwise) followed by countries. Those following 
English common law are assigned value of one and zero otherwise. All the countries are ranked 
against composite investor protection index (IPI+IPII).  
 
The result shows that the top fifteen are developed countries and receive almost 86% of the total 
foreign portfolio investments. The bottom fifteen countries are developing countries, with 
possible exception of Greece, and share approximately 5% of the total portfolio allocation. 
Notably, countries that use the English common law receive approximately 58% of the total 
portfolio investments. 
 
…………Insert Table 8-1about here, see page 170…………. 
 
The descriptive statistics shows that countries receiving higher allocation also ranking higher 
against the composite investor protection index (IPI+IPII). The figures provide an early 
indication of a positive relationship between better investor protection and higher foreign equity 
portfolio allocations. 
 
8.2 Regression results 
For our regressions, we use the data set for 36 countries (host countries) with bilateral equity 
allocation from investors of 16 developed counties (source countries) for the period of six years 
(2001-2006).  We use panel data framework and employ random effect model in most of our 
regressions along with between and fixed effect models in two specifications discussed below.  
Since our aim is to examine whether investor protection climate has any significant impact on 
international portfolio allocations, we run the following base model that only controls for home 
bias: 
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The coefficient for investor protection variable is expected to be positive since international 
investors prefer countries with better investor protection rights. The regression results are 
presented in Table 8-2. As expected, the coefficients for investor protection measures are 
positive and statistically significant at 5% level. The coefficient of home bias is also highly 
significant confirming the widely reported phenomenon of home bias exhibited by foreign 
investors in their portfolio allocation decisions. The results suggest that after controlling for 
home bias, different levels of investor protection measures significantly influence foreign 
portfolio investments. However, the results may not be entirely reliable and robust in the absence 
of other confounding variables. In the following sections we run number of regressions using 
different specifications and address different issues to ensure that our findings are robust. 
 
…………Insert Table 8-2 about here, see page 171…………. 
 
8.3 Omitted variables bias 
The first issue we deal relates to omitted variable bias. Our regression coefficients estimated in 
specification 8-1 may be biased in the absence of the various control variables. In the following 
regression, we include control variables and time dummies.  
 
The results, reported in Table 8-3, show that size of the investor protection coefficients is lower 
than estimated via specification 8-1. The inclusion of the control variable and time dummies 
seem to account for the possible omitted variable bias. However, coefficient for IPII becomes 
insignificant with coefficients of IPI and IPIII still being highly statistically significant. These 
results seem to indicate that investors may only be concerned with those aspects of investor 
regulations that are most favourable to foreign investors. Furthermore, even the countries 
following English common law are the ones receiving the highest portfolio allocation. However, 
to assess the robustness of this result we undertake different sensitivity analysis. Before 
discussing the sensitivity tests, it is worth noting that we have not included both IPI and IPII in 
 
                                                    
 
8-1 
                                                        
                          
               
 
8-2 
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single regression because of the high collinearity (correlation coefficient of 0.71) between the IPI 
and IPII. 
 
………………Table 8-3 about here, see page 172…………. 
 
8.4 Unit specific effect and between effect estimation 
As discussed earlier, the main purpose of using the panel data set-up is to control for the 
correlation of the individual effect with any of the regressors, which if not taken account for, 
may render the estimates biased. We use the fixed effect model to control for any unit specific 
effect as discussed earlier
19
.
 
As shown in Table 8-4 coefficients for IPI and IPIII are still 
significant at the conventional level of 5%. IPII is not only statistically insignificant but also 
carries opposite sign.  For interpreting the coefficients for practical or economic significance, we 
would prefer the coefficients of fixed effect model given its ability to account for unit specific 
effect or individual heterogeneity.  
 
…………Insert Table 8-4 about here, see page 174…………. 
 
Next we use the between effect model that ignores the time series dimensions and only uses the 
cross-sectional information to estimate the parameters. The results are shown in Table 8-5. The 
statistical significance of IPI and IPIII are maintained and now IPII is significant at the 5% level. 
However, it would not be appropriate to draw any firm conclusion  because the between effect 
model is not only highly inefficient but also runs the risk of being biased due to its inability to 
control for the unit specific effects. When we use more efficient random effect and more robust 
fixed effect model, IPII becomes insignificant. 
 
…………Insert Table 8-5 about here, see page 176…………. 
 
                                                 
19
 The result of Hausman tests (Chi-square of 53 for IPI and 133 for IPII using specification 8.2) and Breush-Pagan 
test (Chi-square of 222 and 376 for IPI and IPII respectively using specification 8.2) justifies the estimation using 
fixed effect model. 
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8.5 Reverse causality 
As noted in our earlier empirical chapters, endogeneity arising from reverse causality could be a 
potential problem in our estimations. We tackle it by using one year lagged value of investor 
protection measure
20
 and estimate the following specification.  
 
The results shown in Table 8-6 suggest that while the coefficient for IPI is positive and 
statistically significant, coefficient for IPII is not statistically significant. This may suggest, as 
noted earlier, that foreign investors may be more concerned with investor protection measures 
that directly affect their investment value and returns captured by the IPI measure. The finding is 
also consistent with Bekaert et al., (2007)‟s conjecture who note that foreign investors are more 
concerned about those aspects of legal and regulatory environment directly related to foreign 
investments (IPI - capturing potential risk of expropriation, payment delays and the ability to 
repatriate profits) rather than the general quality of institution variable (IPII). 
 
…………Insert Table 8-6 about here, see page 178…………. 
 
8.6 Free float home bias 
We address issue of free float by computing our home bias measure using the IFC/S&P 
investable market value. Results shown in Table 8-7 are consistent with all the specifications 
used earlier, with IPI and IPIII being highly significant but IPII is not significant. 
 
The results indicate that our composite measure of investor protection sourced from World Bank 
Governance Indicator used in previous chapters were either capturing the effect of other 
variables or they were not able to isolate the effects of investor protection specific to foreign 
investments (i.e. investment profile) and general investor protection environment (quality of 
institutions). 
…………Insert Table 8-7 about here, see page 180…………. 
                                                 
20
 The use of the lag value of the indices also addresses the possibility of the investors acting on the basis of 
expected investor protection measures. We do not include the IPIII as it is a time invariant dummy variable. 
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8.7 Major financial centres 
We next consider the possibility that international investors may choose to buy foreign stocks 
and/or depository receipts listed in major financial centres instead of directly investing in shares 
traded in the foreign equity markets. International investors may be tempted to use major 
financial centres, such as USA, UK and Japan, to buy the cross listed stocks and/or depository 
receipts because they may perceive that their rights are better protected by regulations in major 
financial centres (Reese and Weisbach, 2002). In order to accommodate this possibility, we 
exclude USA, UK and Japan from our sample and run the following specification:  
 
 
Results reported in Table 8-8 show that despite excluding major financial centres, IPI and IPIII 
investor protection measures remain positive and statistically significant thus confirming that 
investor protection, particularly specific to foreign investments, remain an overwhelmingly top 
consideration for foreign investors. It also confirms that countries adopting English common law, 
which are better at establishing and enforcing investor protection measures (LLSV 1997, 1998, 
2000), are able to attract higher level of foreign equity portfolio investments. 
 
…………Insert Table 8-8 about here, see page 182…………. 
 
 
8.8 Other control variables 
Most of the control variables included in our estimations carry the expected sign and are 
significant except for historical returns, which are either not significant or change sign in 
different specifications.  
 
8.9 Chapter summary 
The conclusion whether investor protection framework play any role in country level equity 
portfolio allocation decision is controversial. Using bilateral cross-country foreign equity 
portfolio holdings data on 36 countries we demonstrate that investor protection is an important 
                                                  
                          
               
 
 
8-4 
                
169 
 
input in country allocation decision. However, foreign investors appear to only follow investor 
protection index (investment profile) reflecting regulatory frameworks specific to foreign 
investment and may not worry about the general legal and regulatory infrastructure (quality of 
institutions). We also confirm that countries following English common law seem to attract 
higher level of foreign equity investments. 
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Table 8-1: Descriptive statistics (average over cross-section and time) of IP measures 
Country 
Portfolio 
Allocation (%) 
IPI  
(0-12) 
IPII  
(0-16) 
Composite 
(IPI + 
IPII) 
Common 
English Law 
(IPIII) 
Finland 2.10 12.00 16.00 28.00 0 
Sweden 2.09 12.00 15.25 27.25 0 
New Zealand 0.15 11.83 15.33 27.17 1 
Denmark 0.56 11.61 15.50 27.11 0 
Austria 0.45 12.00 15.00 27.00 0 
Canada 1.71 12.00 14.68 26.68 1 
Norway 0.57 11.58 15.00 26.58 0 
UK 15.73 12.00 14.17 26.17 1 
Australia 1.46 11.33 14.50 25.83 1 
Germany 8.82 12.00 13.50 25.50 0 
Switzerland 5.33 11.75 13.50 25.25 0 
USA 37.76 11.67 13.58 25.25 1 
Belgium 1.08 11.61 12.92 24.54 0 
Japan 7.94 11.67 12.50 24.17 0 
Portugal 0.27 11.91 11.67 23.58 0 
France 10.81 12.00 11.00 23.00 0 
Chile 0.04 11.07 11.67 22.74 0 
Hungary 0.20 11.74 10.59 22.33 0 
Czech Republic 0.09 11.63 10.59 22.22 0 
Taiwan 0.58 11.53 10.41 21.94 0 
Italy 3.43 11.92 9.00 20.92 0 
Poland 0.17 11.07 9.34 20.41 0 
Greece 0.28 10.67 9.08 19.75 0 
Mexico 0.42 11.17 7.49 18.66 0 
Malaysia 0.15 8.75 8.92 17.67 1 
India 0.31 8.57 8.99 17.56 1 
Turkey 0.19 7.84 8.66 16.50 0 
Philippines 0.04 9.42 6.99 16.42 0 
Korea 1.07 9.65 6.00 15.65 0 
Thailand 0.18 8.59 7.03 15.62 1 
Peru 0.02 8.00 7.33 15.33 0 
China 0.41 7.29 7.99 15.28 0 
Russia 0.58 8.83 6.40 15.23 0 
Brazil 0.54 7.75 6.67 14.42 0 
Argentina 0.05 6.05 7.98 14.03 0 
Indonesia 1.01 6.51 5.75 12.26 0 
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Table 8-2: Base Regression 
The dependent variable is the log value of country wise bilateral foreign portfolio allocation from country i in 
country j at time t (wi,j,t). The key independent variables of interest are investor profile (IPI), quality of institution 
(IPII) and English common law dummy (IPII). The only control is bilateral home bias (Hbias). Regression is 
estimated using random effect model. 
 
                                                 
 
Test-statistics are given in parentheses (based on robust standard error allowing for clustering within the cross 
sectional units). All the coefficients are interpreted as elasticity. Significant coefficients are indicated with * 
denoting significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1% 
 IPI IPII IPIII 
Home bias -0.913*** -0.889*** -0.889*** 
 (-56.99) (-57.88) (-51.87) 
    
Investor protection 21.41*** 22.48*** 1.036*** 
 (17.73) (18.33) (4.99) 
    
Overall R
2
 0.264 0.308 0.161 
Number of observations 3196 3196 3196 
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Table 8-3: Regression with investor protection and all controls 
The dependent variable (wi,j,t). is the log value of country wise bilateral foreign portfolio allocation from country i in 
country j at time t. The key independent variables of interest are investor protection measures which includes 
investor profile (IPI), quality of institution (IPII) and English common law dummy (IPII). The controls are bilateral 
home bias (Hbias), stock market development/size, liquidity/transaction cost, equity market volatility, bilateral 
trade, common (pair countries) language dummy (pair countries), log distance between capital cities of the pair 
countries, three year moving average historical return, country financial risk (components are: foreign debt as % of 
GDP, exchange rate stability, foreign debt as % of total export and services, current account as % of exports and 
services and international liquidity), country economic risk (components are: GDP per head, Real GDP growth, 
inflation rate, budget balance as % of GDP, current account as % of GDP) and capital control. Regressions estimated 
using random effect model. 
 
                                                         
 
Test-statistics are given in parentheses (based on robust standard error (SE) allowing for clustering within the 
bilateral asset allocation i.e. cluster adjusted SE corrected for arbitrary heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation). All 
the coefficients are interpreted as elasticity. Significant coefficients are indicated with * denoting significance at 
10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. 
. 
 IPI IPII IPIII 
Home bias -0.931*** -0.932*** -0.932*** 
 (-99.75) (-98.36) (-98.55) 
    
Investor protection 2.097*** -0.622 0.267*** 
 (2.70) (-0.74) (3.60) 
    
Stock market development/size 0.672*** 0.672*** 0.665*** 
 (30.34) (30.06) (29.85) 
    
Emerging market dummy -1.357*** -1.369*** -1.308*** 
 (-13.98) (-14.31) (-13.86) 
    
Liquidity 9.190*** 9.709*** 9.388*** 
 (4.97) (5.32) (5.23) 
    
Equity market volatility -0.173*** -0.175*** -0.172*** 
 (-6.69) (-6.90) (-6.82) 
    
Exchange rate volatility -1.818*** -1.760*** -1.733*** 
 (-5.50) (-6.55) (-6.25) 
    
Transaction cost -0.547*** -0.551*** -0.536*** 
 (-6.99) (-6.89) (-6.87) 
    
Economic policy risk 0.117** 0.135** 0.125** 
 (2.11) (2.18) (2.15) 
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Financial policy risk 0.651*** 0.653*** 0.664*** 
 (3.85) (3.82) (3.86) 
    
Equity market openness 1.625*** 1.649*** 1.664*** 
 (10.55) (10.19) (10.80) 
    
Closely held firms -3.005*** -2.989*** -2.917*** 
 (-17.35) (-17.78) (-16.92) 
    
Common language 0.454*** 0.454*** 0.381*** 
 (6.53) (6.64) (5.46) 
    
Bilateral trade 2.650*** 2.684*** 2.633*** 
 (15.74) (16.29) (15.66) 
    
Distance -0.112*** -0.108*** -0.146*** 
 (-3.60) (-3.60) (-4.37) 
    
Equity return correlation -0.846*** -0.843*** -0.788*** 
 (-4.04) (-4.11) (-3.76) 
    
Historical return 0.305 -0.305** 0.307*** 
 (1.28) (-2.13) (3.57) 
    
Time fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
    
    
Overall R
2
 0.843 0.845 0.845 
Number of observations 2917 2917 2917 
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Table 8-4: Regression with investor protection, all controls and uses fixed effect model 
The dependent variable (wi,j,t). is the log value of country wise bilateral foreign portfolio allocation from country i in 
country j at time t. The key independent variables of interest are one year lagged value of investor protection 
measures which includes investor profile (IPI), quality of institution (IPII) and English common law dummy (IPII). 
The controls are bilateral home bias (Hbias), stock market development/size, liquidity/transaction cost, equity 
market volatility, bilateral trade, common (pair countries) language dummy (pair countries), log distance between 
capital cities of the pair countries, three year moving average historical return, country financial risk (components 
are: foreign debt as % of GDP, exchange rate stability, foreign debt as % of total export and services, current 
account as % of exports and services and international liquidity), country economic risk (components are: GDP per 
head, Real GDP growth, inflation rate, budget balance as % of GDP, current account as % of GDP) and capital 
control. Regressions are estimated using fixed effect model. 
 
                                                         
 
Test-statistics are given in parentheses (based on robust standard error (SE) allowing for clustering within the 
bilateral asset allocation i.e. cluster adjusted SE corrected for arbitrary heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation). All 
the coefficients are interpreted as elasticity. Significant coefficients are indicated with * denoting significance at 
10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. 
 
 IPI IPII 
Home bias -0.932*** -0.931*** 
 (-81.34) (-78.84) 
   
Investor protection 2.725*** -0.357 
 (3.70) (-0.13) 
   
Stock market development/size 0.671*** 0.674*** 
 (30.48) (31.15) 
   
Liquidity 4.052* 5.111** 
 (1.84) (2.46) 
   
Equity market volatility -0.162*** -0.166*** 
 (-5.55) (-5.71) 
   
Exchange rate volatility -2.143*** -1.894*** 
 (-7.50) (-8.41) 
   
Transaction cost -0.428*** -0.385*** 
 (-6.04) (-5.66) 
   
Economic policy risk 0.330* 0.265** 
 (1.76) (2.31) 
   
Country financial risk 0.541*** 0.680*** 
 (3.91) (4.86) 
   
Equity market openness 1.475*** 1.313*** 
 (7.02) (5.92) 
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Bilateral trade 1.795*** 1.794*** 
 (7.08) (7.11) 
   
Historical returns 0.309*** 0.321 
 (11.52) (1.18) 
   
With R
2
 0.815 0.816 
Number of observations 2917 2917 
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Table 8-5: Regression with investor protection, all controls and uses between effect model 
The dependent variable (wi,j,t). is the log value of country wise bilateral foreign portfolio allocation from country i in 
country j at time t. The key independent variables of interest are one year lagged value of investor protection 
measures which includes investor profile (IPI), quality of institution (IPII) and English common law dummy (IPII). 
The controls are bilateral home bias (Hbias), stock market development/size, liquidity/transaction cost, equity 
market volatility, bilateral trade, common (pair countries) language dummy (pair countries), log distance between 
capital cities of the pair countries, three year moving average historical return, country financial risk (components 
are: foreign debt as % of GDP, exchange rate stability, foreign debt as % of total export and services, current 
account as % of exports and services and international liquidity), country economic risk (components are: GDP per 
head, Real GDP growth, inflation rate, budget balance as % of GDP, current account as % of GDP) and capital 
control. Regressions are estimated using fixed effect model. 
 
                                                         
 
Test-statistics are given in parentheses (based on robust standard error (SE) allowing for clustering within the 
bilateral asset allocation i.e. cluster adjusted SE corrected for arbitrary heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation). All 
the coefficients are interpreted as elasticity. Significant coefficients are indicated with * denoting significance at 
10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. 
 
 IPI IPII IPIII 
Home bias -0.907*** -0.887*** -0.939*** 
 (-31.22) (-32.18) (-32.81) 
    
Investor protection 21.45*** 1.13** 0.385*** 
 (6.12) (2.06) (4.50) 
    
Stock market development/size 0.924*** 0.972*** 0.900*** 
 (12.80) (14.50) (12.53) 
    
Emerging market dummy -0.314* -1.028*** -0.260 
 (-1.95) (-5.84) (-1.63) 
    
Liquidity 93.54*** 96.70*** 88.45*** 
 (11.25) (12.42) (10.99) 
    
Equity market volatility -0.811 -0.597 0.452 
 (-1.57) (-1.25) (0.85) 
    
Exchange rate volatility -6.165*** -8.726*** -6.686*** 
 (-4.00) (-6.47) (-4.63) 
    
Transaction cost -7.714*** -6.321*** -7.256*** 
 (-13.84) (-11.52) (-13.10) 
    
Economic policy risk 7.480*** 4.624*** 9.053*** 
 (5.02) (3.15) (6.07) 
    
Financial policy risk 4.366*** 4.965*** 5.195*** 
 (4.65) (5.55) (5.41) 
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Equity market openness 0.717* 0.956*** 1.075** 
 (1.78) (2.60) (2.58) 
    
Closely held firm -0.657*** -1.059*** -0.653*** 
 (-2.81) (-4.68) (-2.82) 
    
Common language dummy 0.384*** 0.412*** 0.352*** 
 (4.73) (5.35) (4.38) 
    
Bilateral trade 1.961*** 1.893*** 1.871*** 
 (12.30) (12.49) (11.73) 
    
Distance -0.180*** -0.176*** -0.204*** 
 (-5.15) (-5.29) (-5.84) 
    
Equity market correlation 0.0201 -0.0763 -0.238 
 (0.09) (-0.40) (-1.20) 
    
Historical returns -1.762*** 0.817 2.286*** 
 (-4.18) (-0.97) (5.22) 
    
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
    
Overall R
2
 0.821 0.849 0.786 
Number of observations 2917 2917 2917 
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Table 8-6:  Regression with lagged investor protection and all controls 
The dependent variable (wi,j,t). is the log value of country wise bilateral foreign portfolio allocation from country i in 
country j at time t. The key independent variables of interest are one year lagged value of investor protection 
measures which includes investor profile (IPI), quality of institution (IPII) and English common law dummy (IPII). 
The controls are bilateral home bias (Hbias), stock market development/size, liquidity/transaction cost, equity 
market volatility, bilateral trade, common (pair countries) language dummy (pair countries), log distance between 
capital cities of the pair countries, three year moving average historical return, country financial risk (components 
are: foreign debt as % of GDP, exchange rate stability, foreign debt as % of total export and services, current 
account as % of exports and services and international liquidity), country economic risk (components are: GDP per 
head, Real GDP growth, inflation rate, budget balance as % of GDP, current account as % of GDP) and capital 
control. 
 
                                                           
 
Regressions estimated using random effect model. Test-statistics are given in parentheses (based on robust standard 
error allowing for clustering within the cross sectional units). All the coefficients are interpreted as elasticity. 
Significant coefficients are indicated with * denoting significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1% significance 
level. 
 IPI IPII 
HBias -0.955*** -0.960*** 
 (-99.84) (-99.22) 
   
Investor protection 1.320** -0.761 
 (2.78) (-1.53) 
   
Stock market development/size 0.518*** 0.555*** 
 (21.89) (24.02) 
   
Emerging market dummy -1.421*** -1.720*** 
 (-15.33) (-19.75) 
   
Liquidity 10.29*** 9.686*** 
 (5.26) (4.93) 
   
Equity market volatility -0.0925*** -0.105*** 
 (-5.01) (-5.73) 
   
Exchange rate volatility -1.959*** -1.646*** 
 (-7.37) (-6.76) 
   
Transaction cost -0.321*** -0.224*** 
 (-3.86) (-2.68) 
   
Economic policy risk 0.122** 0.294** 
 (1.99) (2.24) 
   
 
Financial policy risk 
 
0.862*** 
 
0.954*** 
 (4.69) (5.70) 
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Equity market openness 2.226*** 2.633*** 
 (15.32) (17.32) 
   
Closely held firm -3.182*** -3.290*** 
 (-18.37) (-20.16) 
   
Common language dummy 0.532*** 0.566*** 
 (7.59) (8.11) 
   
Bilateral trade 2.806*** 2.744*** 
 (20.79) (21.28) 
   
Distance -0.0922*** -0.0960*** 
 (-2.87) (-3.18) 
   
Equity market correlation 1.001* -0.893*** 
 (1.95) (-4.62) 
   
Historical returns 0.188*** 0.226*** 
 (5.16) (6.27) 
   
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
   
Overall R
2
 0.839 0.857 
Number of observations 2392 2392 
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Table 8-7: Regression with investor protection and all controls (free float home bias) 
The dependent variable (wi,j,t). is the log value of country wise bilateral foreign portfolio allocation from country i in 
country j at time t. The key independent variables of interest are investor protection measures which includes 
investor profile (IPI), quality of institution (IPII) and English common law dummy (IPII). The controls are bilateral 
free float home bias (Hbias), stock market development/size, liquidity/transaction cost, equity market volatility, 
bilateral trade, common (pair countries) language dummy (pair countries), log distance between capital cities of the 
pair countries, three year moving average historical return, country financial risk (components are: foreign debt as % 
of GDP, exchange rate stability, foreign debt as % of total export and services, current account as % of exports and 
services and international liquidity), country economic risk (components are: GDP per head, Real GDP growth, 
inflation rate, budget balance as % of GDP, current account as % of GDP) and capital control. 
 
                                                            
 
Test-statistics are given in parentheses (based on robust standard error (SE) allowing for clustering within the 
bilateral asset allocation i.e. cluster adjusted SE corrected for arbitrary heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation). All 
the coefficients are interpreted as elasticity. Significant coefficients are indicated with * denoting significance at 
10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. 
 IPI IPII IPIII 
Free float home bias -0.826*** -0.824*** -0.830*** 
 (-67.46) (-66.95) (-68.27) 
    
Investor protection 2.415*** 0.405 0.506*** 
 (4.42) (0.42) (4.72) 
    
Stock market development/size 0.649*** 0.648*** 0.638*** 
 (23.14) (23.04) (22.87) 
    
Emerging market dummy -1.427*** -1.392*** -1.333*** 
 (-10.99) (-10.78) (-10.31) 
    
Liquidity 7.857*** 8.709*** 8.109*** 
 (3.19) (3.56) (3.37) 
    
Equity market volatility -0.194*** -0.197*** -0.192*** 
 (-6.80) (-7.03) (-6.97) 
    
Exchange rate risk -1.304*** -1.121*** -1.140*** 
 (-3.66) (-3.77) (-3.74) 
    
Transaction cost -0.425*** -0.406*** -0.395*** 
 (-4.50) (-4.30) (-4.26) 
    
Economic policy risk 0.495* 0.472* 0.498** 
 (1.89) (1.78) (1.95) 
    
Financial policy risk 0.442** 0.477** 0.464** 
 (2.27) (2.43) (2.37) 
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Equity market openness 2.938*** 2.903*** 2.987*** 
 (15.99) (15.23) (16.33) 
    
Closely held firms -3.592*** -3.567*** -3.426*** 
 (-14.16) (-14.38) (-13.40) 
    
Common language 0.280*** 0.278*** 0.137 
 (2.77) (2.79) (1.32) 
    
Bilateral trade 1.707*** 1.710*** 1.668*** 
 (11.97) (12.13) (11.67) 
    
Distance -0.333*** -0.330*** -0.398*** 
 (-7.66) (-7.78) (-8.52) 
    
Equity return correlation -1.436*** -1.457*** 1.333 
 (-5.41) (-5.56) (0.97) 
    
Historical return 0.392 0.397*** 0.397*** 
 (1.32) (8.51) (8.66) 
    
Time fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
    
Overall R
2
 0.688 0.687 0.693 
Number of observations 2910 2910 2910 
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Table 8-8: Major financial centres 
The dependent variable (wi,j,t). is the log value of country wise bilateral foreign portfolio allocation from country i in 
country j at time t. The key independent variables of interest are one year lagged value of investor protection 
measures which includes investor profile (IPI), quality of institution (IPII) and English common law dummy (IPII). 
The controls are bilateral home bias (Hbias), stock market development/size, liquidity/transaction cost, equity 
market volatility, bilateral trade, common (pair countries) language dummy (pair countries), log distance between 
capital cities of the pair countries, three year moving average historical return, country financial risk (components 
are: foreign debt as % of GDP, exchange rate stability, foreign debt as % of total export and services, current 
account as % of exports and services and international liquidity), country economic risk (components are: GDP per 
head, Real GDP growth, inflation rate, budget balance as % of GDP, current account as % of GDP) and capital 
control. Regressions estimated using random effect model. 
 
                                                         
 
Test-statistics are given in parentheses (based on robust standard error (SE) allowing for clustering within the 
bilateral asset allocation i.e. cluster adjusted SE corrected for arbitrary heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation). All 
the coefficients are interpreted as elasticity. Significant coefficients are indicated with * denoting significance at 
10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. 
 
 IPI IPII IPIII 
HBias -0.938*** -0.939*** -0.939*** 
 (-94.43) (-93.01) (-93.13) 
    
Investor protection 2.373*** -0.633 0.211** 
 (2.77) (-0.68) (2.55) 
    
Stock market development/size 0.664*** 0.663*** 0.659*** 
 (26.85) (26.62) (26.50) 
    
Emerging market dummy -1.416*** -1.432*** -1.370*** 
 (-12.73) (-13.06) (-12.61) 
    
Liquidity 9.195*** 9.584*** 9.332*** 
 (4.51) (4.78) (4.72) 
    
Equity market volatility -0.173*** -0.174*** -0.173*** 
 (-6.02) (-6.17) (-6.12) 
    
Exchange rate risk -1.776*** -1.753*** -1.723*** 
 (-4.80) (-5.79) (-5.53) 
    
Transaction cost -0.535*** -0.545*** -0.531*** 
 (-6.14) (-6.10) (-6.09) 
    
Economic policy risk 0.106** 0.126** 0.114** 
 (2.19) (1.97) (2.23) 
    
Financial policy risk 0.669*** 0.668*** 0.680*** 
 (3.59) (3.57) (3.60) 
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Equity market openness 1.632*** 1.660*** 1.669*** 
 (9.46) (9.21) (9.63) 
    
Closely held firms -3.008*** -2.990*** -2.933*** 
 (-15.57) (-15.93) (-15.22) 
    
Common language 0.469*** 0.469*** 0.421*** 
 (6.22) (6.33) (5.61) 
    
Bilateral trade 2.263*** 2.310*** 2.249*** 
 (10.84) (11.20) (10.77) 
    
Distance -0.146*** -0.141*** -0.175*** 
 (-3.97) (-3.97) (-4.42) 
    
Equity return correlation -0.962*** -0.956*** -0.902*** 
 (-3.93) (-3.98) (-3.69) 
    
Historical return 0.312*** 0.311*** 0.313*** 
 (7.61) (7.70) (7.81) 
    
Time fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
    
Overall R
2
 0.854 0.857 0.855 
Number of observations 2362 2362 2362 
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Chapter 9 Fourth empirical study: Impact of foreign equity portfolio flows 
on global financial linkages of Asian emerging markets 
 
Although most of the beneficial effects of foreign equity investments are supported with ample 
empirical evidences, there is extensive debate on destabilising effect of fickle and short-term 
nature of foreign equity portfolio flows, particularly in emerging markets. Similarly, there is also 
a growing concern that with the increase in foreign equity investments the emerging equity 
markets may become more susceptible to global shocks. Our fourth empirical chapter 
demonstrates the impact of foreign equity flows on global financial linkages of four Asian 
emerging markets. We test the following hypotheses: 
 
H12 Foreign equity portfolio flows drive the global integration of the Asian emerging markets 
with the global equity markets. 
 
H13 Foreign investors are “return chasers”, i.e., flows are caused by changes in expected 
returns (i.e. feedback hypothesis). 
 
H14 Increase in foreign equity portfolio flows raises domestic stock market price (i.e. price 
pressure hypothesis). 
 
9.1 Descriptive statistics 
Before we use rolling correlations and JJ cointegration methods for examining the long-run 
relationship and the different variants of the error correction model to investigate the short-term 
dynamics, we provide simple evidence on the descriptive statistics. With an aim to establish 
whether the pick-up in the foreign equity investments in more recent years following the 
impressive growth shown by the Asian equity markets provides greater empirical support to our 
hypotheses, the total sample is split into two parts. The first sub-period covers January 2001 to 
December 2003 and the second sub-period uses data for January 2004 to March 2007. The growth 
of foreign equity investment flows is evident from Table 9-1 which shows that the average equity 
investment flows more than doubled in the second period of the sample. The average net daily 
foreign equity flows rose to US$98.33 million during the period 2004-07 compared to US$45.57 
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million for the period 2001-03. The descriptive statistics for the returns series and the foreign 
equity investment flow is shown in Table 9-1.  Over the full sample period, highest daily returns 
are offered by Korea followed by Thailand, India and Taiwan. All four Asian markets offer much 
higher daily returns compared to the returns of the MSCI developed market index. The trend is 
generally similar across the two sub-sample periods with the exception that returns offered by 
Thailand and Taiwan in the second sub-period are lower than returns in the developed markets. 
Higher returns in emerging markets do not come without risk as the standard deviations of returns 
are much higher for the Asian emerging markets. The returns are not normal and show significant 
kurtosis. The average daily foreign equity investment flows are much higher in the second sub-
period. Taiwan leads the other markets in terms of foreign equity investment flows followed by 
India, Thailand and Korea.   
 
……..Insert Table 9-1 about here, see page 191……… 
 
9.2 Results on long-run relationship 
Table 9-2 presents the unconditional correlation coefficient between the domestic returns of the 
Asian emerging markets and MSCI world index. There is an indication of a move towards greater 
correlations from the first-sub period to the second sub-period for all markets with India and 
Thailand, in particular demonstrating relatively greater convergence in market movements. We 
present the rolling correlations for the four emerging markets with the global market in Figure 9-1 
to Figure 9-4.
21
 It is evident that though the correlations are not stable over time, a general trend 
of increasing correlation is evident. The correlations appear to have increased significantly from 
2004 onwards which is confirmed from the increase in correlation in the second sub-period as 
shown in Table 9-2. Thus, the observed rise in correlation may partly be explained by the increase 
in the trading activity of foreign investors. This result is consistent with those reported by 
Phylaktis and Ravazzolo (2002) who also find significant correlations amongst the emerging 
Asian markets and the US. 
……..Insert Table 9-2 about here, see page 192……… 
 
                                                 
21
 Several papers have used rolling correlations in investigating the equity markets integration. For instance, Lucey 
and Kearney (2004) use rolling correlations and conclude that they provide a good indication whether markets are 
integrated or segmented. 
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……..Insert Figure 9-1 about here, see page 200……… 
 
……..Insert Figure 9-2 about here, see page 200……… 
 
……..Insert Figure 9-3 about here, see page 201……… 
 
……..Insert Figure 9-4 about here, see page 201……… 
 
Next, we employ the cointegration analysis, which is a more robust approach in testing for long-
run equilibrium relationship. All series including the net foreign equity flow series are integrated 
of order I (1) whilst their first differences are integrated of order I (0). For adding robustness to 
our unit root test, we have reported the results from three different unit root tests. The Augmented 
Dicky Fuller Test statistics is reported in panel A of Table 9-3. As expected, all the test statistics 
are significant at 1% and 5% significance level for the first difference whereas the null of unit 
root cannot be rejected at level series.   Further, the Philips Perron (PP) test was also applied, 
testing the null of unit root. PP tests include an automatic correction to the Dicky Fuller procedure 
allowing for the auto-correlated residuals. As shown in panel B, the results are similar and all 
series show the presence of unit root in their level with no unit root in their first difference. Unit 
roots tests are criticised for lacking power and therefore we also use the KPSS test. The results 
with the KPSS procedure are similar. The null of no unit root cannot be accepted in level series 
whereas the first difference null is accepted. For the ADF and PP tests, lag selection is based on 
the minimization of SIC. KPSS tests were conducted up to 10 lags, however to save space, only 
1
st
 and 10
th
 lag findings are reported. 
 
……..Insert Table 9-3 about here, see page 193……… 
 
Table 9-4 reports result of bivariate cointegration between the emerging Asian market returns and 
MSCI world index returns for the full sample period as well for the two sub-sample periods. For 
the full sample, one cointegrating vector is found for India and Taiwan whereas no cointegration 
is reported for Korea and Thailand. Further analysis reveals that whilst no cointegration is found 
for the first sub-period, results for the second sample period are similar to the full sample period 
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and statistically significant cointegrating vectors are found for India and Taiwan. The results 
show strong signs of convergence of the Indian and Taiwanese markets with the global markets. 
The greater degree of integration found for the second sample period coincides with the 
significant increase in the average foreign equity investment flow for India and Taiwan. The 
average foreign equity investment flows for India and Taiwan increased to US$36.65 million and 
US$54.19 million from US$9.841 million and US$33.22 million respectively. In comparison, the 
foreign equity investment flow did not show any increase in the case of Korea and a relatively 
smaller increase in the case of Thailand.  
 
……..Insert Table 9-4 about here, see page 194…… 
 
Next, we present cointegration analysis results where we include foreign equity investment flow 
series with emerging market and world market return series. This analysis will provide us an 
indication of the relative contribution of foreign equity investment flow in long-run relationship 
reported in Table 9-4. The results of the tri-variate cointegration are reported in Table 9-5. Both 
the trace and max trace statistics are significant for the full sample period as well as the two sub-
sample periods.  With the inclusion of foreign equity flow, at least one cointegrating vector is 
reported for all four markets thereby confirming that the integration process is driven by the 
activities of foreign investors. For India, Taiwan and Thailand two significant cointegrating 
vectors are found for the second sample period confirming the influence of foreign equity flows 
in the integration process. A summary of the main findings of the cointegration analysis is further 
provided in Table 9-6. 
……..Insert Table 9-5 about here, see page 195…… 
 
……..Insert Table 9-6 about here, see page 196…… 
 
9.3  Results on short-term dynamics 
As previously discussed, the error correction provides feedback mechanism that measures the 
effect of a shock in one series as a result of a shock in another series in the VAR system. ECM 
can be applied only on cointegrated series. Since our cointegration analysis results show that all 
four markets are cointegrated when foreign equity investment flows are included, we include the 
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foreign equity investment flow data in the ECM analysis. Four variations of the ECM analysis are 
reported. The first variation is the block exogeneity via Wald test that measures the statistical 
significance of the flow of information between the variables in the form of Granger causality. 
The second is the error correction term which shows the magnitude and speed of short-term 
adjustment. Third is the decomposition of the error variance which provides a quantitative 
measure of the short-run dynamic flow of information explaining the h-step ahead error variance 
in one variable due to transmission of shock in another variable in the VAR system. Finally, the 
impulse response shows the time and direction of the effect of shocks between the variables. 
 
Table 9-7 presents the Granger causality and Error Correction Term (ECT) for each market. It is 
evident that the world market has significant causal impact on the return index of emerging 
markets as well as on the flow of net foreign investments. In contrast, none of the emerging 
markets seem to have any causal effect on the world market returns. These findings are consistent 
with previous literature that has demonstrated that shocks from developed markets have 
significant impact on the Asian emerging markets (see for example, Dungey, 2004). Further, we 
find that net foreign equity investment flows Granger cause returns in India, Taiwan and Thailand 
but no causality is found for Korea.  
 
Table 9-7 also reports the Error Correction Term (ECT) for all four markets as well as the foreign 
equity investment flows which are statistically significant implying that the short-term deviations 
in the integration process of the emerging markets with global markets are being corrected. The 
significant ECT for net foreign investment flows for all four markets confirms the considerable 
influence of foreign investment flow in correcting the short-term deviations in the integration 
process. 
……..Insert Table 9-7 about here, see page 197…… 
 
The Granger causality results are consistent with the price pressure hypothesis suggesting that 
foreign equity investors are mainly responsible for the increase in the stock market valuations in 
the Asian emerging markets. This suggests that the Asian emerging markets may become 
increasingly vulnerable to the shocks in the volume of foreign equity investment flows and thus 
may become more volatile in future. This is a matter of concern to policy makers in emerging 
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markets and, as a consequence some countries have attempted to restrict the speculative 
investment flows in their equity markets.
22
  Our results concerning the price pressure hypothesis 
are similar to those reported by Richards (2005) and much more pronounced than the ones 
documented by Froot et al (2001) for the Asian emerging markets. The results also confirm the 
positive feedback hypothesis since it is clear that returns from emerging markets Granger cause 
the foreign equity investment flows, a finding similar to the ones reported in Froot et al (2001) 
and Bekaert et al (2002). The findings further confirm that foreign investors are high-return 
chasers and extract information from recent returns.  
 
Variance decomposition analysis presented in Table 9-8 shows that in the case of India, a 
significant proportion of domestic return error variance is explained by the world market returns 
and its share of error variance increases over time. In fact, its magnitude of explanation for the 20 
day-ahead forecast variance is equal to 46 % of the proportion explained. For Korea and Taiwan, 
similar results are found which confirm the significant role of global markets in explaining the 
returns in the Korean and Taiwanese markets. For India, the proportion of variance explained by 
the net foreign equity flow is small but increases over time from 3% for 1 day-ahead forecast to 
6% for the 20 day-ahead forecast. The foreign equity flows also seem to explain a large 
proportion of return variance of Taiwanese and the Thai markets. However, they have negligible 
share in explaining the error variance in the case of Korea. Overall, the variance in net foreign 
equity flows is significantly explained by world equity market returns which suggest that external 
shocks may significantly explain the volatility of foreign investments in emerging markets.  
 
……..Insert Table 9-8 about here, see page 198…… 
 
Figure 9-5 to Figure 9-8 present findings of impulse response function analysis. In all cases, a 
unit cumulative innovation in world market returns has a significant and positive impact on the 
returns for all four markets. Innovations in net foreign investment flows also show strong and 
instantaneous effect in all markets. This evidence of contemporaneous price impact is consistent 
                                                 
22  On 16 October 2007, India's stock market regulator proposed restricting the use of offshore participatory notes  
(PNs). PNs are much favoured by foreign investors, especially hedge funds who have been mainly responsible for 
US$90bn investment in PNs. In reaction to this news, the Indian stock market promptly fell by 9 per cent, triggering 
a temporary halt to trading. 
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with the one reported by Richards (2005) and is much stronger than the one documented by Froot 
et al (2001). The second set of figures present the response of net foreign investment flows to the 
lagged returns available in emerging markets as well as lagged investment flows and world 
market returns. The findings confirm the positive feedback hypothesis that foreign investors‟ 
activities are significantly influenced by the returns available in emerging markets. The Granger 
causality of local returns Granger causing flows also supports the feedback hypothesis. 
 
……..Insert Figure 9-5 about here, see page 202…… 
 
……..Insert Figure 9-6 about here, see page 203…… 
 
……..Insert Figure 9-7 about here, see page 204…… 
 
……..Insert Figure 9-8 about here, see page 205…… 
 
9.4 Chapter summary 
We utilize daily net foreign equity portfolio flows, local return and world return index for four 
Asian emerging markets and test the long run equilibrium association and short term dynamic 
relationships.  Using the VECH mechanism we show that momentum and feedback hypotheses 
holds in all the markets and the growing foreign equity investments is leading the linkages of 
Asian markets with global financial markets. The study shows that the trading activities of 
foreign investors may render the local market susceptible to global shocks and may lead to 
greater equity market volatility.  
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Table 9-1: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A  Mean 
 
Median 
 
Maximum 
 
Minimum  Std. Dev. 
 
Skewness 
 
Kurtosis 
 Full Sample (01/01/2001 - 
30/03/2007)             
 Daily Average Net Foreign Equity Portfolio Investment (USD Millions)       
Korea 2.127 0.592 94.176 -91.166 15.180 0.324 8.871 
India 23.764 10.387 776.766 -633.596 73.495 1.709 31.506 
Thailand 2.965 0.000 394.502 -717.012 38.900 -1.879 92.750 
Taiwan 44.109 22.962 654.287 -703.730 147.909 0.062 5.397 
        Daily Total Return (%) 
       Korea 0.115 0.098 9.587 -11.457 1.834 -0.091 5.831 
India 0.091 0.124 8.615 -11.264 1.442 -0.580 8.264 
Thailand 0.100 0.038 11.094 -16.544 1.636 -0.318 11.988 
Taiwan 0.043 0.000 6.524 -6.616 1.602 0.107 4.666 
MSCI World  0.025 0.050 4.713 -3.620 0.859 0.065 5.782 
        Panel B 
       First Sample (01/01/2001 - 
31/12/2003)             
Daily Average Net Foreign Equity Portfolio Investment (USD Millions) 
Korea 2.160 0.592 64.639 -91.166 13.428 -0.384 11.335 
India 9.841 5.183 262.340 -86.639 25.256 2.157 17.828 
Thailand 0.350 -0.111 78.135 -102.278 13.441 0.038 11.343 
Taiwan 33.222 12.701 524.051 -295.647 100.496 0.802 5.087 
        Daily Total Return (%) 
Korea 0.117 0.086 9.587 -11.457 2.089 -0.059 5.117 
India 0.070 0.084 8.615 -11.264 1.433 -0.690 9.405 
Thailand 0.127 0.047 7.813 -5.585 1.674 0.244 4.365 
Taiwan 0.042 -0.029 6.524 -6.616 1.817 0.168 4.024 
MSCI World  0.008 0.045 4.713 -3.620 0.983 0.120 5.013 
        
 
Panel C 
        Second Sample (01/01/2004 - 30/03/2007) 
Daily Average Net Foreign Equity Portfolio Investment (USD Million) 
Korea 2.10 0.56 94.18 -65.26 16.65 0.66 7.39 
India 36.65 27.84 776.77 -633.60 97.32 1.01 19.05 
Thailand 5.39 0.94 394.50 -717.01 52.31 -1.62 54.93 
Taiwan 54.19 36.35 654.29 -703.73 180.53 -0.18 4.28 
        Daily Total Return (%) 
Korea 0.107 0.153 6.370 -7.065 1.420 -0.377 4.933 
India 0.113 0.197 8.615 -11.264 1.517 -0.693 9.867 
Thailand 0.038 0.012 11.094 -16.544 1.580 -1.059 20.949 
Taiwan 0.046 0.021 6.524 -6.616 1.307 -0.313 6.280 
MSCI World  0.055 0.067 2.095 -2.477 0.584 -0.222 4.009 
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Table 9-2: Unconditional correlation between domestic return and world return 
  
Full Sample First Sample Second Sample 
Percent Change in 
Correlation 
        between Two Sub Samples 
Korea 0.248 0.221 0.325 47% 
India 0.192 0.158 0.273 73% 
Thailand 0.173 0.140 0.254 81% 
Taiwan 0.199 0.171 0.272 60% 
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Table 9-3: Unit Root Tests:  Full Sample Period (01/01/2001 - 30/03/2007) 
Panel A:  ADF Test Statistic (Lags 10 and Trend Allowed)   
  Level Data First Difference 
 
Total Return Index 
Net Foreign 
Equity 
Investment 
Total 
Return 
Index 
Net Foreign 
Equity 
Investment 
World -2.116 N/A -12.888 N/A 
India -1.740 -1.574 -12.009 -9.744 
Korea -1.706 -1.221 -12.661 -8.977 
Thailand -2.758 -0.829 -12.342 -8.987 
Taiwan -2.115 -1.436 -13.321 -9.580 
Critical Value (1%)= -3.96 Critical Value (5%)= -3.41       
     
Panel B: Phillip Perron Test Statistic       
World -5.335 N/A -1353.924 N/A 
India -4.500 -1.877 -1499.024 -1549.160 
Korea -8.213 -1.659 -1555.851 -1208.984 
Thailand -0.938 -0.377 -1695.183 -1006.503 
Taiwan -11.234 -2.021 -1655.035 -1013.351 
Critical Value (1%)= -20.50 Critical Value (5%)= -21.80    
     
Panel C: Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin (KPSS)     
World         
Lag 1 15.900 N/A 0.049 N/A 
Lag 10 2.940 N/A 0.050 N/A 
India     
Lag 1 17.500 19.000 0.021 0.340 
Lag 10 3.230 3.470 0.020 0.137 
Korea     
Lag 1 9.510 8.830 0.042 0.344 
Lag 10 1.780 1.610 0.047 0.175 
Thailand     
Lag 1 6.760 16.900 0.037 0.301 
Lag 10 1.270 3.090 0.040 0.126 
Taiwan     
Lag 1 6.890 15.800 0.035 0.116 
Lag 10 1.290 2.890 0.035 0.048 
Critical Value (1%)= 0.216 Critical Value (5%)= 0.146    
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Table 9-4: Cointegration Results - Domestic Return Index and World Return Index 
             Eigenvalues   λtrace test   λmax test 
  r = 0 r ≤ 1   r = 0 r ≤ 1   r = 0 r =1 
Full Sample                 
India 0.015 0.000 
 
24.070* 0.017 
 
24.057* 0.017 
Korea 0.007 0.000 
 
11.805 0.007 
 
11.798 0.007 
Taiwan 0.008 0.003 
 
17.160* 3.378 
 
14.781* 2.378 
Thailand 0.006 0.000   10.847 0.715   10.132 0.715 
         First Sample 
        India 0.006 0.001   5.067 0.686   4.381 0.686 
Korea 0.009 0.002 
 
8.380 1.491 
 
6.889 1.491 
Taiwan 0.007 0.005 
 
8.906 3.671 
 
5.235 3.671 
Thailand 0.006 0.002   6.619 1.891   4.728 1.891 
         Second Sample 
        India 0.021 0.000   17.905* 0.004   17.901* 0.004 
Korea 0.004 0.000 
 
3.015 0.010 
 
3.005 0.010 
Taiwan 0.019 0.000 
 
16.544* 0.000 
 
16.544* 0.000 
Thailand 0.010 0.000   8.876 0.056   8.819 0.056 
         
  Critical Value at 95%   15.495 3.841   14.265 3.841 
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Table 9-5: Trivariate Cointegration Test (Net Foreign Equity Trading, Domestic and World Return Index) 
  Eigenvalues   λtrace Test   λmax Test 
  r = 0 r ≤ 1 r ≤ 3   r = 0 r ≤ 1 r ≤ 3   r = 0 r = 1 r = 3 
Full Sample                       
India 0.022 0.004 0.000   43.864* 7.332 0.009   36.533* 7.323 0.009 
Korea 0.015 0.004 0.000 
 
30.695* 6.511 0.569 
 
24.184* 5.942 0.569 
Taiwan 0.037 0.007 0.000 
 
72.363* 11.842 0.033 
 
60.521* 11.809 0.033 
Thailand 0.022 0.005 0.000   44.575* 8.493 0.536   36.082* 7.956 0.536 
 
    
  
   
  
  First Sample 
    
  
   
  
  India 0.0788 0.0119 0.0041   76.332* 12.4826 3.1876   63.849* 9.2949 3.1876 
Korea 0.0355 0.0221 0.0000 
 
45.845* 14.5636 0.0482 
 
28.281* 17.5155 0.0482 
Taiwan 0.0340 0.0082 0.0013 
 
34.336* 7.4521 1.0375 
 
26.884* 6.4146 1.0375 
Thailand 0.0321 0.0087 0.0022 
 
33.914* 8.5023 1.6744 
 
25.411* 6.8278 1.6744 
     
  
   
  
  Second Sample 
   
  
   
  
  India 0.0270 0.0206 0.0006   41.188* 18.047* 0.4747   23.140* 17.573* 0.4747 
Korea 0.0340 0.0036 0.0000 
 
32.347* 3.0590 0.0401 
 
29.287* 3.0180 0.0401 
Taiwan 0.0272 0.0215 0.0002 
 
41.854* 18.537* 0.1380 
 
23.317* 18.398* 0.1380 
Thailand 0.0822 0.0231 0.0003 
 
92.567* 19.961* 0.2199 
 
72.605* 19.741* 0.2199 
  Critical values at 95%   29.80 15.49 3.84   21.13162 14.2646 3.841466 
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Table 9-6: Final Cointegration Result of local return with 
Full Sample - 01/01/2001 - 30/03/2007 
  
World Return 
Index   
World Return Index and Net Foreign Equity 
Purchase 
India One 
 
One 
Korea None 
 
One 
Taiwan One 
 
One 
Thailand None 
 
One 
    First Sample - 01/01/2001 - 31/12/2003 
  
World Return 
Index   
World Return Index and Net Foreign Equity 
Purchase 
India None 
 
One 
Korea None 
 
One 
Taiwan None 
 
One 
Thailand None 
 
One 
    Second Sample - 01/01/2004 - 30/03/2007 
  
World Return 
Index   
World Return Index and Net Foreign Equity 
Purchase 
India One   Two 
Korea None 
 
One 
Taiwan One 
 
Two 
Thailand None   Two 
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Table 9-7: Granger Causality and ECM Result (Full Sample) 
  Total Return Index Net Foreign Equity Investment   
  World  India  Korea  Taiwan  Thailand  India  Korea  Taiwan  Thailand  ECTt-I  
 
          
World Return Index 
 
62.97* 211.39* 186.12* 70.79* 35.32* 82.52* 196.92* 73.19* 
 India Return Index 1.42 
    
62.43* 
   
-0.0007* 
Korea Return Index 3.51 
     
37.43* 
  
1.46 
Taiwan Return Index 4.23 
      
25.16* 
 
0.00 
Thailand Return Index 3.15 
       
40.35* 0.0027* 
India - Foreign Investment 0.84 8.20* 
       
0.0004* 
Korea - Foreign Investment 0.59 
 
4.5 
      
5.48* 
Taiwan - Foreign Investment 2.55 
  
12.57* 
     
0.0118* 
Thailand - Foreign Investment 0.01 
   
5.55** 
    
-0.045* 
                      
* (**) Indicates Significance of the Chi-Square (t-for ECT) Statistic at 95% (90% ) 
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Table 9-8: Variance Decomposition 
Period World Return 
Domestic 
Return 
Net Equity 
Investment World Return Domestic Return 
Net Equity 
Investment 
India Korea 
 
Domestic Return Domestic Return 
1 5.665 90.691 3.644 8.192 91.808 0.000 
5 33.461 61.493 5.047 39.096 60.790 0.114 
10 40.398 53.706 5.896 42.391 57.525 0.084 
15 44.113 49.748 6.139 43.403 56.527 0.069 
20 46.911 46.872 6.218 43.871 56.069 0.059 
       
 
Net Foreign Equity Investment Net Foreign Equity Investment 
1 0.144 0.000 99.856 0.161 0.509 99.330 
5 11.176 1.521 87.302 12.296 8.885 78.819 
10 14.241 2.192 83.567 16.894 10.473 72.633 
15 14.681 2.865 82.454 18.457 11.770 69.773 
20 14.583 3.549 81.867 19.373 13.043 67.584 
       
 
World Return  World Return  
1 100.000 0.000 0.000 100.000 0.000 0.000 
5 99.932 0.020 0.048 99.931 0.030 0.039 
10 99.904 0.071 0.025 99.912 0.027 0.061 
15 99.813 0.170 0.017 99.907 0.025 0.067 
20 99.684 0.303 0.013 99.906 0.024 0.070 
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Cont. Table 9.8 
        Taiwan Thailand 
       
 
Domestic Return Domestic Return 
1 3.086 83.380 13.534 2.343 76.666 20.991 
5 24.010 60.100 15.890 12.156 71.207 16.637 
10 26.701 57.000 16.299 13.779 69.641 16.580 
15 27.561 56.002 16.437 14.411 69.039 16.551 
20 27.982 55.511 16.508 14.803 68.700 16.497 
       
 
Net Foreign Equity Investment Net Foreign Equity Investment 
1 0.577 0.000 99.423 0.140 0.000 99.860 
5 15.172 0.873 83.955 4.573 1.329 94.098 
10 18.767 1.093 80.140 5.396 1.553 93.051 
15 20.948 1.241 77.811 5.613 1.650 92.738 
20 22.836 1.375 75.789 5.688 1.717 92.595 
       
 
World Return  World Return  
1 100.000 0.000 0.000 100.000 0.000 0.000 
5 99.939 0.014 0.046 99.727 0.260 0.013 
10 99.954 0.020 0.026 99.722 0.270 0.008 
15 99.950 0.026 0.024 99.756 0.237 0.006 
20 99.938 0.032 0.030 99.790 0.201 0.009 
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Figure 9-1: Rolling Correlation between Indian Domestic Return and World Return 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9-2: Rolling Correlation between Korean Domestic Return and World Return 
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Figure 9-3: Rolling Correlation between Taiwanese Domestic Return and World Return 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9-4: Rolling Correlation between Thai Domestic Return and World Return 
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Figure 9-5: Impulse Response Function – India 
 
 
 
 
Response of Domestic Returns to lags of: 
 
 Own Lags        Net Foreign Investments          Return on World Market 
 
 
 
Response of Net Foreign Investments to lags of: 
 
  Domestic Returns    Own Lags        Return on World Market 
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Figure 9-6: Impulse Response Function – South Korea 
 
 
 
 
Response of Domestic Returns to lags of: 
 
   Own Lags          Net Foreign Investments             Return on World Market 
 
 
Response of Net Foreign Investments to lags of: 
 
              Domestic Returns       Own Lags               Return on World Market 
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Figure 9-7: Impulse Response Function – Thailand 
 
 
 
Response of Domestic Returns to lags of: 
 
       Own Lags              Net Foreign Investments     Return on World Market 
 
 
 
Response of Net Foreign Investments to lags of: 
 
         Domestic Returns         Own Lags                        Return on World Market 
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Figure 9-8: Impulse Response Function – Taiwan 
 
 
 
 
Response of Domestic Returns to lags of: 
 
              Own Lags     Net Foreign Investments       Return on World Market 
 
 
 
Response of Net Foreign Investments to lags of: 
 
  Domestic Returns    Own Lags       Return on World Market 
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Chapter 10 Summary, conclusion and limitations 
 
10.1 Introduction 
This thesis comprises four empirical studies (chapters 6-9). In the following sections we report 
summary of first three empirical studies along with the final regression specification of foreign 
equity portfolio holdings (FEPH). The first three empirical chapters (6-8) examine various 
hypotheses examing the determinants of FEPH? The fourth empirical study demonstrates the 
impact of foreign equity portfolio flows on global financial linkages of four Asian emerging 
markets (chapter 9). We conclude the chapter with brief discussion of key contribution, policy 
recommendations, limitation of the study and suggest future research direction. 
 
10.2 Summary and conclusion: Determinants of global foreign equity portfolio holdings 
Errunza (2001) argues that growth in foreign equity portfolio investment plays a pivotal role in 
the development of local capital markets. There is overwhelming evidence in support of the 
contribution of foreign equity portfolio investment in efficient risk sharing and resource 
allocation, mobilization and improvement in the overall structure of external finance, and 
development of domestic capital markets. These developments and growing financial 
globalization reduce the cost of capital, which in turn, further leads to favourable evaluation of 
investment projects and ultimately promotes economic welfare.  
 
Given the importance of foreign equity portfolio investments, as discussed above, our study 
aims to answer the question: What determines the cross-country and temporal variation of 
foreign equity portfolio holdings?  In other words, why investors choose to hold higher 
volumes of equity portfolio investments in certain countries and lower in others?  
 
Following Markowitz‟s (1952) portfolio optimization framework it is widely recognised that 
international diversification of equity portfolios offer potential gain via risk reduction (Grubel, 
1968; Levy and Sarnat, 1970; Solnik, 1974; Grauer and Hakansson, 1987; Errunza, 1988 and 
DeSantis and Gerard, 1997).  Although few studies (Jorion, 1985; Farragher and Hui, 1985 and 
Goetxmann et al., 2001) argue that diversification benefits are not as pronounced as indicated 
in the earlier literature there is a general agreement that international investments offer 
significant benefits. If investments in foreign equities offers the benefit of diversification then 
what is the optimal level of foreign equity portfolio that should be held in domestic portfolio? 
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Motivated by the extension of domestic capital asset pricing model of Sharpe (1964), Lintner 
(1965) and Mossin (1966) in international setting, International Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(ICAPM) suggests that every investor should hold the world market portfolio. However, a 
number of theoretical models (Alder and Dumas, 1983; Solnik, 1974b; Cooper and Kaplanis, 
1986, 1994 and Stulz, 2005) illustrate why investors may not follow the suggestion of ICAPM. 
Most of the equilibrium models attack the unrealistic assumptions of ICAPM which assumes 
that markets are perfectly integrated and fully efficient, purchasing power parity holds, no 
transaction costs, and there are no barriers to international investments. The theoretical models 
demonstrate that the presence of market frictions/barriers, such as real exchange rate risk, 
market inefficiency, illiquidity, institutional risk, information asymmetry etc. invalidates 
ICAPM and investor may therefore deviate from holding the world market portfolio.  Cooper 
and Kaplanis (1986) demonstrate how the presence of deadweight costs, potentially generated 
by barriers/market frictions to international investments, may restrict foreign investors in 
holding the world market portfolio (please see chapter 2 for detail explanation of the model).  
 
On the empirical front, several studies explain the phenomenon of home bias (tendency to 
overweight home markets contrary to ICAPM prescription), particularly using survey and U.S. 
equity portfolio data. A number of factors have been suggested to explain home bias, including 
information asymmetry, behavioural factors and institutional factors.  In view of the extensive 
assessment of extant literature only few studies (two to the best of our knowledge) have 
modelled the bilateral cross-country foreign equity portfolio holdings (FEPH) on a global basis. 
One of the reasons cited for scant studies in modelling of FEPH is the lack of high quality and 
comprehensive bilateral cross-country equity holding data (Chan et. al., 2005). We make use of 
bilateral cross-country equity holding data recently available by the Co-ordinated Portfolio 
Investment Survey (CPIS) of International Monetary Fund. Our study uses a comprehensive 
panel data set on 36 host countries with bilateral investments from 16 source countries for a 
period of 6 years (2001-2006). We are able to exploit over 500 cross sectional units yielding 
over 3000 observations and make important contributions by extending the sparse literature of 
modelling FEPH (see Chapter 2, section 2.8 for details).  Drawing on the theoretical and 
empirical literature we construct an estimate of country level foreign equity portfolio allocation 
(FEPA) and investigate the role of different factors explaining cross sectional and temporal 
variation of FEPA. Based on the theoretical framework of Cooper and Kaplanis (1986) we 
identify various factors which could explain the country allocation of foreign investors and test 
a number of hypotheses (see Chapter 3 for details on hypotheses development). Unlike 
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previous studies (except Gelos and Wei, 2005) which use cross-section models, we test all our 
hypotheses using  relatively more efficient random effect and more robust fixed effect panel 
data models. 
 
The first set of hypotheses demonstrates the association between transaction cost and FEPA 
(see chapter 6). We use handpicked data on three different components of transaction costs 
(commission, fees and market impact) from S&P stock market fact books and test whether the 
three components of transaction explains FEPA (see Chapter 6). To the best of our knowledge 
we are first to comprehensively test the role of each of the components individually and 
collectively in modelling FEPA. We undertake a number of sensitivity analyses in our 
regressions and address issues such as omitted variable bias, unit specific effect, reverse 
causality, free float home bias, effect of major financial centres and between effect estimations. 
The results show strong and robust effect of transaction costs with clear evidence that foreign 
investors tend to underweight countries with higher transaction costs. 
 
The second set of hypotheses investigates the role of country specific equity market 
characteristics (CSEMC) explaining FEPA (see Chapter 7). We use stock market 
development/size, market liquidity, emerging market dummy, equity return volatility and 
exchange rate volatility to proxy the effect of CSEMC. We are first to use the two volatility 
measures in modelling FEPA and justify their inclusion with strong theoretical arguments (see 
chapter 3, section 3.2.4 and 3.2.5). Tackling different robustness issues the results show that all 
CSEMC factors tend to have strong and statistically significant effect on the foreign equity 
portfolio allocation decisions of foreign investors. 
 
The third set of hypotheses examines the relationship between investor protection and FEPA. 
The existing findings on the role of investor protection are highly controversial with divided 
views and contrasting conclusions. Most of the investor protection measures used in the 
literature lack time dimensions. Within the framework of panel data set and following Bekaert 
et al., (2007) we include the ICRG‟s investment profile index to capture the features of investor 
protection risk specifically reflecting the government‟s attitude towards foreign investment. We 
also use ICRG‟s quality of institution index to represent a measure of investor protection 
signifying the quality of broad based country specific regulatory environment. Finally, 
following La Porta et al., (1997, 1998, 2000), who show that countries following Common 
English Law are better at instituting and enforcing investor protection rights,  we  use a dummy 
                
209 
 
which takes value of one if a country follows Common English Law and zero otherwise (see 
Chapter 8). 
 
Our results show that investment profile and English common law dummy are highly 
statistically significant across all specifications. However, quality of institution is not able to 
stand different robustness tests  implying foreign investors may not be interested in the broad 
based general investor protection right measure index rather they are more concerned about the 
regulatory framework which directly affects their investments (see section 3.5 of chapter 3 for 
the argument). 
 
After testing hypotheses in the most robust and efficient way we are able to suggest on a final 
regression specification as shown in Table 10-1. We look at the magnitude of the R
2
 across 
different regression specifications providing an indication of the relative explanatory powers of 
the different groups of regressors. The results presented in Table 10-1 not only shows the final 
best fitted specification but it also signals the relative importance of transaction cost measures 
(specification 2, column 3), country specific equity market characteristics (specification 3, 
column 4), investor protection right measures (specification 4, column 5) and the control 
variables (final specification, column 6). Specification 1 (column 2) shows regression results 
including only the home bias measure. As expected, it is highly significant and alone explains 
almost 13% of the total variation in FEPA. Next we include the transaction cost measures 
(TC1, TC2 and TC3) and the results demonstrate that not only all transaction cost measures are 
statistically significant at the conventional 5% level but also the overall R
2
 improves by 23%. 
We would like to add a caveat for using the R
2
 metric because there is difference between the 
sample sizes of both specifications. However, since the difference is not substantial we believe 
that the comparative R
2
 measure is justified.  
 
……..Insert Table 10-1about here, see page 214…… 
 
Addition of country specific equity market characteristics (CSEMC) further significantly 
improves adequacy of the model by almost 30% indicating CSEMC as the most significant 
features influencing the decision of foreign investors. The results are also consistent with 
previous studies (Chan et al., 2005). Similarly, the addition of investor protection rights further 
augments the fitness of the model by 4%. Although statistically significant, investor protection 
measures are relatively not as important as the transaction cost and CSEMC measures. The 
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addition of control variables and time dummies further adds value in explaining the FEPA by 
improving the R
2
 to almost 86%. 
 
In light of the reported results of our first three empirical studies, we conclude that among 
others, CSEMC, including transaction cost and volatility measures are the most important 
factors influencing foreign investors‟ country allocation decision. It appears investors are more 
inclined to invest in markets, which are more developed in terms of market capitalization, 
highly liquid with lower transaction costs, relatively more efficient in terms of information 
disclosure and have sound and efficient country level corporate governance culture.  
 
10.3 Summary and conclusion: Impact of foreign equity flows on global financial 
linkages of four Asian emerging markets. 
Our final study demonstrates the impact of net foreign equity flows on global linkages of four 
Asian emerging markets (chapter 9). The issue of destabilizing effect of foreign equity 
investment flows for the emerging markets are debatable (see chapter one, section 1.3.3) with 
divided conclusions. Given the limitation of data availability on net equity portfolio flows we 
use daily net foreign equity investment flows and stock index return available for four Asian 
emerging markets of India, Korea, Taiwan and Thailand for 2001-2007. Our study uses a 
number of variants of VEC model for examining the long-run equilibrium relationship and shor- 
run dynamics of flows with local equity markets.  
 
The findings suggest that greater integration of the Asian emerging markets with global equity 
markets appears to be influenced by the increasing investments of foreign investors. Analysis of 
short-run impact confirms that the global markets have a significant causal effect on equity 
returns of all four emerging markets. More notable is the finding that foreign equity investment 
flows play a significant role in correcting the short-term deviations in the convergence process 
of Asian emerging equity markets with the global equity markets. Whilst the results are 
consistent with previous research, we find stronger evidence for positive feedback hypothesis 
for all four markets. The results support the widely-held view that foreign investors are return 
chasers and their trading behaviour in emerging markets is based on information drawn from 
recent returns. The results also confirm the price-pressure hypothesis suggesting foreign equity 
investors are mainly responsible for the increases in the stock market valuations in the Asian 
emerging markets. In view of the empirical evidence presented in this study, the Asian 
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emerging markets may become increasingly vulnerable to shocks in the volume and pace of 
foreign equity investment flows and turn more volatile in future.  
 
10.4 Key contribution 
We have claimed the academic contributions of each empirical study in the previous chapters. 
Here we briefly discuss the core contribution of our study extending the literature on foreign 
equity portfolio investment. 
 
One of the important contributions of this study is that it offers useful insights in explaining 
why foreign investors do not comply with the normative predictions of the International Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (ICAPM). As discussed earlier in the thesis, the ICAPM suggests that each 
investor should hold the world market portfolio. However, there is scant literature on whether 
the theoretical predictions of ICAPM empirically hold.  Although a number of alternative 
theoretical models have emerged over time, the empirical evidence suggesting key factors that 
cause investors to deviate from holding the world market portfolio is rather limited. One of the 
key reasons for the lack of studies is the non-availability of high quality data.  With the help of 
recently available high quality data and a thorough econometric analysis, this study highlights a 
number of direct and indirect barriers creating deadweight costs for foreign investors in holding 
the equity portfolio of a particular country. The findings show how the different barriers to 
foreign investments explain the cross-sectional and temporal variations in foreign equity 
portfolio allocations.  
 
The theoretical implications of the study are profound. The ICAPM does not hold in practice 
because a number of underlying assumptions do not hold when tested with real data. The thesis 
demonstrates that though ICAPM is a good starting point it is an inadequate model for 
explaining the equity portfolio allocation decisions of foreign investors.  
 
10.5 Policy recommendation 
It is evident that foreign investments in the local equity markets have positive impact in 
developing the local equity markets. However, foreign investors may also have adverse effects, 
as seen during the 1994 Mexican and 1997 South Asian crises. If capital market infrastructure, 
information disclosure climate and investor protection institutions are weak, investors may be 
tempted to withdraw their investment at the slightest sign of trouble in emerging markets (see 
Gelos and Wei, 2005). Investors may follow momentum strategy and at the slightest hint of 
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negative news may divest their investment in absence of transparent, reliable and developed 
market infrastructure. The presence of weak, underdeveloped and opaque market infrastructure 
may further lead to herding behaviour (Gelos and Wei, 2002). Such irrational trading attitude 
may have significant and damaging impact on the country‟s exchange rate, complicate 
monetary policy, and may consequently have severe destabilising effect, i.e. increase the 
volatility of equity markets. These effects may be particularly severe if the local equity markets 
exhibit the prevalence of strong price-pressure effect. Based on the results of our four empirical 
chapters we offer the following policy recommendations: 
 
First and most importantly, countries should create an environment that should attract (and 
retain) foreign equity portfolio investment on a permanent basis. National policy makers, 
particularly in emerging markets, should take necessary measures to develop their local capital 
markets. Policy makers should undertake and implement regulatory reforms to ensure their local 
market grows in size and level of development providing enough diversification opportunities 
and adequate liquidity at low cost. Similarly, the reforms must ensure that the market is efficient 
enough for disseminating timely, reliable and adequate information. Such effort also has 
positive impact on market microstructure environment of efficient price discovery process and 
reduces the excess volatility. Trading mechanism should be as cost effective as possible 
diminishing risk premium for investor, which in turn, further increases the valuation of local 
equities.  Furthermore, a good corporate governance culture protecting the rights of foreign 
investors is also a prerequisite. National policy makers should create an environment of 
efficiently enforcing property rights contracts and ensuring smooth repatriation and payment 
process.  
 
Conclusively, commitments to improve the above mentioned preconditions necessary for well-
functioning markets are pivotal, particularly during period of distressed conditions so as to 
ensure that foreign investors trade rationally and avoid following irrational momentum and 
herding behaviour. 
 
10.6 Limitation and future research  
Although we have made efforts to ensure our study is as robust as possible there are some 
limitations worth mentioning. One of the shortcomings is the unavailability of data on frontier 
equity markets. Despite the fact that we have used a comprehensive set of countries (36 in 
total), the addition of so called frontier markets such as Vietnam, Bangladesh, Middle East 
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countries etc. could have made our study more robust and efficient. As in other studies, lack of 
adequate data compelled us to exploit emerging and developed markets only. However, with 36 
counties we have been able to ensure enough variation (temporal and cross sectional) to test our 
hypotheses using the best possible robust and efficient panel data methods. 
 
Intuitively, transaction cost and other measures used in our study should also affect portfolio 
flows. However, the actual portfolio flow data is not available. We find that the proxy portfolio 
flow constructed by taking the first difference of the holdings data do not fully reflect actual 
flows since the change may be caused by changes in valuation of the holdings over time. 
Fidora et al., (2007) uses the same data set for 2001-2003 in studying home bias and note “… 
changes over time are very small and mainly reflect valuation changes rather than cross-border 
investment flows….(p.643)”.  Consequently, it is not surprising that none of the variables are 
able to explain the proxy portfolio flows based on the first difference of the holdings data. 
 
We have not undertaken a range of empirical possibilities given the comprehensive data set, 
such as regional/country differences in terms of average allocation as well as time and cross 
sectional variation of the slope coefficients for each of the variables used. We contemplate to 
undertake the possibilities of such studies in near future. Similarly, we also intent to conduct a 
primary research surveying global fund managers operating in U.K.  Finally, most of our studies 
only focus on the determinant side (except the fourth empirical study). In view of extensive 
review of the existing literature there is immense scope for testing various hypotheses looking at 
the impact of foreign equity portfolio allocations. It will be particularly interesting to test 
various theoretical hypotheses focussing on the impact of foreign equity portfolio investments 
on stock market development, cost of capital, market liquidity, investor protection and bilateral 
information asymmetry. 
 
10.7 Dissemination of research 
In terms of disseminating our research to a wider academic community, we have developed 
four empirical papers. Three of the papers have been published in peer reviewed journals with 
the fourth one under review with a journal of international standing. Please see appendix A for 
details. 
 
                
214 
 
Table 10-1: Relative importance of key variables and final regression specification of Foreign Equity Portfolio Holdings 
 
The dependent variable (wi,j,t) is the log value of country wise bilateral foreign portfolio allocation from country i in country j at time t. The first set of key independent 
variables of interest are three Transaction Costs (in basis points and scaled by 100) include TC1 (commission) TC2 (fees) and TC3 (market impact). The second set of key 
independent variables of interest are the five measures of country specific equity market variables (CSEMC), which includes stock market development/size, market liquidity, 
emerging market dummy, equity market volatility and exchange rate volatility. The final set of factors of interest are  investor protection measures which includes investor 
profile (IPI), quality of institution (IPII) and English common law dummy (IPII).  
 
 
The controls are bilateral home bias (Hbias), country financial risk (components are: foreign debt as % of GDP, exchange rate stability, foreign debt as % of total export and 
services, current account as % of exports and services and international liquidity), country economic risk (components are: GDP per head, Real GDP growth, inflation rate, 
budget balance as % of GDP, current account as % of GDP), capital control measures - equity market openness, closely held firms factor and bilateral information asymmetry 
variables bilateral trade, common (pair countries) language dummy (pair countries), log distance between capital cities of the pair countries,. Regressions estimated using 
random effect model. The models are estimated using random effect estimation method. 
 
 
                                                             
 
 
Specification 1 only includes home bias. 
Specification 2 includes home bias and all the transaction cost measures. 
Specification 3 includes home bias, all transaction cost measures and CSEMC variables. 
Specification 4 includes home bias, all transaction cost measures, CSEMC variables and investor protection measures. 
Final specification includes home bias, all transaction cost measures, CSEMC variables, investor protection measures and all other controls including time dummies. 
 
 
Test-statistics are given in parentheses (based on robust standard error (SE) allowing for clustering within the bilateral asset allocation i.e. cluster adjusted SE corrected for 
arbitrary heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation). All the coefficients are interpreted as elasticity. Significant coefficients are indicated with * denoting significance at 10%, 
** at 5% and *** at 1%. 
 
 Specification 1  
(Home Bias) 
Specification 2  
(Transaction Cost) 
Specification 3 
(CSEMC) 
Specification 4  
(Investor protection) 
Final 
Specification 
HBias -0.887 -0.888*** -0.934*** -0.940*** -0.932*** 
 (-51.88) (-46.96) (-82.22) (-82.48) (-97.10) 
      
TC1(commission)  -3.418*** -1.130*** -1.111*** -0.769*** 
  (-15.11) (-8.39) (-8.11) (-6.44) 
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TC2 (Fees)  -0.377 -0.713*** -0.774*** -0.970*** 
  (-0.82) (-2.86) (-3.12) (-4.73) 
      
TC3(Market Impact)  -0.684*** -0.653*** -0.534*** -0.481*** 
  (-5.77) (-6.06) (-5.17) (-4.42) 
      
Stock market development/size   0.785*** 0.764*** 0.695*** 
   (42.54) (40.35) (32.32) 
      
Liquidity   9.591*** 10.97*** 11.95*** 
   (4.91) (5.61) (6.22) 
      
Emerging market dummy   -2.349*** -2.201*** -0.983*** 
   (-25.61) (-24.06) (-12.94) 
      
Equity market volatility   -0.134*** -0.136*** -0.137*** 
   (-6.04) (-6.20) (-5.64) 
      
Exchange rate volatility   -3.389*** -3.326*** -2.230*** 
   (-10.94) (-11.03) (-7.04) 
      
Investor protection (investment profile)    5.304*** 2.497*** 
    (6.27) (3.10) 
      
English common law dummy    0.323*** 0.298*** 
    (3.43) (3.91) 
      
Financial policy risk     0.703*** 
     (4.16) 
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Economic policy risk     0.229** 
     (2.11) 
      
Equity market openness     1.717*** 
     (11.32) 
      
Closely held firm     -2.704*** 
     (-15.47) 
      
Common language     0.385*** 
     (5.34) 
      
Bilateral trade     2.618*** 
     (16.11) 
      
Distance     -0.118*** 
     (-3.71) 
      
Time fixed effects     Yes 
      
Overall R
2
 0.128 0.355 0.659 0.695 0.863 
Number of observations 3196 2917 2917 2917 2917 
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Appendix: Dissemination of research 
 
Peer reviewed publications (co-authored with Prof. Sunil Poshakwale)  
 
 
1. International equity portfolio allocations and transaction costs, Journal of Banking and 
Finance, 34, 11, 2627 – 2638. 
 
2. The Impact of foreign investment flows on global linkages of the Asian emerging equity 
markets (2009), Applied Financial Economics, 19, 22,1787 - 1802 
 
3. Foreign investors and global integration of Indian equity market (2010), Journal of Emerging 
              Markets Finance, 9, 1, 1- 24 
 
 
 
Paper under review 
 
1. Investor protection and foreign equity portfolio holdings (Global Finance Journal) 
 
Stage: First round review 
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